

Trade Liberalization, Growth, and FDI: A Structural Estimation Framework*

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Abstract

We develop a structural framework that accounts for and decomposes the relationships between trade, growth (physical capital accumulation), and foreign direct investment (FDI). As a byproduct, our theory delivers an intuitive FDI-gravity system that translates into a familiar estimating gravity equation. The FDI-gravity estimates are similar to the corresponding trade indexes, however, we also document some notable differences between them. A counterfactual experiment simulating the effects of trade liberalization between Canada and the European Union demonstrates the effectiveness and the capabilities of our framework.

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1 Introduction: Motivation and Contributions

Over the past quarter century, the world has witnessed an unprecedented wave of globalization efforts that often took the form of regional trade and deeper integration agreements. Such agreements have increased in number, in size, and, importantly, in scope, with many additional chapters and provisions for deeper economic integration among members. Promoting foreign direct investment (FDI) and removing the barriers to FDI have been central items in the negotiations of some of the largest integration agreements in recent years including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Policy makers and academics alike see high potential and promise that such agreements will not only liberalize trade but also facilitate FDI. For example, on the policy side, EU analysts and policy makers hope that TTIP will “liberalise trade and investment between the EU and the US and will result in more jobs and growth and assist Europe in its long-term recovery from the economic crisis.”¹ The role of foreign investment and the expectations for a positive impact of FDI was even more prominent during the negotiations of the Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union, where one of the main goals was the removal and/or alleviation of barriers to foreign investment among members in both Canada and the EU. Specifically, the agreement assures that all European investors in Canada and all Canadian investors in Europe would be treated equally and fairly.² Academics share the hopes for positive impact of integration agreements on welfare through FDI. “If successfully negotiated, [TTIP and TPP] would deepen and strengthen ties with many of the most significant U.S. economic partners. A large majority of inward FDI in the United States already originates from TTIP and TPP countries, making these deals particularly important in the broader effort to recruit global business investment.” (p. 3, Slaughter, 2013). Despite the great expectations for the effects of integration efforts on FDI and the significant interest in the links between trade liberalization and FDI, there is little convincing quantitative evidence for the economic importance, causality, and robustness of such relationships. We propose to fill this gap by making the following contributions to the existing literature.

We develop a structural dynamic framework that accounts for and decomposes the relationships between trade, growth (physical capital accumulation), and foreign direct investment (FDI). Our theoretical model belongs to the class of the new quantitative trade models (see for a very good overview Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2014). The key innovation being the introduction of FDI, which is modeled here as a non-rival factor of production subject to dynamic accumulation. These novel features (non-rivalry and dynamics) lead to new insights for the effects of trade liberalization on trade, growth, and welfare. Our theory is developed in Section 3. While we were not able to obtain a closed form solution for our dynamic theoretical model, we were able to characterize analytically the steady-state equi-

¹Press release, Brussels, 28 January 2014, EU-US Trade Talks: EU and US announce 4th round of TTIP negotiations in March; stocktaking meeting in Washington D.C. to precede next set of talks; available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1020>.

²See <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/>. Importantly, CETA is the first EU trade agreement that also covers foreign direct investment, which only became possible recently due to investment competence that the EU gained under the Lisbon Treaty (Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU).

librium. We capitalize on the clear and tractable structural links in our framework to offer a discussion of the effects of trade liberalization in a hypothetical scenario that is presented in Section 3.2. As an important byproduct, our theory delivers an intuitive FDI-gravity system that links bilateral FDI to the sizes of the host and the origin countries, to bilateral FDI frictions, and to changes in international trade costs, which are consistently aggregated in our model via the trade multilateral resistances. The multilateral resistance term captures the trade and FDI diversion effects of preferential liberalization. We present the FDI-gravity system in Section 3.3.

Our structural system translates into three structural empirical equations. First, it delivers a standard trade gravity system à la Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Second, it delivers an estimating FDI-gravity empirical equation. In combination, these two gravity equations deliver empirical estimates of trade costs and FDI frictions, respectively, including estimates of the effects of regional trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties on both trade flows and foreign direct investment. Third, in addition to the gravity-type estimating equations, we also obtain a structural estimating equation for income as a function of standard determinants, such as capital, labor and TFP, as well as novel structural terms, including FDI and trade openness. We discuss and develop the empirical specifications that result from our theory in Section 4.

We estimate our gravity equations using the latest techniques from the trade gravity literature and with novel panel FDI data covering 89 countries and spanning over the period 1990-2011. We describe our data in detail in Section 5. Our results demonstrate that the trade- and FDI-gravity specifications work well and that they deliver good fit and plausible trade costs and FDI frictions estimates, respectively. However, we also document some important differences between the gravity estimates for trade and for FDI. FDI-gravity estimation results are presented in Section 6. Additionally, our income equation delivers key structural parameters needed for our counterfactual analysis. Importantly, as demonstrated in Section 6.3, our structural estimating equation enables us to establish a causal impact of FDI on income and to quantify this effect.

In Section 7, we perform a counterfactual experiment simulating the effects of trade liberalization between Canada and the European Union. Due to lack of sensitivity experiments and some caveats, which we discuss in Section 7.5, the counterfactual results from this paper should not be interpreted as definitive policy outcomes but rather as a proof of concept that demonstrates the effectiveness and the capabilities of our framework.

We believe that, in combination, the richness, the simplicity, and the tractability of the methods and analysis developed in this paper make our framework an attractive tool for policy analysis and invite further extensions. In what follows, we offer more details for our methods and results associated with the above-mentioned contributions. For each main development we also offer a paragraph describing the specific implications and results for Canada.

2 Non-technical Summary

The objective of our theory is to provide a clear micro-foundation for the relationships between trade, growth and FDI within a tractable structural framework with tight connection

to the data. In order to achieve these goals, we characterize a multi-country world, where each country produces only one good. Goods are differentiated by place of origin (Armington, 1969) and, due to love-of-variety of consumers, countries exchange those goods. Thus, on the trade side, our model fits within the wide class of new quantitative models described in detail by Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014). The key novelty in our theory comes on the supply side, where, in addition to labor and physical capital, which are modeled following Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b), production uses foreign direct investment. In the spirit of McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010), FDI takes the form of technology capital. Corresponding to this production function, representative agents in our model not only work and consume, but also invest in physical capital and in technology capital. Investments in physical capital increase only the domestic stock of physical capital. However, technology capital is non-rival, i.e. a country can use its technology capital not only at home but at the same time in all other countries in the world.³ This is the reason why McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010) use the notion of technology capital to model foreign direct investment (FDI).⁴

The introduction of FDI and its dynamic and non-rival nature in our model uncover novel structural links for the effects of trade liberalization on trade, growth and welfare. While we were not able to obtain a closed form solution for our dynamic theoretical model, we were able to characterize analytically the steady-state equilibrium as a system of eight equations that govern the evolution of bilateral trade flows, production, capital accumulation and foreign direct investment. A nice feature of our system is that it nests as special cases the famous structural gravity system of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and the dynamic growth-and-trade system of Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b). Capitalizing on the relationships that have already been documented in those models, enables us to focus on the novel links between trade liberalization and FDI, which highlight the key contributions of our theory.

Trade liberalization affects FDI via two channels. First, changes in trade costs lead to changes in expenditure, which determines the value of marginal product, i.e. earnings, of FDI and, therefore, directly affects investment in technology capital. The second link between trade and FDI is via the multilateral resistances, which in our model capture the effects of changes in trade costs on consumer prices (inward multilateral resistance, IMR), and on producer prices (outward multilateral resistance, OMR). Theory predicts that FDI should be inversely related to the inward multilateral resistance, i.e. higher prices of consumer and investment goods in the country of origin will lead to less FDI. The intuition is that the IMRs capture the direct and the opportunity costs of investment in technology capital. To the extent that trade liberalization leads to increased expenditure and to lower inward multilateral resistance, our model predicts that lower trade costs between two members will

³The interpretation of technology capital is therefore akin to the notion of knowledge capital (see for example Markusen, 2002). One can think about technology capital as patents, blue-prints, management skills/practices, etc.

⁴Our choice of modeling FDI is consistent with and also complementary to existing FDI theories. For example, our model is consistent with the setup from Head and Ries (2008). The reason for FDI in their framework is value-added by the headquarters, while the reason for FDI in our setup is technology transfer. Bergstrand and Egger (2007, 2010) also allow for two types of capital, physical capital and knowledge capital. However, their framework is static, does not provide accumulation functions for the capital stocks, and does not lead to analytical gravity equation specifications.

stimulate the accumulation of technology capital in the liberalizing countries. Importantly, due to its non-rival nature, the increased stock of technology capital in the liberalizing countries will lead to positive effects in the rest of the world, which will be stronger the more integrated the FDI markets are. Our counterfactual experiment demonstrates that such effects can be strong enough to offset the trade diversion effects of trade liberalization.

Our model also allows us to investigate the effects of investment liberalization, which, as noted earlier, have been of central interest to policy makers in recent years. Removing the barriers to foreign direct investment will lead to an immediate increase in FDI with implications for trade, income, and expenditure. The link between FDI and income and expenditure is direct. An increase in bilateral FDI will lead to higher income and to higher expenditure in the liberalizing countries. To the extent that higher expenditure leads to more accumulation of technology capital, FDI liberalization between two countries will also trigger positive spill over effects on output and expenditure in third countries. Through its impact on output and expenditure, changes in FDI will also translate into changes in trade flows, via the gravity equation. In addition, changes in FDI will also affect trade indirectly, by influencing the multilateral resistances. Finally, since the MRTs are general equilibrium indexes, i.e. they capture the effects of trade liberalization between any two countries on consumer and on producer prices in any country in the model, their changes will transmit throughout the world.

As an important byproduct, our theory delivers an intuitive FDI-gravity system that very much resembles the traditional gravity system from the trade literature. Some familiar features of our FDI gravity system include the following. First, our theory reveals that FDI is directly related to the size of the country of origin, as measured by expenditure. The intuition for this relationship is that the expression for expenditure reflects the value of marginal product of technology capital, i.e. its return, as a key component of FDI in our model. Second, our FDI gravity equation captures the positive relationship between FDI and the size of the host country in terms of nominal output. The intuition for this relationship is that nominal output is a proxy for the value of marginal product of technology capital, i.e. its return, and FDI in the host country. Third, our theory predicts that the stock value of FDI will be inversely related to FDI barriers. Fourth, our system links bilateral FDI stock values to trade via the multilateral resistance in an intuitive way. Specifically, higher inward MRTs, i.e. higher consumer prices, in the country of origin should lead to less bilateral FDI. The intuition for this result is that higher inward multilateral resistances imply higher direct and opportunity cost of investing. The structural relationship between trade and FDI in our model is an important contribution to the existing FDI literature, where, despite significant interest, the relationships between trade and FDI are not clearly established. Finally, our theory suggests that the value of FDI stock from country i in country j is inversely related to the amount of technology capital in country i . This relationship is also intuitive and it is a reflection of the diminishing returns to investments into technology capital.

Our theoretical system translates into a standard estimating gravity equation, which is estimated often in the trade literature. We follow and adapt the latest developments in the empirical gravity literature in order to obtain sound econometric estimates of the effects of the key policy variables in our model. In addition, we offer a comprehensive treatment of bilateral trade costs and we capitalize on our theory to construct country-specific MR indexes, which decompose the effects of trade costs on consumers and on producers in the world. Overall,

our gravity estimates are in accordance with those from the existing literature. This is reassuring for the representativeness of our sample. One novel feature of our empirical gravity specification is that we allow for (and obtain) positive and significant effects of BITs on trade. This is an intuitive, but novel result with significant implications for policy analysis.

Our theoretical system translates into an estimating FDI-gravity equation which is very similar to the gravity equations that are estimated routinely in the trade literature. In order to estimate FDI gravity, we take advantage of the newly constructed Bilateral FDI Statistics database of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). To obtain our main results, we rely on the OLS estimator, which is the standard estimation method in the related literature. Overall, we conclude that our FDI gravity model is quite successful in predicting FDI. The fit of the model varies between $R^2 = 0.700$ and $R^2 = 0.827$ depending on the econometric specification.⁵ In addition, we find that the standard gravity variables from the trade literature, including distance, contiguity, common language and colonial ties are also significant determinants of FDI, with reasonable magnitudes and expected signs.

In addition to the good overall performance of the empirical FDI gravity model and the intuitive and plausible effects of the standard gravity variables, we also document some differences between the gravity estimates for trade versus FDI. For example, the estimates of the effects of distance on FDI are significantly larger as compared to their trade counterparts. In addition, we do not find any significant non-linear distance effects on FDI. This is in contrast with the corresponding distance estimates from the trade literature, where the distance effects are falling for larger distance intervals. Our explanation is that the modes of transportation, which are driving the decreasing distance effects for trade, are mostly irrelevant for FDI. Two other notable differences between our FDI and trade gravity estimates are that the effects of language and, especially, of colonial ties are significantly larger in the FDI gravity equations. Finally, in our main specification, we obtain a positive and statistically significant estimate of the affects of bilateral investment agreements, however, we do not find strong support for any significant effects of a series of time-varying FDI covariates that have been proposed by previous studies including regional trade agreements, customs unions, economic integration agreements, and currency unions.⁶ In addition, even the BIT estimates are unstable across alternative specifications.

Our framework can be used to perform a wide variety ex-post and ex-ante counterfactual experiments and evaluations of various trade and investment policy scenarios. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods, we use our model with the obtained estimates of the structural parameters to ex-ante quantify the effects of trade liberalization between Canada and the European Union. Our analysis delivers plausible results for the effects of trade liberalization on trade, growth and FDI in Canada, in the rest of the CETA members from the EU, and in the rest of the world. Still, we want to emphasize that we do not investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to key assumptions that we make.

⁵We experiment with the PPML estimator, with different data coverage, and by adding pair fixed effects.

⁶The two leading empirical FDI studies are Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski (2012) and Blonigen and Piger (2014). The objective of both studies is to identify a set of robust FDI determinants. Both papers utilize Bayesian Model Averaging and each of them comes up with a set of covariates which vary across the four dimensions that we propose to capture in our study. In addition, both studies provide excellent reviews of the relevant theoretical and empirical FDI literature.

Therefore, the counterfactual analysis presented here should not be taken as a definitive policy analysis but rather as a proof of concept. Nevertheless, we hope that this experiment provides further insights into the mechanics of the model and demonstrates the power and potential usefulness for future counterfactual exercises and policy analysis.

In order to highlight our key theoretical contributions, here we only provide a summary of our counterfactual results for the effects of CETA on trade and FDI. We start by comparing the effects of CETA on trade in a model with FDI versus a model without FDI. First, we find that the effects of CETA on bilateral trade between member countries are a bit smaller in the model with FDI as compared to the model without FDI when CETA acts as an RTA on trade costs. Second, we find that the introduction of FDI magnifies the small trade diversion effects for non-members a bit. However, these results hide the big heterogeneity among countries. Importantly, additionally accounting for FDI will lead to larger efficiency gains for the world. The reason is that CETA will trigger additional investment in technology capital in the CETA countries, which will lead to FDI into foreign countries, increasing the value of their factors and output. According to our estimates, the trade liberalizing effects of CETA will lead to an overall efficiency gain of 0.01 percentage points. The reason for the higher efficiency gains when the FDI channel is operational in our model is that, due to the non-rival nature of technology capital, the additional investments in the CETA countries will have positive spill over effects to non-members as well.

Next, we turn to the CETA effects on FDI. As expected, CETA will increase the factory-gate prices in member countries, thereby increasing the value marginal product, i.e. the return, of FDI. In addition, CETA will lower the inward multilateral resistances, i.e. the consumer price, in member countries. As discussed earlier, these effects work in the same direction of promoting investment in technology capital, which will lead to increase in output and also to higher outward FDI in member countries. In our stylized counterfactual, we find that the largest change in outward FDI (in quantities) is for Canada: An increase of 4.1 percent. While the exact magnitude of this effect can be refined, we are confident that the result that Canada will be amongst the countries with the largest changes in FDI due to CETA is robust. Our estimates for the effects on FDI in non-member countries are very interesting. Specifically, we find that the formation of CETA will lead to increased outward FDI for some non-member countries (such as Ethiopia, Tanzania, Dominican Republic). The intuition for this result is that the negative effect on FDI, due to lower factory-gate prices in non-members, is offset and actually dominated by the positive effect on FDI due to increased output and expenditure in CETA members. This is an interesting and important difference to our findings for physical capital: while physical capital investments typically decreases in non-member countries, FDI increases in many non-member countries. The explanation is that the value of marginal product of physical capital only depends on home country conditions, while FDI is substantially driven by changes in prices and income abroad. As naturally predicted by our model, the changes in outward FDI translate into changes in the corresponding FDI earnings. When we also allow CETA to affect trade costs as a BIT, we find by and large a doubling of the trade and FDI effects. If CETA also reduces FDI frictions, we find only slight additional effects on trade flows, while the FDI effects for the CETA members are substantially affected.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we develop the theoretical foundations for our analysis and we discuss the structural links between trade, growth and

foreign direct investment. This section concludes with the introduction and discussion of an intuitive FDI-gravity system as a byproduct of our model. In Section 4, we translate our trade and FDI gravity theories into econometric models. Section 5 presents the data and the data sources. In Section 6 we report and discuss the trade and FDI gravity estimates. Section 7 develops a counterfactual experiment of trade liberalization between Canada and the European Union. The section concludes with a discussion of the limitations of our analysis and directions for improvements and extensions.

3 Theoretical Foundation

The model describes a dynamic trading world of N countries, each producing a single tradeable good, differentiated by place of origin. Each country purchase goods from every source (as in Armington, 1969) for final consumption and for investment in physical capital. Each country also invests in non-rival technology capital. Technology capital may be ‘leased’ to all other countries. The quotes enclosing ‘leased’ connote that technology transfer includes both within firm Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and arms length licensed technology transfer, equivalently leading to payments across borders for the use of technology.⁷ We abstract from FDI in the form of physical means of production, following McGrattan and Prescott (2009). The setup yields important symmetries between goods trade and FDI treated as trade in technology services, in particular yielding a tractable empirical framework. The non-rival nature of technology capital in our model leads to a FDI gravity model with a key difference from the FDI gravity model of Head and Ries (2008) and the familiar goods structural gravity model: there is no counterpart to outward multilateral resistance because there is no global market clearance condition for each country’s technology capital.

The basic building blocks are set out below. Section 3.1 derives the laws of motion for the dynamic world economy model. Section 3.2 analyzes the steady state of the model. The steady state is the focus of our empirical implementation because the dynamic model of Section 3.1 does not have a closed form solution. Future work will simulate the transition dynamics of Section 3.1. (We note that other current models of FDI such as Head and Ries (2008) also focus on the steady state.)

Production. Total nominal output in country j at time t ($Y_{j,t}$) is produced subject to the following constant returns to scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas production function (similar to McGrattan and Prescott, 2009, 2010):

$$Y_{j,t} = p_{j,t} A_{j,t} (L_{j,t}^{1-\alpha} K_{j,t}^\alpha)^{1-\phi} \left(\prod_{i=1}^N (\omega_{ij,t}^\xi M_{i,t})^{\eta_i} \right)^\phi ; \quad \alpha, \phi \in (0, 1), \quad (1)$$

where $p_{j,t}$ denotes the factory-gate price of good (country) j at time t . Production in country j at time t relies on local technology ($A_{j,t}$) and country-specific (internationally immobile)

⁷Payments by affiliates for use of parent firm technology often differ from the true internal value, for tax and strategic reasons beyond the scope of this study, so the neutral term ‘licensing’ is used to more accurately describe the economically relevant value of the technology transfer.

resources including inelastically supplied labor ($L_{j,t}$) and a stock of physical capital ($K_{j,t}$), which accumulates according to a Cobb-Douglas transition function:⁸

$$K_{j,t+1} = \Omega_{j,t}^{\delta_K} K_{j,t}^{1-\delta_K}, \quad (2)$$

where δ_K is the depreciation rate and $\Omega_{j,t}$ denotes the aggregate flow of investment in physical capital in country j at time t , which we model as a CES aggregate of investment goods ($I_{ij,t}^K$) from all possible countries in the world, including j itself:

$$\Omega_{j,t} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^N \gamma_i^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}} (I_{ij,t}^K)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}. \quad (3)$$

Here, γ_i is a positive distribution parameter, and $\sigma > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution across goods varieties from different countries.

In addition to local technology and domestic resources, production in country j at time t uses a stock of technology capital which combines domestic technology capital $M_{j,t}$ and foreign direct investments, where bilateral FDI stock from country i in country j at time t are given by:

$$FDI_{ij,t} \equiv \omega_{ij,t}^{\xi} M_{i,t}. \quad (4)$$

Here, $M_{i,t}$ is defined as aggregate technology capital stock in country i at time t . $\omega_{ij,t}$ denotes the openness measure for foreign technology of country i in country j at time t . If $\omega_{ij,t} = 1$, then country j is totally open to the use of foreign technology of country i capital at time t within its borders. If $\omega_{ij,t} = 0$, no foreign technology from country i can be used in country j at time t .⁹ Finally, ξ is the elasticity of FDI payments with respect to the openness measure: a 1% rise in ω_{ji} is worth $\xi M_{j,t}$ times the value of marginal product of $M_{j,t}$ in country i given in equation (8) below. Constant returns to scale is imposed by $\sum_{i=1}^N \eta_i = 1$.

Technology capital ($M_{i,t}$) is non-rival, i.e. country i can use its technology capital at home and in all other countries. Our interpretation of technology capital is akin to the notion of knowledge capital (see for example Markusen, 2002). Possible examples include patents, blue-prints, management skills/practices, etc. Following our modeling choice for accumulation of physical capital, we also assume a Cobb-Douglas transition function for technology capital:

$$M_{j,t+1} = \chi_{j,t}^{\delta_M} M_{j,t}^{1-\delta_M}, \quad (5)$$

where δ_M is the depreciation rate and $\chi_{j,t}$ denotes the CES-aggregated flow of investments in technology capital ($I_{ij,t}^M$) in country j at time t from all possible countries in the world,

⁸This transition function reflects the costs in adjustments of the volume of capital. Alternatively, one could view it as incorporating diminishing returns in research activity or as quality differences between old capital as compared to new investment goods. Our modeling choice of the transition function for physical capital is analytically convenient and follows Lucas and Prescott (1971), Hercowitz and Sampson (1991), and Eckstein, Foulides, and Kollintzas (1996). Note that this formulation does not allow for zero investment Ω in any period, as this would render the capital stock and output to be zero. Further, in the long-run steady-state, $K = \Omega$, i.e., the specific transition function implies full depreciation.

⁹In the empirical analysis, we follow and expand on the existing empirical FDI literature by modeling $\omega_{ij,t}$ as consisting of four components including time-varying bilateral FDI determinants/frictions; time-invariant bilateral FDI determinants; time-varying host country characteristics; and time-varying parent country characteristics.

including j itself:

$$\chi_{j,t} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^N \gamma_i^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}} (I_{ij,t}^M)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}. \quad (6)$$

In order to facilitate our analysis, we use the definition of nominal output from Equation (1) to obtain the value marginal product of technology capital at home:

$$\frac{\partial Y_{j,t}}{\partial M_{j,t}} = \phi \eta_j \frac{Y_{j,t}}{M_{j,t}}, \quad (7)$$

and the value marginal product of $M_{j,t}$ abroad:

$$\frac{\partial Y_{i,t}}{\partial M_{j,t}} = \phi \eta_j \frac{Y_{i,t}}{M_{j,t}}. \quad (8)$$

Consumption. Consumer preferences are identical and represented by a logarithmic utility function with a subjective discount factor $\beta < 1$:

$$U_{j,t} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln(C_{j,t}), \quad (9)$$

where aggregate consumption ($C_{j,t}$) includes domestic and foreign goods ($c_{ij,t}$) from all possible countries in the world, including country j , subject to:

$$C_{j,t} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^N \gamma_i^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}} c_{ij,t}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}. \quad (10)$$

The assumption that consumption and investment goods are both a combination of all world varieties subject to the same CES aggregation is very convenient analytically. Allowing for heterogeneity in preferences and prices between and within consumption and investment goods will open additional channels for the interaction between trade, FDI and growth which require sectoral treatment. Exploring such channels is beyond the scope of this project.

Agent's Problem. Representative agents in each country work, invest and consume. At every point in time consumers in country j choose aggregate consumption ($C_{j,t}$) and aggregate investment into physical ($\Omega_{j,t}$) and technology ($\chi_{j,t}$) capital to maximize the present

discounted value of lifetime utility subject to a sequence of constraints:

$$\max_{\{C_{j,t}, \Omega_{j,t}, \chi_{j,t}\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln(C_{j,t}) \quad (11)$$

$$K_{j,t+1} = \Omega_{j,t}^{\delta_K} K_{j,t}^{1-\delta_K} \quad \text{for all } t, \quad (12)$$

$$M_{j,t+1} = \chi_{j,t}^{\delta_M} M_{j,t}^{1-\delta_M} \quad \text{for all } t, \quad (13)$$

$$Y_{j,t} = p_{j,t} A_{j,t} (L_{j,t}^{1-\alpha} K_{j,t}^{\alpha})^{1-\phi} \left(\prod_{i=1}^N (\omega_{ij,t}^{\xi} M_{i,t})^{\eta_i} \right)^{\phi} \quad \text{for all } t, \quad (14)$$

$$E_{j,t} = P_{j,t} C_{j,t} + P_{j,t} \Omega_{j,t} + P_{j,t} \chi_{j,t} \quad \text{for all } t, \quad (15)$$

$$E_{j,t} = Y_{j,t} + \phi \eta_j \sum_{i \neq j} Y_{i,t} - \phi(1 - \eta_j) Y_{j,t} \quad \text{for all } t, \quad (16)$$

$$K_{j,0}, M_{j,0} \quad \text{given.} \quad (17)$$

Equation (11) is the representative agent's intertemporal utility function. Equations (12), (13) and (14) define the law of motion for physical capital stock, the law of motion for technology capital stock, and the value of production, respectively. Equation (15) gives total spending in country j at time t , $E_{j,t}$, as the sum of spending on consumption ($P_{j,t} C_{j,t}$), spending on investments in physical capital ($P_{j,t} \Omega_{j,t}$), and spending on investments in technology capital ($P_{j,t} \chi_{j,t}$). Finally, Equation (16) defines disposable income, which is equal to expenditure, as the sum of total nominal output ($Y_{j,t}$) plus rents from foreign investments ($\sum_{i \neq j} M_{j,t} \times \frac{\partial Y_{i,t}}{\partial M_{j,t}} = \sum_{i \neq j} M_{j,t} \phi \eta_j \frac{Y_{i,t}}{M_{j,t}} = \phi \eta_j \sum_{i \neq j} Y_{i,t}$), minus rents accruing to foreign investments ($\sum_{i \neq j} M_{i,t} \times \frac{\partial Y_{j,t}}{\partial M_{i,t}} = \sum_{i \neq j} M_{i,t} \phi \eta_i \frac{Y_{j,t}}{M_{i,t}} = \phi Y_{j,t} \sum_{i \neq j} \eta_i = \phi(1 - \eta_j) Y_{j,t}$).

3.1 A Model of Trade, Growth and FDI

Solving the representative agent's problem delivers a structural system that describes the relationships between trade, growth and FDI. We solve the agent's optimization problem in two steps. First, we solve the optimal demand of $c_{ij,t}$, $I_{ij,t}^K$ and $I_{ij,t}^M$ for given aggregate variables. We label this stage the '*lower level*'. Then, we solve the dynamic optimization problem for $C_{j,t}$, $\Omega_{j,t}$ and $\chi_{j,t}$. This is what we call the '*upper level*'.

'Lower Level' Equilibrium. Let $p_{ij,t} = p_{i,t} t_{ij,t}$ denote the delivered price of country i 's goods for country j consumers, where $t_{ij,t}$ is the variable bilateral trade cost factor on shipments from i to j at time t .¹⁰ Let $X_{ij,t} = p_{ij,t}(c_{ij,t} + I_{ij,t}^K + I_{ij,t}^M)$ denote country j 's total nominal spending on goods from country i at time t . Solving the representative agent's optimization of (3), (6), and (10), subject to (15) and taking $C_{j,t}$, $\Omega_{j,t}$, and $\chi_{j,t}$ for all i as given, yields:

$$X_{ij,t} = \left(\frac{\gamma_i p_{i,t} t_{ij,t}}{P_{j,t}} \right)^{1-\sigma} E_{j,t}, \quad (18)$$

¹⁰Trade costs thus can be interpreted by the standard iceberg melting metaphor: It is as if goods melt away in distribution so that 1 unit shipped becomes $1/t_{ij,t} < 1$ units on arrival. Technologically, a unit of distribution services required to ship goods uses resources in the same proportions as does production. The units of distribution services required on each link vary bilaterally.

where, for now, $P_{j,t} = [\sum_i (\gamma_i p_{i,t} t_{ij,t})^{1-\sigma}]^{1/(1-\sigma)}$ is the CES price aggregator index for country j at time t . Below we will interpret $P_{j,t}$ as the inward multilateral resistance for the consumers in j at time t . Imposing market clearance, $Y_{i,t} = \sum_j X_{ij,t}$, implies:

$$Y_{i,t} = \sum_{j=1}^N (\gamma_i p_{i,t})^{1-\sigma} (t_{ij,t}/P_{j,t})^{1-\sigma} E_{j,t}. \quad (19)$$

Equation (19) simply tells us that, at delivered prices, the output in each country i and at each point of time t should equal total expenditures on this nation's goods in the world, including country i itself. Define $Y_t \equiv \sum_i Y_{i,t}$ and divide the preceding equation by Y_t to obtain:

$$(\gamma_i p_{i,t} \Pi_{i,t})^{1-\sigma} = \frac{Y_{i,t}}{Y_t}, \quad (20)$$

where $\Pi_{i,t}^{1-\sigma} \equiv \sum_j \left(\frac{t_{ij,t}}{P_{j,t}}\right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{E_{j,t}}{Y_t}$. Use (20) to solve for the power transform of preference adjusted factory-gate prices, $(\gamma_i p_{i,t})^{1-\sigma}$, and substitute in Equation (18) above and in the CES consumer price aggregator following (18). This delivers the familiar structural system of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003):

$$X_{ij,t} = \frac{Y_{i,t} E_{j,t}}{Y_t} \left(\frac{t_{ij,t}}{\Pi_{i,t} P_{j,t}} \right)^{1-\sigma}, \quad (21)$$

$$P_{j,t}^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{i=1}^N \left(\frac{t_{ij,t}}{\Pi_{i,t}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{Y_{i,t}}{Y_t}, \quad (22)$$

$$\Pi_{i,t}^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{j=1}^N \left(\frac{t_{ij,t}}{P_{j,t}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{E_{j,t}}{Y_t}. \quad (23)$$

Equation (21) links intuitively bilateral exports to market size (the first term on the right-hand side) and trade frictions (the second term on the right-hand side). Coined by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), $\Pi_{i,t}^{1-\sigma}$ and $P_{j,t}^{1-\sigma}$ are the multilateral resistance terms (MRTs, outward and inward, respectively), which consistently aggregate bilateral trade costs and decompose their incidence on the producers and the consumers in each region. The multilateral resistances are key to our analysis because they represent the endogenous structural link between the 'lower level' trade analysis and the 'upper level' production and growth equilibrium.¹¹ On the one hand, the MRTs translate changes in bilateral trade costs at the 'lower level' into changes in factory gate prices, which stimulate or discourage investment and growth at the 'upper level'. On the other hand, changing output shares in the multilateral resistances (e.g. through capital accumulation and/or foreign direct investment) alter the incidence of trade costs in the world.

¹¹The MRTs have been used to perform welfare analysis for the Canadian economy in a conditional general equilibrium, where output is taken as exogenously given. For example, Anderson and Yotov (2010a) use the MRTs to translate changes in the incidence of trade costs (globalization) into changes in real output (acting like TFP changes) in Canada and also to evaluate the general equilibrium effects of Canada's Agreement on Internal Trade.

Finally, we note that, unlike the original gravity system of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and despite the fact that we also obtain our results at the aggregate level, nominal output and expenditure are not the same in system (21)-(23). The difference is due to the introduction of FDI in our setting and implies that some countries' expenditure will be higher than the corresponding nominal output, while the opposite will be true in other economies. The reason is that each country j also invests abroad, which leads to additional income besides the value of output produced at home. At the same time, part of domestic output is produced with foreign technology capital, for which country j has to pay. To see this logic more clearly, we use the expressions for the returns to technology capital at home and abroad, equations (7) and (8), to obtain the following expression for national expenditure as:

$$E_{j,t} = Y_{j,t} + \phi\eta_j \sum_{i \neq j}^N Y_{i,t} - \phi(1 - \eta_j)Y_{j,t}. \quad (24)$$

Equation (24) gives total expenditures of country j as a simplified expression of the sum of total nominal output ($Y_{j,t}$) plus rents from foreign investments ($\phi\eta_j \sum_{i \neq j} Y_{i,t}$), minus rents accruing to foreign investments ($\phi(1 - \eta_j)Y_{j,t}$). After rearranging terms and defining total nominal output in the world as the sum of all national nominal outputs, $Y_t = \sum_j Y_{j,t}$, Equation (24) simplifies to:

$$E_{j,t} = (1 - \phi)Y_{j,t} + \phi\eta_j Y_t. \quad (25)$$

Importantly, the equation for total expenditures shows that with FDI there is a wedge between expenditure and nominal output.

'Upper Level' Equilibrium. In order to solve for the upper level equilibrium, we set up the Lagrangian and we obtain the first order conditions for the key variables in our model, including the first order condition for physical capital:¹²

$$\begin{aligned} \beta(1 - \phi)\alpha(1 - \phi + \phi\eta_j) \frac{Y_{j,t+1}}{K_{j,t+1}} - \frac{C_{j,t+1}P_{j,t+1}}{\delta_K C_{j,t}} \frac{K_{j,t+1}^{\frac{1}{\delta_K} - 1}}{K_{j,t}^{\frac{1 - \delta_K}{\delta_K}}} = \\ \frac{\beta(\delta_K - 1)P_{j,t+1}}{\delta_K} \left(\frac{K_{j,t+2}}{K_{j,t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\delta_K}} \quad \text{for all } j \text{ and } t, \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

and the first-order condition for technology capital:

$$\begin{aligned} \beta\phi\eta_j \left((1 - \phi) \frac{Y_{j,t+1}}{M_{j,t+1}} + \phi\eta_j \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N Y_{j,t+1}}{M_{j,t+1}} \right) - \frac{C_{j,t+1}P_{j,t+1}}{\delta_M C_{j,t}} \frac{M_{j,t+1}^{\frac{1}{\delta_M} - 1}}{M_{j,t}^{\frac{1 - \delta_M}{\delta_M}}} = \\ \frac{\beta(\delta_M - 1)P_{j,t+1}}{\delta_M} \left(\frac{M_{j,t+2}}{M_{j,t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\delta_M}} \quad \text{for all } j \text{ and } t. \end{aligned} \quad (27)$$

¹²All derivations for the expressions in this and the next subsection are available upon request.

Combining the two first order conditions for $K_{j,t+1}$ and $M_{j,t+1}$ as given by Equations (26) and (27) with the production function as given by Equation (14), the budget constraint as given by Equation (15), the expression for E_j given in Equation (25), the expressions for p_j solved for from Equation (20), and the equations for the trade multilateral resistance terms P_j and Π_j given by Equations (22) and (23), respectively, we end up with the following structural dynamic system of trade, growth, and FDI:

$$Y_{j,t} = p_{j,t} A_{j,t} (L_{j,t}^{1-\alpha} K_{j,t}^\alpha)^{1-\phi} \left(\prod_{i=1}^N (\omega_{ij,t}^\xi M_{i,t})^{\eta_i} \right)^\phi \quad \text{for all } j \text{ and } t, \quad (28)$$

$$E_{j,t} = P_{j,t} C_{j,t} + P_{j,t} \left(\frac{K_{j,t+1}}{K_{j,t}^{1-\delta_K}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\delta_K}} + P_{j,t} \left(\frac{M_{j,t+1}}{M_{j,t}^{1-\delta_M}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\delta_M}} \quad \text{for all } j \text{ and } t, \quad (29)$$

$$E_{j,t} = (1-\phi)Y_{j,t} + \phi\eta_j Y_t \quad \text{for all } j \text{ and } t, \quad (30)$$

$$p_{j,t} = \frac{(Y_{j,t}/Y_t)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}{\gamma_j \Pi_{j,t}} \quad \text{for all } j \text{ and } t, \quad (31)$$

$$Y_t = \sum_{j=1}^N Y_{j,t} \quad \text{for all } t, \quad (32)$$

$$P_{j,t}^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{i=1}^N \left(\frac{t_{ij,t}}{\Pi_{i,t}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{Y_{i,t}}{Y_t} \quad \text{for all } j \text{ and } t, \quad (33)$$

$$\Pi_{i,t}^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{j=1}^N \left(\frac{t_{ij,t}}{P_{j,t}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{E_{j,t}}{Y_t} \quad \text{for all } i \text{ and } t, \quad (34)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \beta(1-\phi)\alpha(1-\phi+\phi\eta_j) \frac{Y_{j,t+1}}{K_{j,t+1}} - \frac{C_{j,t+1} P_{j,t+1}}{\delta_K C_{j,t}} \frac{K_{j,t+1}^{\frac{1}{\delta_K}-1}}{K_{j,t}^{\frac{1-\delta_K}{\delta_K}}} = \\ \frac{\beta(\delta_K-1) P_{j,t+1}}{\delta_K} \left(\frac{K_{j,t+2}}{K_{j,t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\delta_K}} \quad \text{for all } j \text{ and } t. \end{aligned} \quad (35)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \beta\phi\eta_j \left((1-\phi) \frac{Y_{j,t+1}}{M_{j,t+1}} + \phi\eta_j \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N Y_{j,t+1}}{M_{j,t+1}} \right) - \frac{C_{j,t+1} P_{j,t+1}}{\delta_M C_{j,t}} \frac{M_{j,t+1}^{\frac{1}{\delta_M}-1}}{M_{j,t}^{\frac{1-\delta_M}{\delta_M}}} = \\ \frac{\beta(\delta_M-1) P_{j,t+1}}{\delta_M} \left(\frac{M_{j,t+2}}{M_{j,t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\delta_M}} \quad \text{for all } j \text{ and } t. \end{aligned} \quad (36)$$

Our structural system of trade, growth and FDI is a system of $(8 \times N + 1) \times T$ equations in the $(8 \times N + 1) \times T$ unknowns which include $C_{j,t}$, $K_{j,t}$, $M_{j,t}$, $Y_{j,t}$, Y_t , $p_{j,t}$, $P_{j,t}$, $\Pi_{j,t}$, $E_{j,t}$. For given parameters and variables that are exogenous in our model, i.e. $\omega_{ij,t}$, $L_{j,t}$, α , β , ϕ , ξ , η_j , γ_j , σ , $t_{ij,t}$, δ_K , δ_M , and $A_{j,t}$, this system can be used to simulate the transitional dynamics and steady-state equilibrium effects of a series of policy reforms and counterfactual experiments.

A disadvantage of the system above is that it cannot be solved analytically. Expositionally, this prevents us from offering a clear discussion of the key structural relationships in our framework. For this reason, in the next section we focus our discussion and analysis of the structural system in steady state. Econometrically, the lack of a closed form solution out of the steady state poses difficult challenges that are avoided in this paper by estimating the steady state version of the model. (The same choice is made for the same reasons by Head and Ries (2008).)

3.2 Steady State Links between Trade, Growth and FDI

In order to clearly see and decompose the links between trade, growth and FDI in our framework, in this section we obtain and analyze our structural system in steady state.¹³

$$X_{ij} = \frac{Y_i E_j}{Y} \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{\Pi_i P_j} \right)^{1-\sigma}, \quad (37)$$

$$P_j^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{i=1}^N \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{\Pi_i} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{Y_i}{Y}, \quad (38)$$

$$\Pi_i^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{j=1}^N \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{E_j}{Y}, \quad (39)$$

$$p_j = \frac{(Y_j/Y)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}{\gamma_j \Pi_j}, \quad (40)$$

$$Y_j = p_j A_j (L_j^{1-\alpha} K_j^\alpha)^{1-\phi} \left(\prod_{i=1}^N (\omega_{ij}^\xi M_i)^{\eta_i} \right)^\phi, \quad (41)$$

$$E_j = (1-\phi)Y_j + \phi\eta_j Y, \quad (42)$$

$$K_j = \frac{\alpha\beta\delta_K(1-\phi)(1-\phi+\phi\eta_j)Y_j}{1-\beta+\beta\delta_K} \frac{Y_j}{P_j}, \quad (43)$$

$$M_j = \frac{\beta\phi\eta_j\delta_M}{1-\beta+\beta\delta_M} \frac{E_j}{P_j}. \quad (44)$$

The comparative static shock to system (37)-(44) considered here informally is realistic and policy-relevant: a trade and investment liberalization due to the formation of the Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA), which Canada and the EU finished negotiating in August 2014, but it is not yet applied.¹⁴ CETA will also be the object of study of our counterfactual experiments in Section 7 based on the estimated model.¹⁵

¹³All derivations of the steady state are available upon request.

¹⁴See for more details <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/>.

¹⁵We chose CETA for several reasons. First, along with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), CETA is the largest economic integration agreement with Canada's participation since the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement and NAFTA. The consequences of CETA for Canada will be large and, therefore, its impact on the Canadian economy should be of significant interest to the Canadian policy makers. Second, according to the final outcome of the CETA negotiations, both sides in the agreement will remove 99% of their customs duties. This makes CETA a perfect candidate in terms of trade liberalization effects. Third, an

Our framework will enable us to simulate the effects of CETA in terms of trade liberalization and FDI both simultaneously and also separately. For the sake of expositional clarity, we discuss the effects of trade liberalization and investment liberalization sequentially. We start with the effects of trade liberalization, which in our model are represented by a reduction in the bilateral trade costs (t_{ij}) between Canada and the European Union member countries. Trade liberalization will affect trade, income, growth and investment through several channels, which are direct and indirect. The first, direct (partial-equilibrium) effect of the reduction of trade costs between Canada and the EU will be an immediate increase in bilateral trade flows between Canada and the EU countries without any implications for the economies in the rest of the world. This effect is captured in our model by Equation (37), which directly translates changes in bilateral trade costs into changes in bilateral trade flows for given income, expenditures, and multilateral resistances (remember that $\sigma > 1$).

The indirect effects of the reduction in trade costs between Canada and the EU countries in our model are channeled through the multilateral resistance terms, as given in Equations (38) and (39). Importantly, we note that the MRTs are general equilibrium (GE) indexes that will translate the reduction in trade costs between Canada and the EU into additional GE effects on all countries in the world. The intuition is that, while becoming more integrated with each other, Canada and the countries from the European Union will become more ‘isolated’ from the rest of the world. These effects will be captured by changes in the multilateral resistances, which, as noted by Anderson and Yotov (2010a), will also decompose the incidence of the reduction of trade costs between Canada and the EU on the producers and the consumers in these two regions and in all other countries in the world. Specifically, we would expect that the fall in trade costs between Canada and the EU will result in lower multilateral resistances for the consumers and the producers in member countries, i.e. in Canada and in the EU, and higher multilateral resistances faced by the consumers and the producers in all other countries.

The changes in the multilateral resistances will lead to additional changes in trade, income, growth and investment. The additional effects of trade liberalization between Canada and the EU on trade (via the MRTs) are captured by Equation (37). The fall in the MRTs for Canada and for the EU countries will mitigate the direct positive effect on nominal bilateral trade between these countries. In addition, it will lead to lower trade flows between Canada and the EU on one side and all other countries in the world on the other side. The intuition is that the decrease in the MRTs for member countries will outweigh the increase in the MRTs for non-members. Finally, the general equilibrium effects that are channeled via the multilateral resistances will lead to increased trade among non-members. The intuition is that once these countries find themselves more isolated from Canada and the EU, they will trade more with each other.

additional important goal and achievement of CETA is the removal and/or alleviation of barriers to foreign investment among members in both Canada and the EU. For example, the agreement assures that all European investors in Canada and all Canadian investors in Europe would be treated equally and fairly (see <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/>). Importantly, CETA is the first EU trade agreement that also covers foreign direct investment, which only became possible recently due to investment competence that the EU gained under the Lisbon Treaty (Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU). Thus, CETA offers a great opportunity to study the effects of an agreement that simultaneously removes the barriers to trade and foreign direct investment.

Trade liberalization will also affect nominal income in Canada, the EU, and in the rest of the world. These effects are indirect and will, once again, be channeled through the multilateral resistances. These effects are captured by Equations (40) and (41). Specifically, as can be seen from Equation (40), the lower outward multilateral resistance faced by the producers in Canada and the EU will translate into favorable, higher factory-gate prices for these producers. This, through Equation (41), will result in higher nominal output/income in Canada and the EU countries. The opposite will be true for non-members, i.e. for all other countries, the higher outward resistances will depress factory-gate prices and will decrease the value of domestic production/income. It should also be noted that the additional effects on nominal output that we just described will lead to additional effects on trade via Equation (37). Specifically, as Canada and the EU countries become ‘richer’ they will trade/sell more to each other and to all other countries in the rest of the world. Furthermore, since nominal income is directly related to expenditure (see Equation (42)), Canada and the EU countries will also buy more from each other and also from all other countries in the world. In principle, it is possible that such size effects that lead to trade creation may dominate and outweigh the trade diversion effects on non-members that we described earlier. Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b) and Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015c) offer empirical support for this theoretical possibility in the case of NAFTA and TTIP, respectively. Finally, we note the changes in nominal income and expenditure will lead to further changes in the MRTs, which will affect trade via the channels that we discussed above.

Next, we discuss the effects of trade liberalization on capital accumulation, which is a key component of economic growth.¹⁶ The effects of CETA on capital accumulation are captured by Equation (43), which characterizes the steady-state physical capital stock. Besides parameters, the steady-state physical capital stock is a function of nominal income and the inward MRTs. The relationship between the value of production and capital accumulation is direct. The intuition is that trade liberalization will increase the value of marginal product of capital and, therefore, will make investment more attractive. Specifically, for the case of CETA and Canada, the agreement will decrease the outward MRTs for Canadian producers, which will increase factory-gate prices and the value marginal product of an additional unit of physical capital. This will lead to more investment and, therefore, economic growth.

The relationship between capital accumulation and the inward multilateral resistance (inward MRT) is inverse. The reason is that the inward resistance in our setting is also the aggregate price of capital and consumer goods. Thus, the intuition for the inverse relationship is twofold. First, a lower inward MRT means lower direct cost of investment. Second, a lower inward MRT means a lower opportunity cost of investment. In both cases, a decrease in the inward multilateral resistance would lead to more capital accumulation. In sum, since CETA will lead to a simultaneous fall in the inward MRT and an increase in the value of marginal product of capital, we expect that this agreement will unambiguously lead to increase in investment in physical capital and, therefore, growth in Canada. Similar intuition suggests that the effects of CETA on non-member countries will be the opposite: Inward and outward MRTs will increase, factory-gate prices will decrease, and income will decrease. This will

¹⁶See Wacziarg (2001), Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2007), Baldwin and Seghezza (2008) and Wacziarg and Welch (2008) who empirically demonstrate that capital accumulation accounts for a significant fraction of the positive impact of trade openness on economic growth. Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b) review the related literature.

typically lower the value marginal product of physical capital and increase the (direct and opportunity) cost of investments. Both effects tend to decrease the steady-state physical capital stocks in non-member countries.¹⁷ Finally, we note that capital accumulation will lead to additional changes in nominal output via Equation (41), which will further affect trade via the channels that we discussed earlier. In sum, we expect that CETA will make investments into physical capital in Canada more attractive and the agreement will stimulate growth. This additional growth will lead to lower sellers incidence in Canada and the EU member countries, but also to lower buyers incidence in both member and non-member countries.

Finally, we discuss the effects of trade liberalization on FDI. These effects are due to the fact that trade liberalization will alter the investment patterns for technology capital. These relationships are captured by Equation (44), which characterizes the accumulation of technology (knowledge) capital M_j . Similar to the equation for physical capital, Equation (44) links the stock of technology capital to trade through expenditures and through the inward MRTs. Specifically, M_j is directly related to expenditure and inversely related to the inward MRTs. The intuition for the direct relationship between accumulation of technology capital and expenditure is that the latter reflects the value of marginal product of M_j . Trade affects technology capital by changing factory-gate prices and, consequently, nominal income. As discussed earlier, expenditure is a function of nominal output, which is adjusted for payments to FDI to and from foreign countries. The latter can also be expressed in terms of nominal income. The inverse relationship between M_j and the inward MRTs is due to the fact that P_j captures the direct and the opportunity costs of investment in technology capital. The effects of trade on accumulation of technology capital through expenditure and through the MRTs work in the same direction. Thus, we expect that the trade costs reductions induced by CETA would lead to a higher stock of technology capital in Canada and in the EU countries. The opposite will be true for the non-member countries. Note, however, that due to the non-rivalry nature of technology capital, which can be used anywhere subject to FDI barriers, the higher stock of technology capital in Canada and in the EU benefits all countries in the world. Lastly, we note that the changes in technology capital in the world will lead to additional changes in nominal output and expenditure, which will trigger further response in bilateral trade and in the multilateral resistances.

An important feature of our framework is that it can capture the effects on trade, growth and investment of liberalization in the area of foreign direct investment, which takes central stage in the negotiations of contemporary economic integration agreements such as CETA. The effects of liberalizing investment are captured by an increase of ω_{ij}^ξ in our model and, similar to the effects of trade liberalization, removing or decreasing the barriers to FDI will have direct and indirect impact. The direct effect of liberalizing investments is an immediate increase in FDI between the liberalizing partners. This can be seen from the definition of $FDI_{ij} \equiv \omega_{ij}^\xi M_i$, where $\omega_{ij} \in [0; 1]$ is inversely related to FDI barriers. In addition to the direct effect on FDI, we see from Equation (41) that a change in ω_{ij} will have a direct effect on nominal output/income. Removal of FDI barriers between Canada and the EU will lead to higher income, through (41), and higher expenditure, through (42), in these countries.

¹⁷While this holds typically, for a single country general equilibrium effects may be strong enough to overturn these negative effects.

In addition to the direct effects on FDI, income, and expenditure, FDI liberalization will also have indirect effects. The change in the steady-state output and expenditure due to the increase in FDI stock will trigger additional (direct and indirect) effects on trade and world prices. The direct effect of an increase of income in Canada or the EU on trade is driven by country size and it is strictly positive. As can be seen by Equation (37), an increase of income in Canada or an EU country will result in more exports (due to the increase in output) and in more imports (due to the increase in expenditure) between these countries and also with all of their trading partners, including non-member countries. Note that this income and expenditure growth does not only stimulate CETA trade, but, *ceteris paribus*, also trade with non-member countries. In principle, such trade creation effects may be strong enough to offset or even dominate the trade diversion effects on non-member countries. The indirect effect of growth in FDI stock through changes in income and expenditure in Canada or the EU on trade is channeled through changes in the inward and outward multilateral resistance terms. This can be seen by noting that income and expenditure enter the multilateral resistance terms directly (see Equations (38) and (39)). Note also that the indirect effects of the increase in FDI in the CETA countries are general equilibrium effects, i.e. more FDI in one country may affect trade costs and impact welfare in any non-member country.

In sum, this section demonstrated how our structural system captures and decomposes a series of channels through which trade and investment liberalization may affect trade, income, growth and FDI in member and non member countries. We capitalize on these properties in Section 7, where we simulate the effects of CETA.

3.3 The Gravity Representation of FDI

The steady state system above yields a convenient gravity representation of FDI that is remarkably similar to the familiar trade gravity system. To obtain it, recall the (steady-state) definition of bilateral FDI stock:

$$FDI_{ij}^{stock} \equiv \omega_{ij}^{\xi} M_i. \quad (45)$$

Use the steady-state solution for technology capital M_j from Equation (44):

$$M_j = \frac{\beta \phi \eta_j \delta_M}{1 - \beta + \beta \delta_M} \frac{E_j}{P_j}. \quad (46)$$

Substitute for M_j in Equation (45) to obtain:

$$FDI_{ij}^{stock} = \omega_{ij}^{\xi} \frac{\beta \phi \eta_i \delta_M}{1 - \beta + \beta \delta_M} \frac{E_i}{P_i}. \quad (47)$$

Equation (47) resembles a gravity equation, except that it describes physical FDI stocks. To translate (47) into a stock value FDI equation needed for estimation with data on FDI stock *values*, define the value of FDI from country i to country j as the product of the FDI stock

times its value marginal product:

$$FDI_{ij}^{stock,value} \equiv FDI_{ij}^{stock} \times \frac{\partial Y_j}{\partial M_i} \quad (48)$$

$$= \omega_{ij}^\xi \frac{\beta \phi \eta_i \delta_M}{1 - \beta + \beta \delta_M} \frac{E_i}{P_i} \phi \eta_i \frac{Y_j}{M_i} \quad (49)$$

$$= \frac{\beta \phi^2 \eta_i^2 \delta_M}{1 - \beta + \beta \delta_M} \omega_{ij}^\xi \frac{E_i}{P_i} \frac{Y_j}{M_i}. \quad (50)$$

Combine Equation (47) with the definitions of the multilateral resistance terms P_j and Π_j given by Equations (22) and (23), respectively, to obtain the following FDI gravity system:

$$FDI_{ij}^{stock,value} = \frac{\beta \phi^2 \eta_i^2 \delta_M}{1 - \beta + \beta \delta_M} \omega_{ij}^\xi \frac{E_i}{P_i} \frac{Y_j}{M_i}, \quad (51)$$

$$P_i = \left[\sum_{j=1}^N \left(\frac{t_{ji}}{\Pi_j} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{Y_j}{Y} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}, \quad (52)$$

$$\Pi_j = \left[\sum_{i=1}^N \left(\frac{t_{ji}}{P_i} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{E_i}{Y} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}. \quad (53)$$

Note the resemblance of the above system to the trade gravity system. Some familiar features of the FDI stock value gravity system (51)-(53) include the following. First, the gravity equation for FDI, Equation (51), reveals that FDI is directly related to the size of the country of origin, as measured by expenditure E_i . The intuition for this relationship is that the expression for expenditure in our model reflects the value of marginal product of technology capital M_j . Second, Equation (51) captures the positive relationship between FDI and the size of the host country, as captured by nominal output Y_j . The intuition for this relationship is that Y_j is a proxy for the value of marginal product of technology capital in the host country. Third, Equation (51) accounts for the fact that the stock value of FDI will be inversely related to FDI barriers, which are captured by ω_{ij} . Remember that higher values of ω_{ij} imply lower investment barriers and, therefore, higher FDI stocks between the two countries i and j . Fourth, our FDI gravity system links bilateral FDI stock values to trade via the multilateral resistance in an intuitive way. Specifically, higher inward MRTs in the country of origin i , P_i , (i.e. higher direct and opportunity cost of investing in knowledge capital in i) should lead to less FDI abroad and at destination j in particular.

The key difference of (51) from the trade gravity model is the absence of outward multilateral resistance, or sellers' incidence. The reason is that technology capital is non-rival, in contrast to goods sales: goods sold to j from i cannot be used elsewhere whereas i 's technology used in j has no effect on its utilization elsewhere. Our model assumes that the origin sells use of its technology capital to the destination at its value to the buyer at zero cost to itself. In arms length transactions this assumption is consistent with bargaining where all the power lies with the seller. (We abstract from intermediate bargaining power that splits the surplus between seller and buyer parametrically because it adds nothing useful to the model. For classic FDI within a multinational firm we abstract from various tax avoidance strategies that will deviate from our assumption.) Our gravity model of FDI also contrasts

to the gravity FDI model of Head and Ries (2008) in the same respect: the non-rival nature of technology in our model means there is no role for outward multilateral resistance.

Fifth, Equation (51) suggests that the value of the FDI stock of country i in country j depends negatively on the amount of technology capital in country i . This relationship is also intuitive and it is a reflection of the diminishing returns to investments into technology capital. The structural relationship between trade and FDI in our model is an important departure from the existing FDI literature and we look forward to offer empirical support for this theoretical link. From an empirical perspective of the next section, system (51)-(53) can be estimated using the fixed effects techniques now standard in the trade gravity literature.

4 From Theory to Empirics

This section translates the theoretical FDI gravity system into an econometric model that will deliver the key parameters in our model. Specifically, we will obtain (i) a set of estimates of bilateral trade costs and the effects of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), with special emphasis on Canada's RTAs, which will allow us to simulate the effects of trade liberalization; and (ii) a set of estimates of bilateral FDI frictions including an estimate of the effects of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), which will enable us to simulate the effects of promotion and liberalization in the area of foreign investment, and (iii) estimates of the elasticity of substitution, the capital shares, and the FDI shares in production. While we will capitalize on the latest developments in the empirical trade literature to obtain the estimates of trade costs and the effects of RTAs, our econometric specification and corresponding estimates of the FDI frictions and BITs will be novel in relation to the existing empirical FDI literature. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no tests and corresponding estimates exist of the causal effects of foreign direct investment on national income.

4.1 Estimating Trade Gravity and Trade Costs

We translate the structural gravity system (37)-(39) into an econometric model by capitalizing on the latest developments in the empirical trade literature. First, in order to account for the presence of heteroskedasticity in trade data and to take advantage of the information contained in the zero trade flows, we follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) who advocate the use of the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) estimator. Second, in order to account for the unobservable multilateral resistances, we use time-varying, directional (exporter and importer), country-specific fixed effects. In addition to controlling for the multilateral resistances, these fixed effects will absorb national output and expenditures and, therefore, control for all dynamic forces from our theory. Third, in order to avoid the critique from Cheng and Wall (2005) that '[f]ixed-effects estimation is sometimes criticized when applied to data pooled over consecutive years on the grounds that dependent and independent variables cannot fully adjust in a single year's time.' (footnote 8, p. 52), we use 3-year intervals.¹⁸ Finally, we employ the standard set of gravity variables from the existing

¹⁸Trefler (2004) also criticizes trade estimations pooled over consecutive years. He uses three-year intervals. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) use 5-year intervals. Olivero and Yotov (2012) provide empirical evidence that gravity estimates obtained with 3-year and 5-year lags are very similar, but the yearly estimates produce

literature and we define the power transforms of bilateral trade costs as:

$$t_{ij,t}^{1-\sigma} = \exp \left[\pi_1 RTA_{ij,t} + \pi_2 POLICY_{ij,t} + \sum_{m=3}^6 \pi_m \ln DIST_{ij,m-2} + \pi_7 BRDR_{ij} + \pi_8 LANG_{ij} + \pi_9 CLNY_{ij} \right], \quad (54)$$

where, $RTA_{ij,t}$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 when i and j have a RTA at time t , and it is equal to zero elsewhere.¹⁹ We may use this variable to simulate the effects of trade liberalization in the case of Canada. For example, as noted earlier, one possible scenario that we may evaluate is the formation of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union (EU), which “is by far Canada’s most ambitious trade initiative, broader in scope and deeper in ambition than the historic North American Free Trade Agreement” according to the official web site of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada. Another interesting and important agreement that is viewed as “critical to Canada’s growth and economic prosperity” by the Canadian government, which can also be simulated within our framework is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Free Trade Agreement. It should be noted that, in each case, our framework can evaluate and decompose the effects of these trade agreements in terms of trade and investment liberalization on trade, income, growth, and FDI in Canada.

The rest of the variables in specification (54) include: $POLICY_{ij,t}$, which is a vector of additional time-varying policy variables, which include bilateral investment treaties and currency unions. $\ln DIST_{ij,m}$, which is the logarithm of bilateral distance between trading partners i and j . We follow Eaton and Kortum (2002) to decompose the distance effects into four intervals, $m \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. The distance intervals, in kilometers, are: $[0, 3000)$; $[3000, 7000)$; $[7000, 10000)$; $[10000, \text{maximum}]$; $BRDR_{ij}$ captures the presence of a contiguous border between partners i and j ; $LANG_{ij}$ and $CLNY_{ij}$ account for common language and colonial ties, respectively.

Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b) address the potential endogeneity of regional trade agreements by using the average treatment effect methods (see for example Wooldridge, 2010) that have proven to be successful in the treatment of RTA endogeneity by Baier and Bergstrand (2007). In particular, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) propose two solutions to the endogeneity problem. In order to account for the unobservable linkages between the endogenous RTA covariate and the error term in trade regressions, one should either use first-differenced data or employ bilateral (country-pair) fixed effects. Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b) chose the second option because it allowed them to construct bilateral trade costs from the estimates of the country-pair fixed effects. For the same reasons we adapt their approach in this study. Taking all of the above considerations into account, we use PPML to estimate the following econometric specification of the trade equation in our structural system:

$$X_{ij,t} = \exp [\pi_1 RTA_{ij,t} + \pi_2 POLICY_{ij,t} + \mu_{i,t} + \mu_{j,t} + \mu_{ij}] + \epsilon_{ij,t}. \quad (55)$$

suspicious trade costs parameters. Here, we use 3-year intervals in order to improve efficiency, but we also experiment with 4- and 5-year lags to obtain qualitatively identical and quantitatively very similar results, which are available upon request.

¹⁹We use all regional trade agreements as notified to the World Trade Organization. The RTA data is available for download at <http://www.ewf.uni-bayreuth.de/en/research/RTA-data/index.html>.

Here, $\mu_{i,t}$ denotes the time-varying source-country dummies, which control for the outward multilateral resistances and countries' output shares. $\mu_{j,t}$ encompasses the time varying destination country dummy variables that account for the inward multilateral resistances and total expenditure. μ_{ij} denotes the set of country-pair fixed effects that should absorb the linkages between $RTA_{ij,t}$ and $\epsilon_{ij,t}$ in order to control for potential endogeneity of the former. Importantly, μ_{ij} will absorb all time-invariant gravity covariates from Equation (54) along with any other time-invariant determinants of trade costs that are not observable by the researcher. Due to the inclusion of time-varying source-country dummies alongside bilateral dummies, we choose the country-specific internal trade costs as our references. Hence, the estimates of μ_{ij} should be interpreted as relative to their internal trade counterparts μ_{ii} .

4.2 Estimating the Effects of Canada's RTAs

Given the focus of our counterfactual experiments on CETA, we find it useful and instructive to study the specific impact of Canada's integration efforts on Canada's bilateral trade with its RTA partners. To do this, we amend equation (55) by introducing a vector of RTA dummies, $RTA_CAN_{ij,t}$, that are specific to Canada:

$$X_{ij,t} = \exp[\pi_1 RTA_{ij,t} + \pi_2 POLICY_{ij,t} + \pi_3 RTA_CAN_{ij,t} + \mu_{i,t} + \mu_{j,t} + \mu_{ij}] + \epsilon_{ij,t}. \quad (56)$$

In the empirical analysis, we evaluate the effects of Canada's agreements in three steps. First, we allow for the average effect of Canada's agreements to differ from the average effect of all other RTA agreements that were signed during the period of investigation. To do this, we replace $RTA_CAN_{ij,t}$ with a single variable, $ALL_RTAs_CAN_{ij,t}$, which takes a value of one if Canada had an agreement with a given partner during the period of investigation, and it is equal to zero otherwise. Next, we allow for agreement-specific effects by replacing $ALL_RTAs_CAN_{ij,t}$, which imposes a common effect of all of Canada's agreements, with a vector of indicator variables for each agreement. This specification will enable us to distinguish for example between the effects of the Canada-Israel agreement vs. the effects of the Canada-Chile FTA. We also allow for the possibility of asymmetric agreement specific effects of the Canadian trade agreements, by splitting each of the individual agreement dummies into directional bilateral variables. This specification will enable us to distinguish, for example, between the effects of the Canada-Israel agreement on Canadian imports vs. Canadian exports. In the empirical analysis, we demonstrate that each of the above specification delivers insightful and statistically significant results. Finally, we also study the effects of Canada's BITs on trade by separating them from the average BIT estimate that we obtain first.

4.3 On the Construction of Bilateral Trade Costs

In principle, one can use the estimates of the country-pair fixed effects $\hat{\mu}_{ij}$ from equation (55) to measure directly international trade costs. However, due to missing (or zero) trade flows, we cannot identify the complete set of bilateral fixed effects.²⁰ Therefore, in order

²⁰Fortunately, our data (due to its aggregate nature) enables us to obtain estimates of the bilateral fixed effects for all but eight pairs including Angola-Iraq, Angola-Turkmenistan, Angola-Uzbekistan, Austria-

to construct bilateral trade costs, we adopt a procedure similar to the one from Anderson and Yotov (2016) who propose a two-step method to construct bilateral trade costs, while accounting for RTA endogeneity with country-pair fixed effects. Applied to our setting, the first step of the Anderson-Yotov procedure obtains estimates of the country-pair fixed effects μ_{ij} from equation (55). Then, in the second stage, the estimates of the bilateral fixed effects are regressed on the set of standard gravity variables from equation (54):

$$\begin{aligned} \exp(\widehat{\mu}_{ij}) = & \exp \left[\sum_{m=1}^4 \tilde{\pi}_m \ln DIST_{ij,m} + \tilde{\pi}_5 BRDR_{ij} + \tilde{\pi}_6 LANG_{ij} + \right. \\ & \left. + \tilde{\pi}_7 CLNY_{ij} + \tilde{\mu}_i + \tilde{\mu}_j \right] + \varepsilon_{ij,t}, \end{aligned} \quad (57)$$

where $\varepsilon_{ij,t}$ is a standard remainder error and the exporter- an importer-specific fixed effects will control for all possible intra-national trade costs in each trading partner. As described in Agnosteva, Anderson, and Yotov (2014), the exporter and importer fixed effects, $\tilde{\mu}_i$ and $\tilde{\mu}_j$, are included in equation (57) to account for the fact that the bilateral fixed effects from specification (55) are estimated relative to intra-national trade costs. The estimates from equation (57) are used in combination with actual data on the gravity variables to construct the missing observations in the vector of bilateral fixed effects $\widehat{\mu}_{ij}$. Then, the complete set of bilateral trade costs $\tilde{\mu}_{ij}$ is used to construct power transforms of bilateral trade costs in the absence of RTAs:

$$\left(\widehat{t}_{ij}^{NORTA}\right)^{1-\sigma} = \exp[\tilde{\mu}_{ij}]. \quad (58)$$

The set of bilateral trade costs that account for the presence of RTAs is constructed from Equation (56) and Equation (58):

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\widehat{t}_{ij,t}^{RTA}\right)^{1-\sigma} = & \exp[\widehat{\pi}_1 RTA_{ij,t} + \widehat{\pi}_2 POLICY_{ij,t} \widehat{\pi} + \widehat{\pi}_3 RTA_CAN_{ij,t}] \\ & \times \left(\widehat{t}_{ij}^{NORTA}\right)^{1-\sigma}. \end{aligned} \quad (59)$$

The estimates of Equation (58) and Equation (59) can be used in combination with the structural system from our theory to simulate and study the general equilibrium dynamic effects of CETA and/or TPP on trade, growth, and FDI in Canada, its partners, and in the world.

4.4 Estimating FDI Gravity and FDI Frictions

The goal in this section is to translate our theoretical FDI-gravity system from Equations (51)-(53) into an econometric model that will deliver estimates of bilateral FDI frictions for all pairs in our sample and an estimate of the elasticity of FDI with respect to BITs. The latter can be used as a key parameter in counterfactual experiments that will simulate the effects of increased FDI on Canada's economy.

Iran, Iraq-Uzbekistan, Ghana-Turkmenistan, Qatar-Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan-Venezuela. In robustness analysis we reproduce our results treating trade costs between the pairs as missing, and we find virtually identical results.

In order to avoid taking a stand on a particular year as a steady state, to take full advantage of the novel UNCTAD FDI database, which we describe in the next section, and to capitalize on the latest developments in the estimation of gravity equations, we will estimate the FDI gravity system given by Equations (51)-(53) in a panel specification over the whole period of investigation:

$$FDI_{ij,t}^{stock,value} = \frac{\beta\phi^2\eta_i^2\delta_M}{1-\beta+\beta\delta_M}\omega_{ij,t}^\xi \frac{E_{i,t}}{P_{i,t}} \frac{Y_{j,t}}{M_{i,t}}, \quad (60)$$

$$P_{i,t} = \left[\sum_{j=1}^N \left(\frac{t_{ji,t}}{\Pi_{j,t}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{Y_{j,t}}{Y_t} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}, \quad (61)$$

$$\Pi_{j,t} = \left[\sum_{i=1}^N \left(\frac{t_{ji,t}}{P_{i,t}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{E_{i,t}}{Y_t} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}. \quad (62)$$

The first step in translating Equation (60) into an econometric equation is to model the FDI frictions $\omega_{ij,t}$. Following the existing empirical FDI literature, we decompose $\omega_{ij,t}$ into four components.²¹ The first component is related to characteristics of the country of FDI origin, i.e. the parent/source country. The variables in this group have dimension (i, t) . Based on the findings from Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski (2012) and Blonigen and Piger (2014), possible robust determinants of FDI in the country of origin include corporate tax rate, corruption, and bureaucratic red tape, among others. The second component of $\omega_{ij,t}$ includes FDI determinants that are related to the destination/host country. The variables in this group have dimension (j, t) . Possible candidates here include level of corruption, internal tensions, corporate tax rate, bureaucratic red tape, quality of institutions, etc. The third component of $\omega_{ij,t}$ includes time-invariant bilateral characteristics for the two partners such as bilateral distance, common official language, colonial relationships, which have been found to be among the most robust FDI determinants by both Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski (2012) and Blonigen and Piger (2014). These variables have dimension (ij) .

Finally, the last, and most important component of $\omega_{ij,t}$ for our purposes and from a policy standpoint includes time-varying bilateral determinants of FDI. The variables in this group have dimension (ij, t) . Estimates from Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski (2012) and Blonigen and Piger (2014) suggest that this group of covariates should include regional trade agreements, with special effects of customs unions, and currency unions. Interestingly, neither Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski (2012) nor Blonigen and Piger (2014) distinguish between the average effects of RTAs and the effects of RTAs covering FDI. FDI chapters and provisions are an important part of contemporary integration efforts. For example, the investment chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership has already attracted significant attention and is a subject of heated debate and negotiation among all members, including Canada. Similarly, as discussed earlier, the potential for FDI between Canada and the

²¹The two leading empirical FDI studies are Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski (2012) and Blonigen and Piger (2014). The objective of both studies is to identify a set of robust FDI determinants. Both papers utilize Bayesian Model Averaging and each of them comes up with a set of covariates which vary across the four dimensions that we propose to capture in our study.

countries from the European Union takes central stage in the negotiations of CETA. To the best of our knowledge, the effects on FDI of such deeper integration agreements which cover FDI have not been quantified yet. More importantly, we are not aware of any estimates of the effects of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) on foreign direct investment. Given that promoting and liberalizing FDI is the main objective of BITs, we expect that the effects of such agreements should be positive and significant. It is our goal in this study to obtain partial equilibrium estimates of the effects of deeper Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs) and Bilateral Investment Treaties and to test whether such agreements have had significant influences on foreign direct investment. If so, our EIA and BIT estimates can be used to quantify their general equilibrium incidence on trade, growth and investment in Canada.

In order to achieve our goals, we propose the following flexible econometric specification, which will enable us to obtain econometric estimates of the effects of the time-varying bilateral FDI determinants, which are of central interest to us, while at the same time we will control for the universe of observable and unobservable time-varying FDI determinants in the source and in the host countries as well as for all observable time-invariant robust FDI determinants from the literature:

$$\begin{aligned}
FDI_{ij,t}^{stock,value} &= \pi_1 BIT_{ij,t} + \pi_2 EIA_{ij,t} + \pi_3 FTA_{ij,t} + \pi_4 CUSTU_{ij,t} + \pi_5 PRTL_{ij,t} \\
&+ \pi_6 CURRU_{ij,t} + \sum_{m=7}^{10} \pi_m \ln DIST_{ij,m-6} + \pi_{11} BRDR_{ij} \\
&+ \pi_{12} LANG_{ij} + \pi_{13} CLNY_{ij} + \tilde{\nu}_{i,t} + \tilde{\nu}_{j,t} + \tilde{\varepsilon}_{ij,t}.
\end{aligned} \tag{63}$$

The right-hand side of the first line of Equation (63) includes time-varying covariates that we expect to influence FDI. Specifically, as noted earlier, Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski (2012) and Blonigen and Piger (2014) propose Free Trade Agreements ($FTA_{ij,t}$), CUSTOMS Unions ($CUSTU_{ij,t}$), and CURRENCY Unions ($CURRU_{ij,t}$) as robust determinants of FDI. In addition, we expect that the presence of deeper Economic Integration Agreements ($EIA_{ij,t}$), Partial Trade Agreements ($PRTL_{ij,t}$) and Bilateral Investment Treaties ($BIT_{ij,t}$) between partners i and j would also have positive impact on foreign direct investment. Accordingly, we add these covariates to the list of time-invariant FDI determinants.²²

The variables in the second line of Equation (63) include observable time-invariant covariates that have been established as robust FDI determinants. The first variable that we include here is the logarithm of bilateral distance ($DIST_{ij}$) between partners i and j . Motivated by the empirical trade literature, we split the effects of distance in four intervals, $m \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. The distance intervals, in kilometers, are: $[0, 3000)$; $[3000, 7000)$; $[7000, 10000)$; $[10000, \text{maximum}]$. We also account for the presence of a contiguous borders, common language, and colonial ties between partners i and j with three bilateral indicator variables: $BRDR_{ij}$, $LANG_{ij}$, and $CLNY_{ij}$, respectively. Finally, we use two sets of fixed effects to flexibly account for all possible directional (origin and destination) country-specific determinants of FDI. In particular, $\tilde{\nu}_{i,t}$ denotes the set of source country-time fixed effects, which will account for and absorb all time-varying country-specific variables that are related

²²In sensitivity analysis, we also experiment by estimating the effects of Canada's BITs vs. the rest of the BITs in our sample.

to the country of FDI origin, including the source country variables and parameters from specification (60). $\tilde{\nu}_{j,t}$ denotes the set of host country-time fixed effects, which will account for and absorb all time-varying country-specific variables that are related to the FDI destination country, including the source country variables and parameters from specification (60).

4.5 Income, Trade, and Foreign Direct Investment

We now turn to the econometric specification of our income equation. This analysis is important for three reasons. First, the income equation will enable us to test for a causal relationship between trade openness and the value of production. This topic has been of significant interest to both the academic and to the policy communities. Second, the income equation will enable us to test for a causal relationship between foreign direct investment and the value of production. To the best of our knowledge this is a novel relationship that has not been previously investigated in the literature, especially within a structural-estimation setting such as ours. In addition to testing whether FDI affects income, our analysis will demonstrate whether any of the standard covariates in the income regressions from the literature are biased due to the omission of FDI. Finally, the estimates of the income equation will enable us to recover four very important structural parameters, namely, the trade elasticity, $1 - \sigma$, the labor share in production, $1 - \alpha$, capital share in production, α , as well as the FDI share of production, ϕ .

In order to transform the theoretical specification for income into an econometric model, we follow the steps taken by Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b) and we expand on their analysis by introducing the additional effects of foreign direct investment. To obtain an estimating equation, we substitute equation (28) for prices into equation (31), solve for $Y_{j,t}$ and express the resulting equation in natural logarithmic form:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln Y_{j,t} = & \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln Y_t - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln \left(\frac{1}{\Pi_{j,t}^{1-\sigma}} \right) + \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \ln \left(\frac{A_{j,t}}{\gamma_j} \right) + \frac{(\sigma - 1)(1 - \alpha)(1 - \phi)}{\sigma} \ln L_{j,t} \\ & + \frac{(\sigma - 1)\alpha(1 - \phi)}{\sigma} \ln K_{j,t} + \frac{(\sigma - 1)\phi}{\sigma} \ln FDI_{j,t}^{q,in}, \end{aligned} \quad (64)$$

with inward FDI in quantities given by $FDI_{j,t}^{q,in} = \prod_{i=1}^N \left(\omega_{ij,t}^\xi M_{i,t} \right)^{\eta_i}$. We keep the expression for the outward multilateral resistance as a power transform, $\Pi_{j,t}^{1-\sigma}$, because we can recover this power term directly from the ‘lower level’ estimation procedures without the need to assume any value for the elasticity of substitution σ .²³ As demonstrated below, our methods also enable us to obtain our own estimate of σ .

While our theory translates into a simple and clear structural econometric model, obtaining sound estimates of the key coefficients in equation (64) requires us to address several important econometric challenges. First, we do not observe $A_{j,t}$ and data on γ_j are not available. To account for the latter, we introduce country-specific fixed effects ϑ_j . These country

²³In fact, we capitalize on the property of the PPML estimator to be perfectly consistent with structural gravity (see Fally, 2015; Anderson, Larch, and Yotov, 2015a), in order to recover the power transforms of the multilateral resistances directly from the directional gravity fixed effects.

fixed effects will also absorb any time-invariant differences and variation in technology $A_{j,t}$ at the country level. In order to control for additional time-varying effects that may have affected technology globally, we also introduce time fixed effects ν_t . The year fixed effects will also control for any other common time-varying variables that may affect output in addition to the time-varying covariates that enter our specification explicitly. In addition, the year dummies will absorb the structural world output term $\frac{1}{\sigma} \ln Y_t$, which may be measured with error.

Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b) argue that the country fixed effects and the year fixed effects in specification (64) will absorb most of the variability in technology $A_{j,t}$, however, it is still possible that we would miss some high-frequency moves in $A_{j,t}$ at the country-year level. We follow their approach to account for such movements by introducing several additional covariates as proxies for productivity. These include a direct TFP measure, a measure of R&D, and a measure of the occurrence of natural disasters. We label the vector of these additional covariates $TFP_{j,t}$.²⁴ Taking the above considerations into account, equation (64) becomes:

$$\ln Y_{j,t} = \kappa_1 \ln L_{j,t} + \kappa_2 \ln K_{j,t} + \kappa_3 \ln FDI_{j,t}^{q,in} + \kappa_4 \ln \left(\frac{1}{\Pi_{j,t}^{1-\sigma}} \right) + \nu_t + \vartheta_j + \varepsilon_{j,t}. \quad (65)$$

Here, $\kappa_1 = (\sigma - 1)(1 - \alpha)(1 - \phi)/\sigma$, $\kappa_2 = (\sigma - 1)\alpha(1 - \phi)/\sigma$, $\kappa_3 = (\sigma - 1)\phi/\sigma$ and $\kappa_4 = -1/\sigma$. Importantly, a significant estimate of the coefficient on the MR/trade openness term, $\hat{\kappa}_4$, will support a causal relationship of trade on income. In addition, $\hat{\kappa}_4$ can be used to recover the elasticity of substitution directly as $\hat{\sigma} = -1/\hat{\kappa}_4$.²⁵ With $\hat{\sigma}$ at hand, we can recover ϕ from κ_3 : $\hat{\phi} = \hat{\sigma}\hat{\kappa}_3/(\hat{\sigma} - 1)$. α can then be recovered from κ_2 : $\hat{\alpha} = \hat{\sigma}\hat{\kappa}_2/((\hat{\sigma} - 1)(1 - \hat{\phi}))$. Finally, our model implies the following structural relationship between the coefficients on the three covariates in (65), $\kappa_1 + \kappa_2 + \kappa_3 = 1 + \kappa_4$.

The next major challenge with the estimation of equation (65) is that our measure of trade openness, $\ln \left(\frac{1}{\Pi_{j,t}^{1-\sigma}} \right)$, is endogenous by construction, because it includes own national income. The issue is similar to the endogeneity concern in the famous Frankel and Romer (1999) study of the relationship between trade and income/growth. Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b) offer a structural foundation for the reduced-form trade-and-income specification from Frankel and Romer (1999), which enables them to also recover a structural estimate of the trade elasticity σ . We complement and extend the structural income-and-trade system of Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b) by introducing FDI as an important contributor to the determination of income. Specifically, in combination, equations (55) and

²⁴Further details on these variables and the data used for their construction appear in Section 5. We are aware of the successful efforts to estimate productivity with available firm-level data, cf. Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). However, the aggregate nature of our study does not allow us to implement those estimation approaches. The plausible estimates of the production function parameters that we obtain in the empirical analysis are encouraging evidence that our treatment of technology with controls and country as well as time fixed effects is effective.

²⁵The ability to estimate σ and correspondingly the trade elasticity $(1 - \sigma)$ is a nice feature of our model, especially because this parameter is viewed in the literature as the single most important parameter in international trade (see ACR and Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014). Furthermore, we will be able to compare our estimates with existing estimates in order to gauge the success of our methods.

(65) deliver our structural estimating system of income, trade openness, and FDI:

$$\begin{aligned} Trade : X_{ij,t} &= \exp [\pi_1 RTA_{ij,t} + \pi_2 POLICY_{ij,t} + \pi_3 RTA_CAN_{ij,t}] \\ &\times \exp [\mu_{i,t} + \mu_{j,t} + \mu_{ij}] + \epsilon_{ij,t}, \end{aligned} \quad (66)$$

$$\begin{aligned} Income : \ln Y_{j,t} &= \kappa_1 \ln L_{j,t} + \kappa_2 \ln K_{j,t} + \kappa_3 \ln FDI_{j,t}^{q,in} + \kappa_4 \ln \left(\frac{1}{\Pi_{j,t}^{1-\sigma}} \right) \\ &+ \nu_t + \vartheta_j + \varepsilon_{j,t}. \end{aligned} \quad (67)$$

Frankel and Romer (1999) use a version of *Trade equation* (66) to instrument for international trade, which enters their *Income equation* corresponding to equation (67) directly, to replace the structural term $\ln(1/\Pi_{j,t}^{1-\sigma})$. Instead, the effects of trade and trade openness on income are channeled via the structural trade term $\ln(1/\Pi_{j,t}^{1-\sigma})$ in equation (67). Importantly, this will enable us not only to test for a causal relationship between trade openness and income but also to recover an estimate for the elasticity of substitution $\hat{\sigma} = -1/\hat{\kappa}_3$.²⁶ Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b) propose a structural instrument that directly eliminates the endogenous components from our structural measure of trade openness. Mechanically, they achieve that by calculating the multilateral resistances based on international trade linkages only, i.e. by removing the intra-national components, which include national income and, therefore, cause endogeneity by construction.²⁷

$$\tilde{\Pi}_{i,t}^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{j \neq i} \left(\frac{t_{ij,t}}{P_{j,t}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{E_{j,t}}{Y_t}. \quad (68)$$

In the empirical analysis, we will employ this instrument in order to account for potential endogeneity of trade openness. In addition, we will also allow and account for potential endogeneity concerns related to labor, capital, TFP and FDI.

5 Data

In order to perform the analysis for this study, we compile a novel, balanced panel data set for 89 countries over the period 1990-20011, which includes data on foreign direct investment, trade flows, gross domestic product (GDP), employment, physical capital, various forms of regional trade agreements, currency unions, bilateral investment treaties, and natural disasters. In addition, we estimate bilateral trade costs and FDI frictions using data for the standard gravity variables including distance, common language, contiguity and colonial ties, which do not vary over time.²⁸ The lower bound of our time coverage (1990) was determined

²⁶In the empirical analysis below we estimate system (66)-(67) with the original Frankel-Romer methods and with our structural approach and we compare our results.

²⁷This procedure is akin to the methods from Anderson, Milot, and Yotov (2014), who use $\tilde{\Pi}_{i,t}^{1-\sigma}$ to calculate Constructed Foreign Bias, defined as the ratio of predicted to hypothetical frictionless foreign trade, aggregating over foreign partners only, $CFB_i = \tilde{\Pi}_{i,t}^{1-\sigma} / \Pi_{i,t}^{1-\sigma}$, where $\Pi_{i,t}^{1-\sigma}$ is the standard, all-inclusive outward multilateral resistance.

²⁸The list of countries and their respective labels in parentheses includes Angola (AGO), Argentina (ARG), Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Bangladesh (BGD), Belarus (BLR), Belgium (BEL), Brazil (BRA), Bul-

by the availability of FDI data. The upper bound in our sample (2011) was limited by the availability of capital stock data. Finally, we note that the countries in our sample account for most of the economic activity in the world. For example, the 89 countries that we cover accounted for more than 96 percent of world GDP and for more than 94 percent of FDI throughout the sample period.

Many of the data sources and variables used here are the same as in Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b) and Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015c) and we used the data sets from these studies as our foundation database.²⁹ Therefore, similar description of the data and data sources applies. Data on GDP, employment, and capital stocks are from the latest edition of the Penn World Tables 8.0.³⁰ The Penn World Tables 8.0 offer several GDP variables. Following the recommendation of the data developers and applying the approach by Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b), we employ *Output-side real GDP at current PPPs (CGDP^o)*, which compares relative productive capacity across countries at a single point in time, as the initial level in our counterfactual experiments, and we use *Real GDP using national-accounts growth rates (CGDP^{na})* for our income-based cross-country growth regressions. The Penn World Tables 8.0 include data that enables us to measure employment in effective units for all countries in our sample. To do this we multiply the *Number of persons engaged in the labor force* with the *Human capital index*, which is based on average years of schooling. Capital stocks in the Penn World Tables 8.0 are constructed based on accumulating and depreciating past investments using the perpetual inventory method. For more detailed information on the construction and the original sources for the Penn World Tables 8.0 series see Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2013). As a main measure for total factor productivity we use TFP level at current PPPs. In addition, we also employ a measure for research and development (R&D) spending, which is taken from the World Development Indicators. Finally, we experiment with an instrument for occurrence of natural disasters, which comes from EM-DAT - The International Disaster Database.³¹

Aggregate trade data come from the United Nations Statistical Division (UNSD) Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). In order to construct internal aggregate trade, which is needed for our estimations and also for the counterfactual analysis, we used

garia (BGR), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), China (CHN), Colombia (COL), Croatia (HRV), Czech Republic (CZE), Cyprus (CYP), Denmark (DNK), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt (EGY), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Ghana (GHA), Greece (GRC), Hong Kong (HKG), Hungary (HUN), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Iran (IRN), Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Kazakhstan (KAZ), Kenya (KEN), Korea, Republic of (KOR), Kuwait (KWT), Lebanon (LBN), Lithuania (LTU), Latvia (LVA), Luxembourg (LUX), Macedonia (MKD), Malaysia (MYS), Malta (MLT), Mexico (MEX), Morocco (MAR), Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Nigeria (NGA), Norway (NOR), Pakistan (PAK), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Qatar (QAT), Romania (ROU), Russia (RUS), Saudi Arabia (SAU), Singapore (SGP), Slovak Republic (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), South Africa (ZAF), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Syria (SYR), Thailand (THA), Turkey (TUR), Ukraine (UKR), United Kingdom (GBR), United States (USA), Uzbekistan (UZB), Venezuela (VEN), and Vietnam (VNM).

²⁹We use as a base the dataset of Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015c) who add seven additional countries from the European Union to the original data set of Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b). We extend the data set of Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015c) by adding data on foreign direct investment, bilateral investment treaties, and currency unions.

³⁰These series are now maintained by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre and reside at <http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/>.

³¹<http://www.emdat.be/database>.

the ratio between aggregate manufacturing in gross values and total exports of manufacturing goods in order to construct a multiplier at the country-time level.³² We then used this multiplier along with data on aggregate exports to project the values for intra-national trade. Data on gross manufacturing production, which came from the United Nations' Ind-Stat database, enabled us to construct multiplier indexes for half of the countries in our sample and for the period 1990-2006. We used a rest-of-the-world (ROW) multiplier index to construct the rest of the internal trade data. The original source for data on various forms of regional trade agreements is the World Trade Organization.³³ The RTA data employed here is constructed by Mario Larch.³⁴ Finally, data on the standard gravity variables, i.e., distance, common borders, common language, and colonial ties are from the CEPII's Distances Database.³⁵

In addition to the data from Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b) and Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015c), we use data on FDI stocks, bilateral investment treaties, and currency unions. FDI data come from two sources. The main source of our FDI data is the newly constructed Bilateral FDI Statistics database of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).³⁶ UNCTAD's FDI data covers inflows, outflows, inward stock, and outward stock for 206 countries over the period 1990-2011. Data are collected from national sources and international organizations. In order to ensure maximum coverage, mirror data from partner countries is used as well. The second source of FDI data is the International Direct Investment Statistics database, which is constructed and maintained by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).³⁷ OECD's data offers detailed statistics for inward and outward foreign direct investment flows and positions (stocks) of the OECD countries, including transactions between the OECD members and non-member countries. We use the OECD data to ensure consistency and maximum coverage. Finally, given our theory, we focus our analysis on FDI stocks (positions), which is also the FDI category for which most data are available. We constructed our indicator variable for bilateral investment treaties (BITs) from the original UNCTAD data on international investment agreements (IIAs).³⁸ To capture the presence of currency unions in our sample, we used the data set of de Sousa (2012).³⁹

³²An alternative approach is to construct intra-national trade flows as the difference between GDP data, which are widely available, and data on total exports. However this procedure is inconsistent because GDP is a measure of value added while total exports are a gross measure.

³³The regional trade agreements data are available at <http://www.ewf.uni-bayreuth.de/en/research/RTA-data/index.html>.

³⁴A detailed description of the RTA data used here and the data set itself can be found at <http://www.ewf.uni-bayreuth.de/en/research/RTA-data/index.html>.

³⁵CEPII's databases can be accessed at http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp.

³⁶UNCTAD's Bilateral FDI Statistics database can be found and accessed from UNCTAD's web site at <http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx>. We are extremely grateful to Marco Fugazza who shared these data and who answered many questions about it. We are also very grateful to researchers at Global Affairs Canada, and to Felix Stips from the University of Bayreuth who helped with the downloading and the formatting of earlier versions of the UNCTAD FDI data.

³⁷We thank George Pinel from Drexel University for his help with the downloading and formatting of the OECD FDI data.

³⁸This database is maintained by UNCTAD's IIA Section and can be found at <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA>.

³⁹The data set and the codes to create it can be found at <http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm>.

6 Estimation Results: Trade and FDI Gravity

In this section, we present and discuss our estimation results for trade costs and FDI frictions and the relationship between income, trade openness, and foreign direct investment.

6.1 Trade Frictions

We obtain and discuss our estimates of trade frictions in two steps. First, we estimate and discuss the effects of RTAs with special focus on the Canadian agreements that entered into force during the period of investigation. Then, we present and discuss our estimates of bilateral trade costs.

6.1.1 On the Effects of RTAs

We start with a discussion of our estimates of the effects of regional trade agreements, which is obtained with a PPML estimator from Equation (56):

$$X_{ij,t} = \exp [\pi_1 RTA_{ij,t} + \pi_2 POLICY_{ij,t} + \pi_3 RTA_CAN_{ij,t} + \mu_{i,t} + \mu_{j,t} + \mu_{ij}] + \epsilon_{ij,t}. \quad (69)$$

Here, as noted earlier, the bilateral fixed effects μ_{ij} control for potential RTA endogeneity, and the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, $\mu_{i,t}$ and $\mu_{j,t}$, respectively, account for the structural multilateral resistance terms and for output and expenditure shares.

We start with a specification, which imposes a common average effect across all agreements that entered into force among the 89 countries in our sample during the period of investigation:

$$X_{ij,t} = \exp [\pi_1 RTA_{ij,t} + \mu_{i,t} + \mu_{j,t} + \mu_{ij}] + \epsilon_{ij,t}. \quad (70)$$

The results from this specification are reported in the first column of Table 1, where we obtain an estimate of the average treatment effect of RTAs that is equal to 0.324 (std.err. 0.105),⁴⁰ which is readily comparable to the corresponding summary mean estimate of 0.36 (std.dev. 0.42) from the meta analysis study of more than 2500 estimates from 159 papers conducted by Head and Mayer (2014). This is encouraging evidence of the representativeness of our sample and gives us confidence to use our estimate of the RTA effects to proxy for the effects of trade liberalization in the counterfactual experiments below.

Next, we introduce two additional policy covariates that may influence trade flows. Specifically, we add to our gravity equation two indicator variables that account for the presence of bilateral investment treaties (*BIT*) and for currency unions (*CURRU*). Our estimate for the effects of currency unions is economically small and only marginally significant. In terms of magnitude, the effect of the currency unions that we obtain is significantly smaller than the summary estimates presented by Head and Mayer (2014), however this result is robust across alternative specifications. The estimate of the effects of BITs is large and it is statistically significant at any conventional level. In fact, the BIT effects that we

⁴⁰Our RTA estimate suggests an increase of 38% ($[\exp(0.324) - 1] \times 100$) in bilateral trade flows among member countries.

obtain on bilateral trade are larger as compared to the corresponding effects of RTAs. Multi-national production is a natural explanation for this result. We are not aware of any study that documents the positive effects of BITs on bilateral trade and we think that this result deserves further investigation.

In the next experiment we allow for the effects of Canada's free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties to differ from the rest of the agreements that entered into force during the period of investigation:

$$X_{ij,t} = \exp[\pi_1 RTA_{ij,t} + \pi_2 POLICY_{ij,t} + \pi_3 RTA_CAN_{ij,t} + \pi_4 BIT_CAN_{ij,t}] \times \exp[\mu_{i,t} + \mu_{j,t} + \mu_{ij}] + \epsilon_{ij,t}. \quad (71)$$

Here, $RTA_CAN_{ij,t}$ takes a value of one for all of Canada's trade agreements, and it is equal to zero otherwise. Similarly, $BIT_CAN_{ij,t}$ takes a value of one for all of Canada's bilateral investment treaties, and it is equal to zero otherwise. In addition, we have removed Canada's agreements from $RTA_{ij,t}$ and Canada's BITs from $POLICY_{ij,t}$. During the period of investigation Canada entered several major agreements including those with Mexico and US (NAFTA, in force January 1, 1994), with Israel (in force January 1, 1997), with Chile (in force July 5, 1997), with Costa Rica (in force November 1, 2002), with European Free Trade Association (in force July 1, 2009), with Peru (in force August 1, 2009), and with Colombia (in force August 15, 2011). Due to the short time coverage, we are not able to investigate the effects of the agreements signed after 2008. In addition, Costa Rica does not enter our sample. Thus, our focus will be on the agreements with Mexico, US, Israel, and Chile. In addition, Canada entered a large number of BITs.

Estimation results based on specification (71) are reported in column (3) of Table 1. Four main findings stand out. First our estimate on $RTA_CAN_{ij,t}$ is positive and statistically significant at any conventional level. This suggests that, on average, Canada's RTAs have lead to significant increase in bilateral trade with Canada's RTA partners. Second, we find that the average effect of Canada's RTAs is significantly larger (almost three times) than the effect of all other RTAs in our sample. A possible explanation for this result is careful selection of RTA partners. With respect to the effects of BITs, (i) we note that Canada's BITs stimulated Canada's bilateral trade, and (ii) that the effects of Canada's BITs are not different than the average BIT estimate for the rest of the countries in our sample.

Next, we allow for agreement-specific effects of each of Canada's agreement for which our sample allows meaningful identification:

$$X_{ij,t} = \exp[\pi_1 RTA_{ij,t} + \pi_2 POLICY_{ij,t} + \pi_3 BIT_CAN_{ij,t} + \pi_4 CAN_ISR_{ij,t}] \times \exp[\pi_5 CAN_CHL_{ij,t} + \pi_6 CAN_MEX_{ij,t} + \pi_7 CAN_USA_{ij,t}] \times \exp[\pi_8 USA_MEX_{ij,t} + \mu_{i,t} + \mu_{j,t} + \mu_{ij}] + \epsilon_{ij,t}. \quad (72)$$

Since NAFTA involves three members, we also explicitly allow for separate effects of NAFTA on trade between US and Mexico. Estimation results based on specification (72) are reported in column (4) of Table 1. Two main findings stand out. First, we note that each of the RTA estimates that we obtain is large, positive and highly statistically significant. Second, our results indicate that the effects of Canada's RTAs are quite heterogeneous. Based on these estimates, the effect of NAFTA on trade with Mexico is the largest, and the effect of the

bilateral RTA with Chile is the smallest. A possible explanation for these results is the deeper integration combined with pronounced comparative advantage differences between Canada and Mexico as NAFTA members. The positive effect of NAFTA on trade between Canada and US is half the size of the corresponding estimate for Canada and Mexico, but it is still large and statistically significant.

We finish this section by estimating an econometric model that allows for directional RTA effects for each of Canada’s agreements. For brevity, we do not write the explicit specification. However, the interpretation of the resulting estimates, which appear in column (5) of Table 1 should be clear. For example, in order to investigate the directional effects on the agreement between Canada and Israel, we break the single RTA dummy, *CAN_ISR*, into two variables, which capture the effects of this agreement on Canada’s exports to Israel, *CAN_ISR_EXP*, and the effects on Canada’s imports from Israel, *CAN_ISR_IMP*.

The main messages from the estimates column (5) of Table 1 are that Canada’s RTAs have successfully promoted Canada’s bilateral trade in each direction. This is supported by the fact that all estimates in column (5) are large, positive and statistically significant at any conventional level. Without any exception each of our directional estimates of the effects of Canada’s RTAs is significantly larger as compared to the average RTA estimate for the rest of the world. Second, our estimates reveal significant asymmetries between the effects of Canada’s RTAs. For example, we find that the agreements with Israel, Chile, and Mexico (especially with Mexico) lead to a disproportional increase in imports as compared to exports, while NAFTA lead to relatively more Canadian exports to the United States. We believe that the asymmetries that we obtain here are interesting from an academic perspective and important from a policy point of view. It should be noted that these results are not a reflection of comparative advantage, since comparative advantage forces and their changes over time are already controlled for in our specification by the exporter-time and the importer-time fixed effects. Possible explanations for this results may be unobserved trade policy variables as well as outsourcing patterns. While such an analysis is beyond the scope of this study, we think that these findings deserve further investigation with more detailed data that may generate more robust results and further insights.

6.1.2 Bilateral Trade Costs

Next, we discuss the estimates of bilateral trade costs that we obtain from the pair-fixed effects μ_{ij} in specification (56). Before we do so, we briefly discuss the estimates of the coefficients on the standard gravity covariates from the second-stage estimating equation (57), which we use to fill in the eight missing bilateral fixed effects. For brevity, we report the estimates directly in the estimating equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \exp(\hat{\mu}_{ij}) = & \exp\left[\frac{-\mathbf{0.968}}{(0.070)} \ln DIST_{ij,1} - \frac{\mathbf{0.961}}{(0.063)} \ln DIST_{ij,2} - \frac{\mathbf{0.970}}{(0.059)} \ln DIST_{ij,3}\right] \\ & \times \exp\left[\frac{-\mathbf{0.952}}{(0.057)} \ln DIST_{ij,4} + \frac{\mathbf{0.328}}{(0.083)} BRDR_{ij} + \frac{\mathbf{0.263}}{(0.074)} LANG_{ij}\right] \\ & \times \exp\left[\frac{\mathbf{0.190}}{(0.117)} CLNY_{ij} + \hat{\mu}_i + \hat{\mu}_j\right]. \end{aligned} \quad (73)$$

As can be seen from Equation (73), all coefficient estimates have the expected signs and reasonable magnitudes. We find that distance is a strong impediment to trade. All distance estimates are significant at any conventional level (standard errors are given in parenthesis

below the respective point estimates). In addition, we find that the estimates of the effects of distance are not statistically different from each other, which is in contrast with the result from Eaton and Kortum (2002) that shorter distances have a larger negative effect on trade. A possible explanation for this result is that we construct our distance variables as the interaction between dummy variables for each distance interval and the actual distance for a given pair, while the distance variables in Eaton and Kortum (2002) are simply the indicator intervals. Contiguous borders and common language promote international trade. The estimates on *BRDR* and *LANG* are positive, large, statistically significant and comparable to estimates from the existing literature as summarized in the meta-analysis estimates of Head and Mayer (2014). The estimate of the coefficient on *CLNY* is positive but it is not statistically significant. Overall, we find the gravity estimates from Equation (73) to be plausible, and we are comfortable using them to construct bilateral trade costs for our counterfactuals below.

We employ the estimates from Equation (73) together with data on the gravity variables to construct a complete set of bilateral trade costs $\{\hat{t}_{ij}\}$ which are used in our counterfactual experiments. Without going into details, we briefly discuss several properties of the bilateral trade costs, which are constructed as $\hat{t}_{ij} = \widehat{\exp(\hat{\mu}_{ij})}^{1/(1-\sigma)}$, where $\widehat{\exp(\hat{\mu}_{ij})}$ is the predicted value from (73) and we use a conventional value of the elasticity of substitution, $\sigma = 6$. First, without any exception and in accordance with theory, all estimates of t_{ij} are positive and greater than one.

Second, we find that the estimates of the bilateral fixed effects vary widely but intuitively across the country pairs in our sample. For example, we obtain the lowest (in absolute value) estimates of t_{ij} for countries that are geographically and culturally close and economically integrated. The smallest estimates of bilateral trade costs are for the pairs Malaysia-Singapore (1.50) and for Germany-Netherlands (1.56). On the other extreme of the distribution of trade costs, we obtain some large (in absolute values) estimates of t_{ij} for countries that are isolated economically and geographically. The largest (in absolute value) estimates are for the pairs Uzbekistan-Dominican Republic (103.2) and for Angola-Macedonia (82.99). While these estimates are extremely high, they do reflect the fact that these pairs trade very little and also reveal that the standard proxies for trade costs tend to severely underestimate trade costs at the upper tail of the distribution. This is also reflected by the mean of our trade cost estimates, which, with a value of 5.46, is significantly larger as compared to the average trade cost value reported in the trade costs survey of Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).

6.2 FDI Frictions

Next, we turn to the FDI gravity estimates, which are obtained from Equation (63):

$$\begin{aligned}
FDI_{ij,t}^{stock,value} &= \pi_1 BIT_{ij,t} + \pi_2 EIA_{ij,t} + \pi_3 FTA_{ij,t} + \pi_4 CUSTU_{ij,t} + \pi_5 PRTL_{ij,t} \\
&+ \pi_6 CURRU_{ij,t} + \sum_{m=7}^{10} \pi_m \ln DIST_{ij,m-6} + \pi_{11} BRDR_{ij} \\
&+ \pi_{12} LANG_{ij} + \pi_{13} CLNY_{ij} + \tilde{v}_{i,t} + \tilde{v}_{j,t} + \tilde{\varepsilon}_{ij,t},
\end{aligned} \tag{74}$$

In most of our specifications we employ the OLS estimator, which is the current standard estimator for FDI stock and flow equations. In some robustness experiments we also employ

the PPML estimator, which is the leading technique for trade gravity estimations. Our first set of OLS estimates includes only the standard gravity variables and the results are reported in the first column of Table 2. Several findings stand out. In accordance with the results from the existing literature, we find that the main trade gravity variables are also significant determinants of FDI. Thus for example, based on the estimates for $DIST_{ij,1} - DIST_{ij,4}$, we see that distance is a significant impediment to FDI. All estimates of the effects of distance are negative, large, and statistically significant at any conventional level. Two differences between the estimates of the effects of distance on trade and on FDI are worth to mention. First, the FDI estimates are larger (almost twice larger in fact) as compared to their trade counterparts. This suggests that distance is a stronger impediment to FDI as compared to trade. Second, we do not find any significant non-monotonic distance effects on FDI. Pushing inference to the limit, one may argue the effects of distance on FDI are the strongest for the smallest and for the largest distance intervals. However, none of the estimates is statistically different from the rest.

We also find strong effects for the other time-invariant gravity covariates. As expected, all else equal, sharing a common border promotes FDI. In terms of magnitude, the estimate on $BRDR$ (0.380, std.err. 0.229) is similar to the corresponding estimates from the literature and also to our own estimate from Equation (73). As expected, all else equal, sharing a common official language facilitates bilateral FDI. We estimate positive, large, and significant effects of $LANG$. Our estimates of the effects of language on FDI are comparable to our estimate of the language effects on trade from Equation (73), but they are stronger/larger than the corresponding values obtained for goods trade. The natural explanation for this result is that most FDI relationships require continuous personal interaction and communication. Finally, we obtain very large and strong effects of colonial ties on FDI. Our estimates suggest that the effects of colonial ties are much stronger than those of contiguity and of common language. This is in sharp contrast with our estimate on $CLNY$ from Equation (73) and with the most recent findings for the effects of colonial ties on international trade. For example, Anderson and Yotov (2010b) conclude that the effects of colonial ties on manufacturing trade have slowly disappeared during the 1990s. However, this is not the case with FDI where we establish that colonial relationships are still a very important determinant of FDI.

Next, we turn to the estimates of the time-varying covariates from Equation (74). The results from column (2) introduce BITs, RTAs, and Currency Unions to our econometric model. In contrast to the existing literature (see Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski, 2012; Blonigen and Piger, 2014), we do not find significant effects of regional trade agreements (RTA) and currency unions ($CURRU$) on FDI. We offer two possible explanations for these results. First, our findings may be driven by the specific coverage of our sample. While this is indeed possible, we believe that our sample is representative in terms of country coverage. As documented in the data section, the countries in our sample account for more than 94 percent of FDI in the world. In addition, the new UNCTAD data are the best available data in terms of time coverage. For comparison, almost all previous studies are based on cross-section data for a particular year, usually 2001. A second possible explanation for our insignificant results is that our origin-time and host-time fixed effects have absorbed and account for the significant effects of the above-mentioned covariates from previous studies. Thus, our findings cast doubt on the robustness of the positive effects of RTAs and currency unions

from previous studies. Importantly, we do obtain a positive and (marginally) significant estimate of the effects of bilateral investment treaties on FDI. Specifically, our BITs estimate of 0.209 (std.err. 0.113) suggests an increase of about 23% ($[\exp(0.209) - 1] \times 100$) in FDI among BIT member countries. This result is in contrast with the mostly insignificant BIT estimates from the existing literature and offers evidence in support of bilateral efforts to promote FDI through the formation on investment treaties.

In column (3) of Table 2 we break the effects of RTAs per type of agreement. Specifically, we investigate the effects of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs), Partial Agreements (PRTL), and Customs Unions (CUSTU). Several findings stand out. First, we note that all estimates, expect for the estimate on *EIA*, are positive. Second, the estimates from column (3) reveal that partial agreements and customs unions have had positive impact on bilateral FDI. Third, we find that once the effects of RTAs are broken by type, the impact of BITs increases in magnitude and significance.⁴¹

We finish our analysis of the FDI gravity estimates with three robustness experiments. In column (4) of Table 2, we only use data for the post 2000 period. The motivation for this experiment is that we observe large increases in the available FDI data post 1999. The estimates from column (4) are identical to their counterparts from column (3). Next, in column (5) we introduce pair fixed effects. The motivation for this experiment is that the pair fixed effects will control for all possible observable and unobservable bilateral time-invariant determinants of FDI and also would mitigate/eliminate endogeneity of the policy variables. The main result from column (5) is that none of the policy variables is significant.

Finally, in the last column of Table 2 we employ the PPML estimator, which has established itself as the preferred and leading technique for trade gravity regressions due to its ability to account for heteroskedasticity, which leads to inconsistent trade gravity estimates. Estimating the model in multiplicative form will also enable us to take into account the information contained in the zero trade flows. The estimates from column (6) reveal the following. First, the estimates of all standard gravity variables are still significant and have signs as expected, however they are halved in size. Second, the PPML estimates of the effects of FTAs and partial agreements are positive and statistically significant. Finally, we see that the BIT estimate becomes negative, large, and statistically significant. The latter is an unexpected finding, which cast doubts on the PPML estimates.

6.3 Income, Trade, and FDI

Next, we turn to the estimation of our *Income equation*, which will enable us to test for causality between trade openness and income and between FDI and income. The *Income equation* will also deliver estimates of the capital, labor, and FDI shares in production and of the elasticity of substitution:

$$\ln Y_{j,t} = \kappa_1 \ln L_{j,t} + \kappa_2 \ln K_{j,t} + \kappa_3 \ln FDI_{j,t}^{q,in} + \kappa_4 \ln \left(\frac{1}{\prod_{j,t}^{1-\sigma}} \right) + \nu_t + \vartheta_j + \varepsilon_{j,t}. \quad (75)$$

⁴¹In Table 3, we allow for Canada specific BIT effects as well as for directional effects of Canada's BITs to find that none of these estimates are statistically significant.

Estimates from various specifications of equation (75) are reported in Table 4. All specifications include year fixed effects and country fixed effects, and we report standard errors that are robust or bootstrapped when a generated regressor enters the estimating equation directly. We start our analysis with several specifications that establish the representativeness of our sample. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, respectively, we offer results from an unconstrained and from a constrained estimation of a standard Cobb-Douglas production value function. As can be seen from the table, both the labor and the capital shares in each specification are within the theoretical bounds $[0; 1]$ even though the capital share is a bit higher than the standard corresponding value from the literature.⁴²

In columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, we add to the standard labor and capital variables our structural trade openness and FDI measures. The estimates in column (3) are unconstrained, while the specification in column (4) imposes the structural restrictions of our theory, which implies that $\kappa_1 + \kappa_2 + \kappa_3 = 1 + \kappa_4$. The constrained and the unconstrained results are very similar. In fact they are not statistically different from each other. This is encouraging preliminary evidence in support of our model. It also enables us to focus our interpretation on the constrained estimates from column (4), which impose the structural restrictions of our theory.

We see from column (4) that all estimates have expected signs and are statistically significant at any conventional level. Importantly, and similar to Frankel and Romer (1999), we find that trade openness leads to higher income. This is captured by the negative and significant estimate of the coefficient of our inverse theoretical measure of trade openness $\ln\left(1/\widehat{\Pi}_{j,t}^{1-\sigma}\right)$. Thus, our model and estimates offer evidence for a causal relationship between trade and income. In addition, we obtain a positive and a highly statistically significant estimate of the effect of FDI on the host-country income. This result is also in accordance with our theory and establishes a causal effect of FDI on income. This finding also uncovers an additional general equilibrium channel through which FDI affects trade. To the best of our knowledge the impact of FDI on income has not been empirically established in the existing literature.

The specification in column (5) addresses our inability to control for high-frequency (country-year) technology changes with the set of country and year fixed effects that we added to our econometric model, as motivated in Section 4.5. To do this, we introduce as a covariate a direct TFP measure, which, as discussed in Section 5, we take from the Penn World Tables. As expected, we obtain a positive and significant estimate on the coefficient of $TFP_{j,t}$. Furthermore, we find that the addition of the TFP measure does not affect our findings qualitatively, as all estimates are still statistically significant and with signs as expected. However, the magnitudes of the effects of labor, capital, and trade openness have changed. Specifically, controlling for TFP decreases the effects of effective labor and trade openness and leads to a higher estimate of the effect of capital. The estimate of the effect of FDI is unchanged.

In order to further test the robustness of our results with respect to productivity, we also add R&D and the occurrence of natural disasters as possible candidates that may affect productivity and income and we re-estimate the specification from column (5) with these additional covariates. However, as can be seen from the estimates in Table 5, we find that

⁴²In the sensitivity analysis for our counterfactuals we experiment with alternative values for α .

none of the effects of these variables are statistically significant and that their introduction does not affect the estimates of the effects of the other covariates in our specification. Therefore, we do not include these additional productivity covariates directly in our analysis. However, below we capitalize on these results by using the occurrence of natural disasters as an instrument in the IV specifications of our *Income equation*.

In columns (6) of Table 4, we account for endogeneity of trade openness. To do this, we employ a mixture of instruments including the structural instrument of Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2016), which we also derive and describe in Section 4.5, and which is constructed after explicitly removing the endogenous components from the OMR/trade openness index. In addition, we also employ the third lag of our openness regressor in order to mitigate simultaneity concerns. The IV results in column (6) are encouraging. All variables retain their signs and are statistically significant. The estimate on FDI increase in magnitude, while the trade openness estimate is smaller and only marginally significant. In addition, as is evident from the test statistics reported in the bottom panel of Table 4, our instruments pass the underidentification, the weak identification, and also the overidentification tests.⁴³ Inspection of the first stage IV estimates reveals that both of our instruments are highly statistically significant and contribute significantly to explain the variability in the endogenous trade openness regressor.

Next, we control for endogenous capital, endogenous labor, endogenous TFP, and endogenous FDI in columns (7), (8), (9), and (10), respectively, of Table 4. Our approach is to endogenize one additional variable at a time while still treating all variables that already have been endogenized in previous specifications as endogenous. As a result, the estimates in column (10) are obtained with all covariates from Equation (75) being treated as endogenous. In column (7), we use lagged capital stocks and occurrence of natural disasters to instrument for current capital stock. Then, in column (8), we also allow for endogenous labor in addition to endogenous capital and endogenous trade openness, and we add the log of population to instrument for labor in addition to the instruments for capital and those for openness. In column (9), we add lagged TFP as instruments for current TFP. Finally, in column (10), we also instrument for FDI with the lag of this variable in addition to the set of all other instruments. The estimates from column (10), where trade openness, capital, labor, TFP, and FDI are all treated as endogenous are not statistically different from those in each of the previous four columns. The main differences are that the estimate of the effect of FDI in column (10) is more precisely estimated and it is a bit larger in magnitude. Finally, we note that, as evident from the indexes in the bottom panel of Table 4, the instruments that we use in each of specifications (7)-(10) pass all IV tests.

The estimates in the last column of Table 4 represent our main results because they are obtained after we control for endogeneity of all covariates (as in column (10)), while also simultaneously imposing the structural constraints of our model (as in column (4)). Once again, we find that the estimates of all covariates have expected signs, reasonable magnitudes, and are statistically significant. We capitalize on the structural properties of

⁴³The “weak identification” (WeakId) Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) are obtained with the Kleibergen-Paap Wald test, which is appropriate when the standard error i.i.d. assumption is not met and the usual Cragg-Donald Wald statistic (Cragg and Donald, 1993), along with the corresponding critical values proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005), are no longer valid. This is true in our case, where the standard errors are either robust or bootstrapped.

our model to recover estimates of the elasticity of substitution, $\hat{\sigma}$, of the capital share, $\hat{\alpha}$, and of the FDI share $\hat{\phi}$. Using the structural relationships from Section 4, we obtain a value of $\hat{\sigma} = -1/\hat{\kappa}_4 = 4.186$ (std.err. 0.397), which satisfies the theoretical restriction that the elasticity of substitution should be greater than one. In addition, our estimate of $\hat{\sigma}$ falls comfortably within the distribution of the existing (Armington) elasticity numbers from the trade literature, which usually vary between 2 and 12,⁴⁴ and it is not statistically different from the summary meta-analysis measure of $\sigma = 6.13$ reported in Head and Mayer (2014). With the value of $\hat{\sigma}$ at hand, we then recover an estimate of the FDI share ϕ from the estimate of κ_3 as $\hat{\phi} = \hat{\sigma}\hat{\kappa}_3/(\hat{\sigma} - 1) = 0.008$ (std.err. 0.004). We are not aware of any existing estimate of the effects of FDI on income with which to compare our result. However, we find the small magnitude of $\hat{\phi}$ to be plausible and we are encouraged by the fact that the estimate of the effect of FDI on income is positive and statistically significant. Finally, we use the estimates of σ and ϕ in combination with the estimate of κ_2 to recover an estimate of the capital share $\hat{\alpha} = \hat{\sigma}\hat{\kappa}_2/((\hat{\sigma} - 1)(1 - \hat{\phi})) = 0.599$ (std.err. 0.033). The capital share that we recover is a bit larger than the standard corresponding value from the literature. However, it is within the theoretical bounds $[0; 1]$. In the robustness analysis for our counterfactuals we experiment with alternative values for α in order to test the sensitivity of our results.

Overall, we view the parameter estimates of α , σ , and ϕ that we obtain in this section to be plausible. Furthermore, we view the stable and robust performance of our results across all the specifications in Table 4, which range from a very basic unconstrained OLS model (column (4)) to a constrained IV specification that allows for all structural terms to be endogenous (column (11)), as encouraging evidence in support of our model. Finally, in addition to confirming that trade openness leads to higher levels of income, we offer novel evidence for a causal relationship between FDI and host-country income.

7 Counterfactual Experiments

Our theoretical developments lead to a structural framework that can be used for ex-post and ex-ante policy evaluations. We use our estimated trade costs, FDI frictions, and structural parameters to calibrate our theoretical model and investigate the ex-ante trade, capital, and FDI effects of CETA. We simulate three counterfactuals: one where CETA as an RTA leads to a reduction of trade costs among the CETA member countries only, one where trade costs are reduced by CETA as an RTA but also by CETA as a BIT, and one where additionally to a reduction of trade costs CETA reduces FDI frictions as a BIT.

We first describe the counterfactual setup, which can be extended to accommodate numerous policy experiments related to trade liberalization, capital accumulation, FDI promotion, etc. Then, we will present the empirical results of the basic CETA counterfactual experiment in three steps. First, we study the CETA effects on trade. Second, we analyze the CETA effects on physical capital accumulation. And third, we will present the effects of CETA reducing trade costs on FDI. Afterward, we will describe the two additional counterfactuals.

⁴⁴See Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Broda, Greenfield, and Weinstein (2006) and Simonovska and Waugh (2014). Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) and Head and Mayer (2014) each offer a summary and discussion of the available estimates of the elasticity of substitution and trade elasticity parameter.

7.1 Counterfactual Setup

The counterfactuals will be performed in six steps.

Step 1: Obtain trade cost estimates by estimating Equations (55) and (57). Then calculate bilateral trade costs for the baseline:

$$t_{ij,t}^{1-\sigma} = \exp \left[\pi_1 RTA_{ij,t} + POLICY_{ij,t} \pi + \sum_{m=2}^5 \pi_m \ln DIST_{ij,m} + \pi_6 BRDR_{ij} \right. \\ \left. \pi_7 LANG_{ij} + \pi_8 CLNY_{ij} \right]. \quad (76)$$

Additional trade costs may have to be calculated for specific counterfactual experiments and policy analysis. For example, in order to evaluate the effects of CETA, we have to obtain a new set of bilateral trade costs, which simulate the formation of CETA. Specifically, we construct:

$$(\widehat{t}_{ij,t}^{CETA})^{1-\sigma} = (\widehat{t}_{ij,t}^{RTA})^{1-\sigma} \times \exp[\widehat{\pi}_1 CETA_{ij,t}]. \quad (77)$$

Here, we apply the average estimate of the effects of RTAs, $\widehat{\pi}_1$, and $CETA$ is an indicator variable that is equal to one for pairs involving Canada on one side and each of the European Union countries on the other. The differences between the values for the key variables of interest are obtained as a response to the change in the trade costs vector from $(\widehat{t}_{ij,t}^{RTA})^{1-\sigma}$ to $(\widehat{t}_{ij,t}^{CETA})^{1-\sigma}$. The described procedure is equivalent to replacing the original RTA dummy, $RTA_{ij,t}$, from Equation (76) with a new RTA variable that accounts for the formation of CETA, resulting in $RTA_{ij,t}^c$. Then, recalculate $(\widehat{t}_{ij,t}^{RTA})^{1-\sigma}$ by replacing $RTA_{ij,t}$ with $RTA_{ij,t}^c$ in Equation (76). The differences between the values for the key variables of interest should be obtained as a response to the change in the trade costs vector due to the introduction of CETA, i.e. due to replacing $RTA_{ij,t}$ with $RTA_{ij,t}^c$.

Step 2: Obtain investment cost estimates by estimating Equation (74). Then calculate bilateral investment costs for the baseline:

$$(\widehat{\omega}_{ij,t})^\xi = \exp \left[\widehat{\pi}_1 BIT_{ij,t} + \widehat{\pi}_2 EIA_{ij,t} + \widehat{\pi}_3 FTA_{ij,t} + \widehat{\pi}_4 CUSTU_{ij,t} + \widehat{\pi}_5 PRTL_{ij,t} \right. \\ \left. + \widehat{\pi}_6 CURRU_{ij,t} + \sum_{m=7}^{10} \widehat{\pi}_m \ln DIST_{ij,m} + \widehat{\pi}_{11} BRDR_{ij} + \widehat{\pi}_{12} LANG_{ij} \right. \\ \left. + \widehat{\pi}_{13} CLNY_{ij} \right]. \quad (78)$$

Again, additional investment costs may have to be calculated in order to perform specific counterfactual experiments. For example, if we want to evaluate a BIT between Canada and the USA, we have to set $BIT_{ij,t}$ to one for Canada and the USA, resulting in $BIT_{ij,t}^c$. Then we should recalculate $(\widehat{\omega}_{ij,t})^\xi$ by replacing $BIT_{ij,t}$ with $BIT_{ij,t}^c$ in Equation (78). The differences between the values for the key variables of interest are obtained as a response to the change in the investment costs vector due to the introduction of the BIT between Canada and the United States, i.e. due to replacing $BIT_{ij,t}$ with $BIT_{ij,t}^c$.

Step 3: Complement the estimates of trade costs and FDI frictions from steps 1 and 2 with parameter estimates from the literature in order to complete the set of parameters needed for our counterfactual experiments. Table 6 summarizes the parameters that we used. The own estimate of $\alpha = 0.599$, the capital share in production, is a bit higher than the standard value of the literature (which is around 0.3, see Acemoglu, 2009), but still within the theoretical and empirical bounds. σ , the elasticity of substitution, falls nicely within the bounds established in the literature (see for surveys Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014; Head and Mayer, 2014). β , the consumer discount rate, is borrowed from the literature. Our estimates reveal a share of FDI in the production function (ϕ) of 0.0075. We are not aware of any comparable estimates. Note that this share is quite low and we therefore expect the changes introduced by allowing for FDI flows as compared to a model without FDI for the effects on trade flows and capital accumulation to be small. $\eta_i = \eta$ is the share of technology capital from one country as a share from total technology capital used. Due to the lack of better estimates, we set this share equal to $1/N$, where N is the number of countries in our data. For similar reasons, we set ξ , the elasticity of FDI payments with respect to the FDI openness measure, equal to one. The depreciation rate for physical and technology capital is set equal to 0.061, an estimate that we obtained from our capital estimating equation in Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2016).

Step 4: Using the estimates for trade and investment costs described in Steps 1 and 2, and estimates from the literature for the production function parameters α , ϕ , η_i , and ξ , the elasticity of substitution σ , the physical and technology capital depreciation rates δ_K and δ_M , and a value for β from Step 3, and data for $L_{j,t}$, $Y_{j,t}$ and $E_{j,t}$, and assuming that we are in a steady-state, i.e., $K_{j,t+1} = K_{j,t}$ and $M_{j,t+1} = M_{j,t}$, we recover country-specific, theory-consistent steady-state physical and technology capital stocks alongside with preference-adjusted technology A_t/γ_j in the baseline from the steady-state equation system given by Equations (37)-(44). Note that as we recover K_j^{SS} , M_j^{SS} and A_j/γ_j from data and estimated parameters, we ensure that our baseline is perfectly consistent with our GDP and employment data.

Step 5: Using the values obtained in Steps 1 and 4, we solve our system given by equations (37)-(44) in the counterfactual.

Step 6: After solving the model, we calculate the effects on trade, and on physical and technology capital accumulation. We report the results for all countries individually, as well as aggregates for the world, the CETA member countries, and for all CETA-non-member countries, which we call the Rest of the World (ROW).

- *Trade effects:* Trade effects are calculated as percentage changes in overall real exports for each country between the baseline and the counterfactual:

$$\Delta x_i \% = \frac{\left(\sum_{j \neq i} X_{ij}^c / P_i^c - \sum_{j \neq i} X_{ij} / P_i \right)}{\sum_{j \neq i} X_{ij} / P_i} \times 100,$$

where X_{ij} is calculated according to Equation (37) divided by P_i to transform it into real values, and X_{ij}^c are the counterfactual trade flows. The effects for the world as a whole are calculated by summing over all countries, i.e. $\Delta x_{\text{World},t}\% = \left(\sum_i \sum_{j \neq i} X_{ij,t}^c / P_i^c - \sum_i \sum_{j \neq i} X_{ij,t} / P_i \right) / \left(\sum_i \sum_{j \neq i} X_{ij,t} / P_i \right) \times 100$. For the trade effects within CETA, we only sum over the within-CETA trade relationships. For ROW, we sum all remaining bilateral trade relationships \bar{j} : $\Delta x_{\text{ROW},t}\% = \left(\sum_i \sum_{\bar{j} \neq i} X_{ij,t}^c / P_i^c - \sum_i \sum_{\bar{j} \neq i} X_{ij,t} / P_i \right) / \left(\sum_i \sum_{\bar{j} \neq i} X_{ij,t} / P_i \right) \times 100$.

- *Physical capital effects:* The effects on physical capital are also calculated as the percentage changes between the baseline and the counterfactual:

$$\Delta K_i\% = \frac{(K_i^c - K_i)}{K_i} \times 100.$$

The results for the world are calculated by summing over all countries, i.e. $\Delta K_{\text{World}}\% = (\sum_i K_i^c - \sum_i K_i) / (\sum_i K_i) \times 100$. For CETA, we only sum capital stocks over the CETA members in the baseline and counterfactual and calculate the change of this sum, while the results for ROW are calculated as the change of the sum of capital stocks for the remaining countries.

- *FDI effects:* For FDI we report four different effects. First, we report outward FDI in quantities, which is given by:

$$FDI_i^{q,out} = \prod_{j=1}^N \left(\omega_{ij}^\xi M_i \right)^{\eta_i}. \quad (79)$$

The change in $FDI_i^{q,out}$ is calculated as:

$$\Delta FDI_i^{q,out}\% = \frac{(FDI_i^{q,out,c} - FDI_i^{q,out})}{FDI_i^{q,out}} \times 100.$$

The results for the world are calculated by summing over all countries, i.e. $\Delta FDI_{\text{World}}^{q,out}\% = (\sum_i FDI_i^{q,out,c} - \sum_i FDI_i^{q,out}) / (\sum_i FDI_i^{q,out}) \times 100$. For CETA, we only sum $FDI_i^{q,out}$ and $FDI_i^{q,out,c}$ over the CETA members in the baseline and counterfactual, respectively, and calculate the change of this sum, while the results for ROW are calculated as the change of the sum of $FDI_i^{q,out}$ and $FDI_i^{q,out,c}$ for the remaining countries.

Next, we report inward FDI in quantities, which is given by:

$$FDI_i^{q,in} = \prod_{j=1}^N \left(\omega_{ji}^\xi M_j \right)^{\eta_j}. \quad (80)$$

The change in $FDI_i^{q,in}$ is calculated as:

$$\Delta FDI_i^{q,in}\% = \frac{(FDI_i^{q,in,c} - FDI_i^{q,in})}{FDI_i^{q,in}} \times 100.$$

The results for the world are calculated by summing over all countries, i.e. $\Delta FDI_{\text{World}}^{q,in} \% = (\sum_i FDI_i^{q,in,c} - \sum_i FDI_i^{q,in}) / (\sum_i FDI_i^{q,in}) \times 100$. For CETA, we only sum $FDI_i^{q,in}$ and $FDI_i^{q,in,c}$ over the CETA members in the baseline and counterfactual, respectively, and calculate the change of this sum, while the results for ROW are calculated as the change of the sum of $FDI_i^{q,in}$ and $FDI_i^{q,in,c}$ for the remaining countries.

Values of FDI are given as earnings and payments for overall outward and inward FDI, respectively. Specifically, remember that we defined expenditures as $E_j = Y_j + \phi\eta_j \sum_{i \neq j} Y_i - \phi(1 - \eta_j)Y_j$ in Equation (16). Hence, we can define the real value of outward FDI by its earnings, i.e.

$$FDI_i^{v,out} = \frac{\phi\eta_i}{P_i} \sum_{j \neq i} Y_j. \quad (81)$$

The change in $FDI_i^{v,out}$ is calculated as:

$$\Delta FDI_i^{v,out} \% = \frac{(FDI_i^{v,out,c} - FDI_i^{v,out})}{FDI_i^{v,out}} \times 100.$$

The results for the world are calculated by summing over all countries, i.e. $\Delta FDI_{\text{World}}^{v,out} \% = (\sum_i FDI_i^{v,out,c} - \sum_i FDI_i^{v,out}) / (\sum_i FDI_i^{v,out}) \times 100$. For CETA, we only sum $FDI_i^{v,out}$ and $FDI_i^{v,out,c}$ over the CETA members in the baseline and counterfactual, respectively, and calculate the change of this sum, while the results for ROW are calculated as the change of the sum of $FDI_i^{v,out}$ and $FDI_i^{v,out,c}$ for the remaining countries.

The overall real payments for FDI utilized in country i , i.e. real value of inward FDI, is given by

$$FDI_i^{v,in} = \phi(1 - \eta_i) \frac{Y_i}{P_i}. \quad (82)$$

The change in $FDI_i^{v,in}$ is calculated as:

$$\Delta FDI_i^{v,in} \% = \frac{(FDI_i^{v,in,c} - FDI_i^{v,in})}{FDI_i^{v,in}} \times 100.$$

The results for the world are calculated by summing over all countries, i.e. $\Delta FDI_{\text{World}}^{v,in} \% = (\sum_i FDI_i^{v,in,c} - \sum_i FDI_i^{v,in}) / (\sum_i FDI_i^{v,in}) \times 100$. For CETA, we only sum $FDI_i^{v,in}$ and $FDI_i^{v,in,c}$ over the CETA members in the baseline and counterfactual, respectively, and calculate the change of this sum, while the results for ROW are calculated as the change of the sum of $FDI_i^{v,in}$ and $FDI_i^{v,in,c}$ for the remaining countries.

7.2 CETA as an RTA

We begin our counterfactual analysis with an investigation of the effects of CETA as an RTA, i.e., we assume that CETA reduces bilateral trade costs between CETA members according to the average estimated trade cost reduction effect of RTAs. The analysis is developed in three steps: first, we describe the effects on trade, followed by a discussion of the CETA effects on physical capital accumulation and on FDI.

7.2.1 CETA Effects on Trade

Estimation results for the CETA effects on trade are reported in Table 7. In order to decompose the various competing channels through which CETA affects trade flows in the world, we follow the steps from Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015b). We start with the analysis of the “Direct Effects” of CETA, where the partial equilibrium CETA effects on trade costs translate into increases in trade among member countries, but have no effect on trade between members and outsiders and among outsiders. Next, in a scenario labeled “Conditional GE”, we allow for general equilibrium (GE) effects, which are channeled through the multilateral resistance terms (38) and (39) at constant output and expenditures. In the third step, we also allow for changes in trade costs to affect factory-gate prices and thus we endogenize income. We label this scenario “Full GE Static”. In a fourth step, we unlock the dynamic channel where, in addition to all previous effects, changes in trade costs due to CETA also affect physical capital accumulation. This is the “Full GE Dynamic” scenario. Last, we add technology capital in our “Full GE Dynamic” scenario, in order to highlight the effects of technology capital for trade flows. This scenario is labeled “Full GE Dynamic FDI”. For each of the five scenarios, we report estimates of the CETA effects on trade. In addition, where appropriate, we discuss the corresponding changes in the multilateral resistance terms, which are the key vehicle relating growth, trade, and FDI.

Direct CETA Effects on Trade. By construction, the direct CETA effects are triggered by a single, uniform decrease in bilateral trade costs among the CETA members.⁴⁵ Thus, the direct effects are confined across members only. Our average RTA estimate suggests an increase of 103.6% ($[\exp(0.711) - 1] \times 100$) in bilateral trade flows among CETA members, which translates into an increase of 0.48% in total world trade. As noted above, there is no direct CETA effect on outsiders. These results are summarized at the bottom panel of Table 7 in column (2), where we report aggregate CETA estimates for the world, members, non-members (ROW). Looking at the rest of column (2) of Table 7, we see that the increase in total real exports varies among the CETA countries. Slovakia, Cyprus, Latvia, Czech Republic, Croatia, and Bulgaria are the CETA members that register the smallest increase in trade, varying between 0.18 percent for Slovakia, and 0.32 percent for Bulgaria. The biggest winners from CETA in terms of increase in real exports are Canada (8.3%), Great Britain (1.68%), and Ireland (0.85%). It is clear from our estimates that Canada is the biggest winner in terms of increase in real trade flows. The intuition is clear too: CETA will open up the whole large European market for Canada. At the same time, amongst the European countries, we see that the countries that will gain the most are those countries with similar language and for whom Canada is an important trade partner already.

Conditional GE Effects of CETA on Trade. In column (3) of Table 7 we report indexes that capture the general equilibrium CETA effects on member and non-member countries which are channeled through changes in the multilateral resistance terms at con-

⁴⁵In principle, our framework can be used to accommodate any changes in bilateral trade costs, which can be pair specific, e.g. the removal of tariffs or the elimination of NTBs. This approach is for example taken in Francois, Manchin, Norberg, Pindyuk, and Tomberger (2013) for the evaluation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. As the estimates of trade costs are of prime importance for the quantification of the static and dynamic welfare gains, this may explain part of the differences in the results between other studies and ours.

stant/exogenous output and expenditures. Our estimates suggest significant “Conditional GE” effects of CETA. Overall, we find that once we allow for these additional GE forces, the increase in trade among CETA members declines from the direct effect of 103.6% to 98.2%. See the bottom panel of of Table 7, where we report aggregate CETA estimates for the world, members, and non-members (ROW). The intuitive explanation is trade diversion. The new, lower trade costs among members make trade with the CETA countries more attractive at the expense of trade with the rest of the world. This is also reflected in the negative effect of -0.20% on total real exports, which we obtain for the CETA-non-member countries (ROW). In combination, the positive CETA effects for members and the negative CETA effects for non-members translate into a decrease of the positive effect for the world from 0.48% to 0.26%. Hence, taking only into account the changes in the trade structure holding output and expenditures constant, we will see only a slight increase in world trade.

The “Conditional GE” effects of CETA are quite heterogeneous across members and across non-members. The biggest winners in terms of trade creation among the CETA member countries are Canada (6.05%), Great Britain (1.25%), and Lithuania (0.65%). Our country-specific findings suggest that (i) as expected from theory, the trade diversion forces through the multilateral resistance terms act in the opposite direction of the direct CETA effects, and (ii) that the trade diversion effects are much stronger for the European economies and reduce the direct, trade creation effects for many, specifically small EU countries substantially. The reason for the latter lies in the nature of CETA: while Canada gains 28 trading partners with preferential access, the EU countries only gain one. This asymmetry is reflected in the magnitudes of the trade creation and trade diversion effects.

The “Conditional GE” CETA effects on outsiders are smaller but comparable in size to the effects of some smaller EU CETA-member countries. Our estimates suggest that the two biggest losers from trade diversion are Macedonia and the United States. Each of these countries will suffer a decrease in total real exports of more than 0.43% due to CETA. The negative effects for the United States and Macedonia can easily be understood: Canada has a trade agreement due to NAFTA and is one of the major trading partners for the United States. Hence, a preferential agreement where Canada integrates with such a huge market as the European Union will show effects for trade with the United States. For a full-fledged evaluation that may help to inform policy makers about the potential impact of CETA, a simultaneous consideration of a possible conclusion of a trade agreement between the United States and the EU (such as the one currently negotiated as Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnerships, TTIP) would be of interest. Concerning Macedonia, one has to keep in mind that Macedonia is not part of the EU, but has itself agreements to preferentially trade with the EU countries (the so called Stabilisation and Association Agreement, which entered into force in 2004). However, an agreement such as CETA will not liberalize trade between Canada and Macedonia. As due to CETA trade between Canada and the EU countries will be spurred, Macedonia will suffer from trade diversion.

Full GE Static Effects of CETA on Trade. Next, we allow for additional responses of the factory gate prices and income due to the change in trade costs triggered by CETA. Results are reported in column (4) of Table 7. Intuitively, the additional effects should benefit producers in member countries, because they will enjoy more favorable mill prices, and should hurt producers in non-member countries. The change in mill prices translates into a change in output and expenditures. Thus, in effect, by allowing for these additional

effects we endogenize output and expenditures. The changes in output and expenditures will translate into additional effects on trade directly, because output and expenditures enter the gravity equation explicitly, and indirectly, through the output and expenditure effects on the multilateral resistances.

Overall, we find some additional GE effects through this channel. The gains for CETA members in terms of percentage change in total exports amount to 99.4%, about 1.2 percentage points larger than the “Conditional GE” effects from column (3). These results reveal additional gains for CETA producers due to the increase in their factory gate prices. The average negative effect on the rest of the world is actually smaller (about -0.16%) as compared to the negative “Conditional GE effect” of -0.20% from column (3). The explanation is that, on average, producers in non-member countries suffer lower factory gate prices, however, the favorable output and expenditure change in CETA members partly offsets the negative trade diversion effects on outsiders. This result calls for a more detailed look at individual countries, which we do next.

Turning to specific countries, we find significant increases in the benefits for members and decreases in the negative effects for many non-members. The additional effects on some CETA members are sizable. For example, total real exports from Canada increase from 6.05% to 6.71%, and that for Great Britain from 1.25% to 1.35%. There is also a slight change in ordering between the “Conditional GE” scenario and the “Full GE Static” scenario, which suggests that producers in different EU countries will be affected differently (for example, France is now more heavily affected than Sweden, and Ireland more heavily than Italy).

The additional GE effects on non-members are quite heterogeneous. Overall, we see a slight decline of the negative trade diversion effects. However, there are also countries which see increases in their negative changes. The most heavily affected country, Macedonia, sees an increase in its negative total real export change when accounting for changes in factory gate prices from -0.48% to -0.36% . Similarly, the United States sees a relatively substantial increase from -0.44% to -0.36% . However, in absolute values the change is smaller for the United States compared to Macedonia (0.08 compared to 0.12). The most important reason is country size: the United States is a big country, and hence its producer prices are less affected when accounting for output and expenditure changes. On the other hand-side, the positive country-size changes of the CETA countries, most importantly for Canada, will exert an additional positive impact on the consumer prices in the United States. Similar effects will occur in Macedonia, but as Macedonia is a comparable small country, the changes in the foreign producer prices and their output and expenditure are stronger and lead to a smaller increase of real exports of Macedonia. In combination with the large effects for members, the relatively small negative effects for non-members offer encouraging evidence for the net effects on trade of CETA. Specifically, when taking into account factory-gate price changes, real world trade flows increase by about 0.05 percentage points. Anderson and Yotov (2016) extend the iceberg trade costs metaphor and interpret such net effects as global efficiency gains.

Dynamic Effects of CETA on Trade. Next, we describe the additional dynamic CETA effects on trade which are channeled via physical capital accumulation. The results are reported in column (5) of Table 7. First, we estimate an additional dynamic effect. Comparison between the average effects on the CETA members in the “Full GE Static” scenario and in the “Full GE Dynamic” scenario reveal an additional increase in total real trade of

about 0.13 percentage points in the dynamic setting. See the bottom panel of Table 7. The negative effect on the rest of the world falls from -0.16% in the static scenario to -0.05% in the dynamic scenario. We also obtain a net efficiency gain of 0.43% for the world as a whole. Second, we find that the additional dynamic effects lead to additional benefits for individual CETA members, which vary by country. Once again, Canada is on top with total gains in exports of 8.33% , followed by Great Britain with trade gains of 1.62% . Third, while the dynamic effects have not lead to significant changes in the ordering of CETA members in terms of their gains, we note that even the small EU countries and new members register additional dynamic gains from CETA. In contrast, for the non-members quite substantial ordering occur. For example, the negative effects for Macedonia under the “Full GE Static” scenario of -0.36 turn into a positive change of 0.04 . The reason is that part of the additional growth in income and expenditure is also spend on non-member countries.

Dynamic Effects of CETA on Trade with FDI. Last, we describe a scenario, where we take not only physical capital accumulation into account, but additionally allow for FDI through technology capital. This scenario is labeled “Full GE Dynamic FDI” and the results are reported in column (6) of Table 7.

Let us start with the overall effects. We find a slight decrease in total real exports among CETA members from 102.41% to 102.32% when allowing for FDI. On the other hand, the negative effects on the CETA-non-members become a bit larger and world real trade flows increase. This shows that additionally accounting for FDI will lead to larger efficiency gains for the world. The reason is that CETA will trigger additional investment in technology capital in the CETA countries, which will lead to FDI into foreign countries, increasing the value of their factors and output. The additional FDI will thereby mitigate the negative trade diversion effects for those countries. However, not all outside countries gain. Actually, the pattern is quite heterogeneous. For example, while Angola, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia see now slight increases in their overall real exports with FDI when they had negative effects without FDI, countries like the United States, Norway and Mexico (the most negatively affected countries) see increases in their negative effects as compared to a situation without FDI.

In order to shed more light on these results, we will study the effects on physical capital accumulation in the next section, followed by a study of the FDI effects. This will provide further insights into the FDI channel.

7.2.2 CETA Effects on Physical Capital Accumulation

One of the two main mechanisms that lead to dynamic effects in our framework is through physical and technology capital accumulation. Physical capital accumulation is at the heart of neoclassical growth models. More recent work by Wacziarg (2001), Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2007), Baldwin and Seghezza (2008) and Wacziarg and Welch (2008) confirms the empirical relevance of the links between trade policy and economic growth.⁴⁶ Thus, our estimates of

⁴⁶Employing a panel of 57 countries for the period of 1970 to 1989, Wacziarg (2001) finds that physical capital accumulation accounts for about 60% of the total positive impact of openness on economic growth. Baldwin and Seghezza (2008) and Wacziarg and Welch (2008) confirm these findings for up to 39 countries for two years (1965 and 1989) and a set of 118 countries over the period 1950 to 1998, respectively. Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2007) demonstrate the role of factor accumulation to reproduce the large observed increases

the effects of CETA on capital accumulation can be interpreted as CETA effects on growth.

Table 8 reports results for changes in physical capital and FDI. In column (2) of Table 8 we report the physical capital changes from the “Full GE Dynamic” scenario, i.e. from our model where we take into account all GE effects and physical capital accumulation, but ignore FDI (technology capital). Several findings stand out. First, we find that CETA will promote capital accumulation in member countries. The intuition is that CETA will lead to an increase in the factory gate prices in member countries and to a decrease in the factory gate prices in non-members. Therefore, consumers/investors from CETA members will find it more beneficial to invest. We find the largest physical capital accumulation effects for Canada (3.99%), Macedonia (0.87%), and Great Britain (0.56%). Canada and Great Britain are also the countries with the largest changes in their total real exports. Macedonia profits from the additional capital accumulation and switches from negative trade flow effects to positive ones. The smallest gains in terms of capital accumulation amongst the CETA members are for Slovakia (0.016%) and Czech Republic (0.022%). This again resembles the ordering of the trade effects in terms of gains in real exports. Second, as expected, we find that CETA will deter capital accumulation in non-member countries. Mexico (−0.03%), the United States (−0.03%), and Norway (−0.02%) are among the most affected countries.

Column (3) of Table 8 shows the capital accumulation results for the “Full GE Dynamic FDI” scenario. Compared to column (2), we find some interesting differences. First, when comparing the overall statistics, we find a slight increase of capital accumulation within the CETA countries. This increase is substantially driven by the increase of physical capital accumulation in Canada. Some CETA member countries actually decrease their physical capital accumulation compared to a situation without FDI (see for example Cyprus, Latvia or Estonia). Further, the negative effects on CETA-non-members on capital accumulation gets magnified a bit. However, also here the effects are quite heterogeneous. For some non-member countries, such as Macedonia and Turkmenistan we see a substantial decrease in physical capital accumulation, which even turns negative when CETA is in place in the scenario with FDI. The reason is that in these countries inward FDI decreases which decreases the value marginal product of physical capital. For other non-member countries, such as Mexico, China, and Russia, the negative effect on physical capital accumulation due to CETA gets mitigated when taking FDI flows into account. The reason is that here the decrease in inward FDI flows due to CETA are accompanied by decreases in outward FDI flows. Hence, the disinvestment is shifted more towards technology capital than towards physical capital for these countries. For the world overall, we see an decrease in world capital stock accumulation from 0.083% to 0.081%.

7.2.3 CETA Effects on FDI

We next turn to the FDI implications of CETA. It is important to remind the reader that CETA is only assumed to reduce trade costs between Canada and the EU in the counterfactual experiment considered at the moment. Here, we do not allow for any reduction in FDI frictions due to CETA. Thus, all changes in FDI described below are exclusively due to trade liberalization and, naturally, the FDI effects only occur in our “Full GE Dynamic

in trade shares after modest tariff reductions.

FDI” scenario. We thereby distinguish between outward and inward FDI stocks, as well as quantities and values of FDI.

Let us start with the effects on outward FDI in quantities, which are reported in column (4) of Table 8. Several findings stand out. First, we find that CETA will promote outward FDI in member countries. The intuition is that CETA will lead to an increase in the factory gate prices in member countries and to a decrease in the factory gate prices in non-members. Therefore, consumers/investors from CETA members will find it more beneficial to invest. We find the largest change in outward FDI for Canada (4.09%), Great Britain (0.57%), and Ireland (0.39%). Note that the change in outward FDI for all these countries is smaller than the change for physical capital. The reason is that physical capital accumulation depends on real GDP (see Equation (43)), while outward FDI (which is equal to changes in M_j) depends on real expenditures (see Equation (44)). The difference between real GDP and real expenditures are FDI earnings and payments. If the change in FDI earnings is smaller than the change in FDI payments, then expenditures will increase less than GDP, leading to a larger change in physical capital accumulation than change in outward FDI. This is likely to happen in the CETA members because, due to CETA, GDP in the member countries increases, which increases their attractiveness as hosts for FDI.

Turning to non-member countries, we obtain small, and partly positive effects on outward FDI. Even though FDI investments have become more expensive on average due to increases in their factory gate price, the increase of the value marginal product of FDI in CETA members leads to more outward investments from some non-member countries (such as Ethiopia, Tanzania, Dominican Republic). For others, we find negative effects, but smaller ones than for physical capital. Hence, this channel and the intuition for the results is different from the one that applies to the change in physical capital investments, which decrease in most CETA-non-member countries.

The change of inward FDI stock in quantities is for all countries the same (0.09%). The reason is that FDI is non-rival: hence, any investment into technology capital will be available in all countries in the world. In our CETA experiment, where we only change trade costs, the change in the inward FDI stock in quantities is only driven by the world change in the investments into technology capital, which is the same for all countries in the world. Note that FDI liberalizations, which can be captured by changes in ω , will lead to differential bilateral changes in the inward FDI stock and to additional differential bilateral changes in outward FDI. As discussed earlier, such changes will trigger additional changes in trade and the multilateral resistances with further (third order) implications for FDI. We will demonstrate that when considering CETA as an RTA and BIT on trade costs and FDI frictions in Section 7.4.

Next, we turn to total earnings from FDI investments abroad and total payments for FDI utilized in a country for each country in the world. The results for FDI earnings from outward FDI are presented in column (5) of Table 8. The pattern that we see when comparing quantities and values is that the CETA members tend to experience relatively larger changes in their quantity than in their value. The opposite is true for non-member countries. Hence CETA members see a decrease in their increases, while non-member countries see smaller negative effects. The reason is that in non-member countries prices fall, decreasing the value of outward FDI of CETA-member countries, while the prices in the CETA-member increases, which increases the value of outward FDI of non-member countries. Further, when

focusing on FDI earnings, we see that for all countries besides Angola, the change in the FDI earnings is positive when CETA is effective, reflecting the fact that FDI is directed towards CETA-member countries, where prices increase.

Last, we discuss the changes in FDI payments. The results are reported in column (6) of Table 8. The FDI payments increase in the CETA member countries. On average, the CETA members see an increase of their FDI payments of 0.37%. The reason for this increase is the increased attractiveness of the CETA countries as host countries for FDI. The CETA-non-member countries see a modest average decrease of FDI payments of -0.01% . Note also that the changes in FDI payments are identical to the changes in physical capital accumulation. The reason is that both, FDI payments and physical capital accumulation, can be expressed as a share of real GDP (see Equations (82) and (43), respectively). The changes in FDI payments and physical capital are solely driven by changes in real GDP.

7.3 CETA as an RTA and BIT on Trade Costs

So far, we assumed that CETA only reduces trade costs by acting as an RTA. Next, we investigate the impact of CETA by treating it as a deeper agreement that also promotes FDI. The estimates of the effects of Canada's BITs, as obtained in column (3) of Table 1 suggest that the additional average direct effect of CETA as a BIT on bilateral trade is about 48% ($[\exp(0.392) - 1] \times 100$). The direct CETA effects on the trade flows of individual member countries are presented in Table 9, which is organized in the exact same fashion as Table 7. As can be seen from column (1) of Table 9, the additional direct effects lead to a nearly double as large effect on the average CETA member real export as compared to a situation where CETA acts only as an RTA (compare the bottom of Tables 7 and 9). Also total trade flows in the world increase by 0.94, which is also about double the size as compared to the situation where CETA only acts as an RTA. Hence, if CETA also captures liberalization efforts as an average BIT, overall efficiency gains in the world nearly double.

Comparing the columns (2) to (6) of Table 9 capturing the five different scenarios with the corresponding ones of Table 7, we see that the doubling is a consistent pattern over all five scenarios. This holds for all results, the overall efficiency gains in the world, the CETA-member countries, and the non-member countries. By and large, it also holds at the country-level. The reason is that while we consider here an additional trade cost reducing and thereby trade flow increasing effect of CETA as a BIT alongside CETA as an RTA, we do not change any other assumption. Hence, there is a direct change in the magnitudes, but the relative effects on trade flows do not change, as only trade costs are affected.

Similar to Table 8, we report the physical capital and FDI effects in Table 10. Concerning the overall effects for the world, the CETA-members and CETA-non-members, we find again a similar pattern: a roughly doubling of the effects. However, when focusing on single countries, we see substantial heterogeneity of the effects across countries. Let us first focus on column (2), the physical capital effects without FDI. While we find a doubling for many member and non-member countries, like Angola, Argentina, Australia, and Canada, to name just a few in alphabetical order, for some countries we find substantially different effects. For example, we find a decrease in physical capital accumulation for Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Macedonia, Oman, Sudan, Serbia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Tanzania, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe. These countries typically increase their physical capital stocks if CETA

acts only as an RTA, they decrease their physical capital stock if CETA acts in addition as a BIT on trade costs. The main reason is the decrease in FDI inflows, decreasing the value of marginal product of physical capital and thereby decreasing the incentive to invest in physical capital. Some countries, like Cyprus and Estonia, also reduce physical capital accumulation substantially compared to the counterfactual where CETA only acts as an RTA, but still increase it a bit when CETA acts as RTA and BIT on trade costs. The reason for those countries is that they see only slight increases in FDI inflows, which are more than overcompensated by outward FDI activities. Hence, more is invested into technology capital than into physical capital, explaining the decrease in physical capital accumulation as compared to the counterfactual where CETA acts only as RTA.

We next turn to the FDI effects. The effects on outward FDI in quantities are given in column (4) of Table 10. For the world as a whole and for the average outward FDI in quantities we again see about a doubling of the effect as compared to the situation where CETA acts as RTA only. For the non-member countries we see a larger negative effect, but a less than double as large effect in absolute values. The country effects are quite heterogeneous again. While we again find a roughly doubling for many CETA countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, and Canada, the effects for non-member countries vary a lot. For example, while Angola sees a smaller decrease in outward FDI in quantities, the decrease increases in Argentina. While these patterns seem to be complex, we note that the qualitative pattern stays pretty stable.

The effects on outward FDI in values (FDI earnings) are given column (5) of Table 10. In values, we see that for the world, the CETA-members and CETA-non-members, we see on average a nearly doubling of the effects. This is also true at the country level for outward FDI in values. The only exception is Angola, where the outward FDI in values are real values, as we take it as our numeraire with $P_{AGO}^b = P_{AGO}^c = 1$. We also see that while the country ranking seems to be pretty much preserved, many countries switch from basically zero effect to small positive effects.

Inward FDI in quantities is again a constant value over all countries, explained again by the no-rival nature of technology capital driving FDI. It increases from 0.089 in the case where CETA only acts as an RTA, to 0.175 when CETA acts as an RTA and BIT on trade costs. Hence, inward FDI in quantities also roughly doubles. The last column of Table 10, column (6), reports changes in inward FDI in values. The FDI payments increase in the CETA member countries and again nearly double as compared to the case when CETA acts as an RTA only. The reason for this increase is the increased attractiveness of the CETA countries as host countries for FDI. The CETA-non-member countries see a modest average decrease of FDI payments of -0.018% . Remember that the changes in FDI payments are identical to the changes in physical capital accumulation as both, FDI payments and physical capital accumulation, can be expressed as a share of real GDP (see Equations (82) and (43), respectively). The changes in FDI payments and physical capital are therefore solely driven by changes in real GDP. Hence, the heterogeneity at the country-level is the same as for the results for physical capital accumulation. And again, the country ranking between the counterfactual with CETA acting as an RTA only and CETA acting as an RTA and BIT on trade costs is pretty much preserved.

7.4 CETA as an RTA and BIT on Trade Costs and FDI Frictions

So far, we assumed that CETA will only reduce trade costs as an RTA or that CETA will act simultaneously as a RTA and a BIT on trade costs. In our next experiment, we assume that CETA not only affects trade costs, but that it also reduces FDI frictions via the average effect of a BIT on FDI frictions as estimated in our preferred specification from column (2) of Table 2. Hence, in this experiment, CETA acts as a RTA and a BIT on trade costs, and also as a BIT on FDI frictions.

The results for trade flows are presented in Table 11. This table is organized in the exact same fashion as Table 7. First, note that the results for all scenarios besides the one with FDI reported in column (6) are identical to the ones reported in Table 9. The reason is that in the other scenarios FDI plays no role and therefore the FDI friction-reducing effect of CETA as a BIT do not come into force. We see slight changes in the last column reporting the “Full GE Dynamic FDI” scenario. These changes are induced by partial equilibrium effect of CETA on FDI frictions from column (2) of Table 2, which implies an average increase in FDI of about 21%. These additional direct effects lead to a small increase in average real exports of CETA-member countries (from 197.73 to 197.92; compare the bottom of column (6) in Tables 9 and 11). Also total trade flows in the world increase slightly. Hence, if CETA also reduces FDI frictions, overall efficiency gains in the world slightly increase. The negative effect on CETA-non-members slightly decreases on average, implying that there is a small increase of trade flows as compared to a situation where CETA only affects trade costs. Even though the effects at the country-level vary a bit, they all comparable small and increase compared to the counterfactual where CETA only affects trade costs. Hence, reducing FDI frictions in addition to trade costs leads to an increase of trade for each country, irrespective whether it is a member or non-member country of CETA. In order to understand this increase of trade flows for all countries, we next turn to the capital effects.

Similar to Table 8, we report the physical capital and FDI effects in Table 12. Let us first note that for the scenario without FDI reported in column (2) of Table 12 we find no difference to the scenario where CETA does not reduce FDI frictions. The reason is again that without FDI, FDI frictions play no role. For the scenario with FDI (reported in column (3)), we find that the overall effects for the world, the CETA-members and CETA-non-members all are slightly magnified. However, when focusing on single countries, we see differences. While we find small additional positive effects for many member and non-member countries, like Argentina, Australia, Austria, and Belgium, to name just a few in alphabetical order, for some countries we find slight additional negative effects when compared to the situation when CETA does not reduce FDI frictions. For example, we find smaller physical capital accumulation effects for Angola, Belarus, Ecuador, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Vietnam. These countries also see smaller inward FDI effects and hardly any change in outward FDI effects. Hence, the smaller FDI inflow is strong enough to decrease the value of marginal product of physical capital and thereby decrease the incentive to invest in physical capital.

We next turn to the FDI effects. The effects on outward FDI in quantities are given in column (4) of Table 12. As for physical capital, we see a magnification of outward FDI in quantities for the world as a whole, as well as for CETA-member and non-member countries as compared to the case when CETA reduces only trade costs. However, the additional average

outward FDI effects in quantities are quite substantial for the CETA member countries and the world as a whole: they nearly double as compared to a situation where CETA does not change FDI frictions. The country effects are quite heterogeneous again. They nearly double for most CETA member countries as compared to a situation without FDI friction reduction. This reflects the fact that a reduction of FDI frictions will spur CETA member FDI, but due to the increase of market size, will also attract more FDI from CETA-non-member countries. Hence, also outward FDI of many non-member countries slightly increase. The qualitative pattern across countries is preserved.

The effects on outward FDI in values (FDI earnings) are given column (5) of Table 12. In values, we see that for the world, the CETA-members and CETA-non-members, we see only slight changes of the effects as compared to the situation without FDI friction reduction. This is also true at the country level for outward FDI in values. The only exception is Angola, where the outward FDI in values are real values, as we take it as our numeraire with $P_{AGO}^b = P_{AGO}^c = 1$. Concerning magnitudes, we see that in values the effects are way smaller than in quantities. The price effects counteract the changes in quantities.

Let us now switch to the effects on inward FDI. Remember that for all counterfactuals up to now inward FDI in quantities was a constant value over all countries due to the non-rival nature of technology capital driving FDI. When CETA also affects FDI frictions, this is no longer the case. The results of inward FDI in quantities are reported in column (6) of Table 12. There is a clear pattern visible: the largest effect on inward FDI is for Canada, with an increase of 6.74%. The reason is that reducing FDI frictions between Canada and the EU makes FDI from the EU to Canada easier, which leads to a strong increase of inward FDI into Canada. For the EU countries, Canada has now less frictions to invest technology capital. Hence, we see an increase of inward FDI into the EU countries. While the exact magnitudes of inward FDI in the EU countries vary a bit, they are all centered around an increase of 0.4%. Last, for CETA-non-member countries we see an increase of inward FDI of 0.177%. The positive affect is due to the non-rival nature, and the reason for the exact same value for all non-member countries is due to the fact the there is no change of FDI frictions for CETA-non member countries.

The last column of Table 12, column (7), reports inward FDI in values. The FDI payments increase in the CETA member countries are again only slightly larger compared to the case when CETA affects trade costs only. The reason for this increase is the increased attractiveness of the CETA countries as host countries for FDI. The CETA-non-member countries see a modest average decrease of FDI payments of -0.018% . Remember that the changes in FDI payments are identical to the changes in physical capital accumulation as both, FDI payments and physical capital accumulation, can be expressed as a share of real GDP (see Equations (82) and (43), respectively). The changes in FDI payments and physical capital are therefore solely driven by changes in real GDP. Hence, the heterogeneity at the country-level is the same as for the results for physical capital accumulation. And again, the country ranking between the counterfactual with CETA acting as an RTA and BIT on trade costs and CETA also affecting FDI frictions is pretty much preserved.

7.5 Caveats and Extensions

At the end, we want to come back to our introductory statement in this section and emphasize that the presented counterfactual analysis should not be seen as definitive policy analysis but rather as a proof of concept which provides insights into the workings of the model with an as good as possible calibration. While we tried to come up with our own sound trade cost and FDI friction estimates and estimates of the most important structural parameters relying on the best available trade, FDI, output and expenditure data, we also want to discuss some caveats of the present analysis and some possible routs for future investigation.

First, we definitely would like to improve our calibration and parameter estimation. For example, so far we have assumed one depreciation rate δ for all countries. Additionally, we assumed the same depreciation rate for physical and technology capital. Ideally, we would like to have country-specific depreciation rates that are different for physical and technology capital. Further, a more informative estimate of η would be of interest. So far, we just assumed that it is equal over all countries, i.e. $\eta = 1/N$. We may also further improve on our estimates for trade costs t_{ij} and investment costs/openness measure for FDI ω_{ij} .

Besides obtaining a better calibration and improving the estimates for our parameters, we may also use the developed theoretical model for additional counterfactual experiments. So far, we investigated the trade and investment liberalizing effects of CETA. Besides CETA many other agreements may be of potential interest for Canada. As already mentioned, TTIP is currently negotiated, which potentially affects Canada substantially because the United States is the most important trading partner for Canada. We are not aware of a single study so far that evaluated the trade *and* FDI effects of TTIP in a structural framework similar to the one we developed here. Our framework can also be used to simulate the effects of BITs, which have been so popular in recent years, or any other effort to promote inward or outward FDI.

Further, in our analysis so far we restricted ourselves to the steady-state. However, focusing only on the long-run may be misleading if adjustments take time and are costly. Both, physical and technology capital need to be build by investments. This process is costly and it takes time. Therefore, we believe that it would be of great interest (to us and to policy makers alike) to characterize the full transition of physical and technology capital within our structural framework and see how the conclusions concerning the trade and accumulation affects from CETA and other interesting counterfactual experiments may change.

Finally, we restricted our analysis to the trade and capital effects so far. Policy-makers, researchers, and the public are often interested in the welfare effects. A structural framework allows to make predictions about real GDP and welfare (which are distinct in our framework with physical capital accumulation and FDI). When taking into account the adjustments and simulating the full transition, this will also have welfare implications. Working out the transitional dynamics and calculating the appropriate welfare effects will lead to a more thorough evaluation of trade and investment liberalization counterfactual.

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Table 1: RTA and BIT Effects on Canada's International Trade, 1990-2011

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	RTAs	RTAs_BITs	CANADA	SPECIFIC	DIRECTIONAL
RTA	0.324 (0.105)**	0.249 (0.088)**			
BIT		0.399 (0.042)**			
CURRU		0.074 (0.044)+	0.073 (0.044)+	0.073 (0.044)+	0.073 (0.044)+
RTA_NO_CAN			0.196 (0.071)**	0.182 (0.074)*	0.181 (0.074)*
BIT_NO_CAN			0.404 (0.042)**	0.405 (0.043)**	0.405 (0.043)**
RTA_CAN			0.711 (0.089)**		
BIT_CAN			0.392 (0.148)**	0.390 (0.149)**	
CAN_ISR				0.749 (0.062)**	
CAN_CHL				0.613 (0.062)**	
CAN_MEX				1.393 (0.079)**	
CAN_USA				0.633 (0.089)**	
USA_MEX				0.828 (0.056)**	
CAN_ISR_EXP					0.499 (0.103)**
CAN_ISR_IMP					0.897 (0.147)**
CAN_CHL_EXP					0.571 (0.138)**
CAN_CHL_IMP					0.606 (0.132)**
CAN_MEX_EXP					0.708 (0.119)**
CAN_MEX_IMP					1.963 (0.117)**
CAN_USA_EXP					0.803 (0.114)**
CAN_USA_IMP					0.442 (0.112)**
USA_MEX_EXP					0.449 (0.108)**
USA_MEX_IMP					1.205 (0.106)**
BIT_CAN_EXP					0.332 (0.142)*
BIT_CAN_IMP					0.400 (0.201)*
<i>N</i>	59543	59543	59543	59543	59543

Notes: This table reports estimates of the effects of RTAs over the period 1990-2011. Column (1) reports the average RTA effect across all agreements in the sample. Column (2) adds the effects of BITs and Currency Unions across all countries. Column (3) separates the Canadian RTAs and BITs and obtains average RTA and BIT effects for Canada vs. all other RTAs and BITs. Column (4) allows for specific effects of each of Canada's trade agreements. Finally, column (5) obtains agreement specific effects for Canada's agreements in each trade flow direction. Huber-Eicker-White robust standard errors, clustered by country pair, are reported in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. Three-year intervals are used. All estimations are performed with bilateral dummies and directional (source and destination) time-varying fixed effects. Fixed effects estimates, including the constant, are omitted for brevity. See text for further details.

Table 2: FDI Determinants, 1990-2011

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	GRAVITY	POLICY	SPECIFIC	NEW_DATA	PAIR_FEs	PPML
DIST_1	-1.724 (0.152)**	-1.703 (0.153)**	-1.695 (0.152)**	-1.760 (0.158)**		-0.388 (0.129)**
DIST_2	-1.703 (0.138)**	-1.675 (0.140)**	-1.654 (0.139)**	-1.714 (0.144)**		-0.422 (0.109)**
DIST_3	-1.726 (0.127)**	-1.698 (0.129)**	-1.675 (0.128)**	-1.746 (0.133)**		-0.443 (0.106)**
DIST_4	-1.748 (0.125)**	-1.720 (0.127)**	-1.696 (0.127)**	-1.763 (0.131)**		-0.466 (0.096)**
BRDR	0.380 (0.229)+	0.411 (0.228)+	0.393 (0.227)+	0.407 (0.241)+		0.345 (0.159)*
LANG	1.123 (0.227)**	1.120 (0.225)**	1.082 (0.225)**	1.030 (0.237)**		0.360 (0.153)*
CLNY	1.625 (0.277)**	1.607 (0.276)**	1.661 (0.275)**	1.719 (0.283)**		0.481 (0.160)**
BIT		0.209 (0.113)+	0.231 (0.112)*	0.228 (0.111)*	-0.185 (0.132)	-0.398 (0.149)**
RTA		0.168 (0.123)				
CURRU		0.258 (0.222)	0.115 (0.218)	0.071 (0.220)	0.234 (0.243)	-0.075 (0.193)
FTA			0.085 (0.150)	0.170 (0.153)	0.181 (0.205)	0.569 (0.156)**
EIA			-0.055 (0.187)	-0.114 (0.185)	-0.165 (0.182)	0.172 (0.152)
PRTL			0.618 (0.269)*	0.733 (0.276)**	-0.021 (0.505)	0.655 (0.293)*
CUSTU			0.546 (0.214)*	0.555 (0.217)*	0.347 (0.311)	0.114 (0.208)
<i>N</i>	18927	18927	18927	15204	18927	36103
<i>R</i> ²	0.699	0.699	0.700	0.692	0.827	

Notes: This table reports estimates of the effects of RTAs and BITs over the period 1990-2011. Column (1) offers traditional FDI gravity estimates. Column (2) obtains average RTA, BIT, and Currency Union effects across all agreements in the sample. Column (3) breaks the RTAs by group. Column (4) uses only data for the period 2000-2011. Column (5) uses pair fixed effects. Finally, column (6) uses the PPML estimator. Huber-Eicker-White robust standard errors, clustered by country pair, are reported in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. Three-year intervals are used. All estimations are performed with bilateral dummies and directional (source and destination) time-varying fixed effects. Fixed effects estimates, including the constant, are omitted for brevity. See text for further details.

Table 3: Canada-specific BIT Effects, 1990-2011

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MAIN	CANADA	DIRECTIONAL	PAIR_FES
DIST_1	-1.703 (0.153)**	-1.714 (0.153)**	-1.715 (0.153)**	
DIST_2	-1.675 (0.140)**	-1.685 (0.139)**	-1.685 (0.139)**	
DIST_3	-1.698 (0.129)**	-1.707 (0.129)**	-1.707 (0.129)**	
DIST_4	-1.720 (0.127)**	-1.727 (0.127)**	-1.727 (0.127)**	
CNTG	0.411 (0.228)+	0.387 (0.229)+	0.387 (0.229)+	
LANG	1.120 (0.225)**	1.123 (0.224)**	1.127 (0.224)**	
CLNY	1.607 (0.276)**	1.605 (0.276)**	1.602 (0.276)**	
BIT	0.209 (0.113)+			
RTA	0.168 (0.123)			
CURRU	0.258 (0.222)	0.271 (0.222)	0.270 (0.222)	0.227 (0.245)
BIT_NO_CAN		0.235 (0.116)*	0.236 (0.116)*	-0.190 (0.131)
RTA_NO_CAN		0.151 (0.123)	0.150 (0.123)	0.060 (0.197)
RTA_CAN		0.958 (0.646)	0.951 (0.644)	-1.084 (0.666)
BIT_CAN		-0.480 (0.687)		
BIT_CAN_EXP			0.367 (0.596)	0.673 (0.854)
BIT_CAN_IMP			-1.674 (1.060)	-1.103 (1.143)
<i>N</i>	18927	18927	18927	18927
r2	0.699	0.699	0.699	0.827

Notes: This table reports estimates of the effects of RTAs and BITs for Canada over the period 1990-2011. Column (1) reproduces the main estimates from column (2) of Table 2. Column (2) separates the effects of Canada's RTAs and BITs during the period of investigation. Column (3) allows for directional effects of Canada's BITs. Finally, column (4) adds pair fixed effects to the specification from column (3). Huber-Eicker-White robust standard errors, clustered by country pair, are reported in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. Three-year intervals are used. All estimations are performed with bilateral dummies and directional (source and destination) time-varying fixed effects. Fixed effects estimates, including the constant, are omitted for brevity. See text for further details.

Table 4: Trade Openness, FDI, and Income, 1990-2011

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
CD		CDCnstr	Base	BaseCnstr	TFP	IV-Open	IV-Cap	IV-Lab	IV-TFP	IV-All	IV-All-Cnstr
$\ln L_{j,t}$	0.324 (0.038)**	0.485 (0.033)**	0.282 (0.037)**	0.363 (0.030)**	0.251 (0.037)**	0.158 (0.037)**	0.169 (0.037)**	0.210 (0.049)**	0.208 (0.048)**	0.239 (0.050)**	0.303 (0.031)**
$\ln K_{j,t}$	0.462 (0.034)**	0.515 (0.033)**	0.452 (0.033)**	0.476 (0.040)**	0.521 (0.040)**	0.511 (0.036)**	0.491 (0.035)**	0.477 (0.036)**	0.478 (0.036)**	0.456 (0.038)**	0.453 (0.020)**
$\ln FDI_{j,t}$			0.011 (0.003)**	0.011 (0.004)**	0.011 (0.005)*	0.005 (0.003)+	0.005 (0.003)+	0.005 (0.003)+	0.005 (0.003)+	0.008 (0.004)*	0.006 (0.003)+
$\ln(\Pi_{j,t}^{\sigma-1})$			-0.122 (0.023)**	-0.150 (0.021)**	-0.104 (0.024)**	-0.306 (0.050)**	-0.307 (0.050)**	-0.311 (0.051)**	-0.309 (0.049)**	-0.261 (0.049)**	-0.239 (0.023)**
$TFP_{j,t}$					0.323 (0.099)**	0.170 (0.082)*	0.169 (0.083)*	0.166 (0.084)*	0.173 (0.064)**	0.206 (0.060)**	0.275 (0.022)**
N	1738	1738	1623	1623	1504	1117	1117	1117	1117	1080	1223
UnderId					82.674	81.736	76.526	74.269	71.644		
χ^2 p-val					(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)		
Weak Id					34.170	23.084	18.081	14.966	12.138		
χ^2 p-val					(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)		
Over Id					5.489	6.254	6.399	6.415	4.652		
χ^2 p-val					(0.139)	(0.181)	(0.1713)	(0.1702)	(0.460)		

Notes: This table reports estimates of the relationship between trade openness, FDI and income. All specifications include country and year fixed effects whose estimates are omitted for brevity. Columns (1) and (2) report estimates from an unconstrained and a constrained specification of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Columns (3) and (4), respectively, present unconstrained and constrained baseline estimates of our structural model. Column (5) introduces an additional control variable for technology. In column (6) we instrument for trade openness. Columns (7), (8), (9), and (10) sequentially allow for endogenous capital, labor, TFP, and FDI in addition to allowing for endogenous openness. Finally, in column (11) all regressors are treated as endogenous and we impose the structural restrictions of the model. In the bottom of panel A, we report UnderId χ^2 values, “weak identification” (WeakId) Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006), and OverId χ^2 values when available. Note that the Kleibergen-Paap Wald test is appropriate when the standard error i.i.d. assumption is not met and the usual Cragg-Donald Wald statistic (Cragg and Donald, 1993), along with the corresponding critical values proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005), are no longer valid. This is true in our case, where the standard errors are either robust or bootstrapped. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. See text for further details.

Table 5: Trade Costs, R&D, Disasters, and Production, 1990-2011

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	R&D	Disastr	R&D&Disastr
$\ln L_{j,t}$	0.196 (0.047)**	0.251 (0.039)**	0.196 (0.050)**
$\ln K_{j,t}$	0.427 (0.045)**	0.521 (0.043)**	0.427 (0.043)**
$\ln FDI_{j,t}$	0.024 (0.004)**	0.011 (0.004)*	0.024 (0.004)**
$\ln(\widehat{\Pi_{j,t}^{\sigma-1}})$	-0.029 (0.009)**	-0.104 (0.021)**	-0.029 (0.009)**
$TFP_{j,t}$	0.431 (0.050)**	0.323 (0.082)**	0.431 (0.066)**
$R\&D_{j,t}$	-0.005 (0.010)		-0.005 (0.010)
$Disastr_{j,t}$		0.192 (0.289)	0.024 (0.310)
N	860	1504	860
r^2	0.999	0.997	0.999

Notes: This table reports results from three alternative specifications of the income equation from our structural model. All specifications include country and year fixed effects whose estimates are omitted for brevity. Column (1) reports estimates where we add R&D spending. In column (2) we add a control for the occurrence of natural disasters. Finally, in column (3) we add the controls for R&D and for natural disasters simultaneously. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. See text for further details.

Table 6: Summary of Parameters used in Counterfactual Experiments

Parameter	Value	Description
N	89	Number of countries
σ	4.186	Elasticity of substitution
β	0.98	Discount factor
α	0.599	Income share spent on capital as a share of total labor and capital spending
ϕ	0.0075	Income share spent on technology capital
η	1/89	Share of technology capital from one country as a share from total technology capital used
ξ	1	Elasticity of FDI payments with respect to the FDI openness measure
δ_K	0.061	Depreciation rate for physical capital
δ_M	0.061	Depreciation rate for technology capital
t_{ij}	Matrix	Trade cost matrix; estimated
ω_{ij}	Matrix	FDI friction matrix; estimated

Table 7: Evaluation of the Trade Effects of CETA as an RTA on Trade Costs

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country	Direct Eff.	Cond. GE	Full GE Static	Full GE Dynamic	Full GE Dynamic FDI
AGO	0.0000	-0.0713	-0.0612	-0.0327	0.1685
ARG	0.0000	-0.0401	-0.0362	-0.0217	-0.0229
AUS	0.0000	-0.0434	-0.0378	-0.0209	-0.0229
AUT	0.5367	0.3158	0.3615	0.4908	0.4991
AZE	0.0000	-0.1261	-0.1054	-0.0431	-0.0391
BEL	0.5462	0.3828	0.4090	0.4868	0.5050
BGD	0.0000	-0.0939	-0.0805	-0.0423	-0.0401
BGR	0.3165	0.1904	0.2127	0.2846	0.2716
BLR	0.0000	-0.0260	-0.0230	-0.0105	-0.0099
BRA	0.0000	-0.0639	-0.0555	-0.0302	-0.0332
CAN	8.2725	6.0485	6.7072	8.3302	7.4967
CHE	0.0000	-0.0928	-0.0823	-0.0467	-0.0499
CHL	0.0000	-0.0633	-0.0556	-0.0315	-0.0338
CHN	0.0000	-0.0617	-0.0536	-0.0291	-0.0317
COL	0.0000	-0.0598	-0.0527	-0.0299	-0.0296
CYP	0.1954	-0.1012	-0.0331	0.1879	0.1205
CZE	0.2321	0.1263	0.1417	0.1885	0.1932
DEU	0.6241	0.4289	0.4678	0.5804	0.5975
DNK	0.7977	0.5012	0.5630	0.7368	0.7447
DOM	0.0000	-0.0182	-0.0192	-0.0157	0.0004
ECU	0.0000	-0.0345	-0.0313	-0.0187	-0.0126
EGY	0.0000	-0.0616	-0.0544	-0.0302	-0.0286
ESP	0.4811	0.3231	0.3504	0.4326	0.4423
EST	0.4108	0.2033	0.2421	0.3681	0.3279
ETH	0.0000	-0.0482	-0.0427	-0.0241	0.0032
FIN	0.8461	0.5871	0.6408	0.7939	0.8001
FRA	0.7003	0.4926	0.5339	0.6533	0.6719
GBR	1.6787	1.2490	1.3479	1.6200	1.6642
GHA	0.0000	-0.1538	-0.1270	-0.0444	-0.0339
GRC	0.3669	0.2325	0.2542	0.3267	0.3201
GTM	0.0000	-0.0411	-0.0381	-0.0245	-0.0082
HKG	0.0000	-0.0241	-0.0222	-0.0140	-0.0153
HRV	0.2702	0.1436	0.1642	0.2328	0.2204
HUN	0.3341	0.1817	0.2086	0.2900	0.3011
IDN	0.0000	-0.0285	-0.0253	-0.0148	-0.0163
IND	0.0000	-0.0447	-0.0392	-0.0217	-0.0233
IRL	0.8597	0.5177	0.5910	0.7946	0.8092
IRN	0.0000	-0.0408	-0.0355	-0.0191	-0.0203
IRQ	0.0000	-0.0812	-0.0696	-0.0365	-0.0367
ISR	0.0000	-0.0710	-0.0639	-0.0369	-0.0388
ITA	0.7213	0.5323	0.5685	0.6748	0.6942
JPN	0.0000	-0.0508	-0.0443	-0.0247	-0.0270
KAZ	0.0000	-0.0682	-0.0586	-0.0300	-0.0311
KEN	0.0000	-0.1104	-0.0917	-0.0293	-0.0128
KOR	0.0000	-0.0367	-0.0326	-0.0189	-0.0206
KWT	0.0000	-0.0270	-0.0242	-0.0143	-0.0132
LBN	0.0000	-0.0587	-0.0524	-0.0278	-0.0137
LKA	0.0000	-0.0673	-0.0579	-0.0287	-0.0198
LTU	0.8480	0.6531	0.6884	0.8025	0.7639
LUX	0.4439	0.2953	0.3194	0.3912	0.3666
LVA	0.2233	-0.0620	-0.0001	0.2001	0.1650
MAR	0.0000	-0.0785	-0.0702	-0.0408	-0.0392
MEX	0.0000	-0.1006	-0.0947	-0.0607	-0.0686
MKD	0.0000	-0.4822	-0.3624	0.0381	-0.0101
MLT	0.3265	0.1667	0.1953	0.2797	0.2308
MYS	0.0000	-0.0255	-0.0238	-0.0155	-0.0171
NGA	0.0000	-0.0589	-0.0520	-0.0292	-0.0293
NLD	0.4419	0.2408	0.2805	0.3954	0.4043
NOR	0.0000	-0.2128	-0.1841	-0.0987	-0.1064
NZL	0.0000	-0.0570	-0.0493	-0.0268	-0.0261

Continued on next page

Table 7 – *Continued from previous page*

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country	Direct Eff.	Cond. GE	Full GE Static	Full GE Dynamic	Full GE Dynamic FDI
OMN	0.0000	-0.0124	-0.0113	-0.0071	-0.0040
PAK	0.0000	-0.0608	-0.0530	-0.0288	-0.0263
PER	0.0000	-0.1491	-0.1260	-0.0643	-0.0671
PHL	0.0000	-0.0288	-0.0271	-0.0180	-0.0194
POL	0.3808	0.2386	0.2624	0.3353	0.3516
PRT	0.4405	0.2643	0.2961	0.3903	0.3902
QAT	0.0000	-0.0252	-0.0223	-0.0129	-0.0121
ROM	0.3840	0.2472	0.2708	0.3424	0.3397
RUS	0.0000	-0.0605	-0.0529	-0.0277	-0.0302
SAU	0.0000	-0.0355	-0.0313	-0.0179	-0.0191
SDN	0.0000	-0.0440	-0.0373	-0.0184	-0.0084
SER	0.0000	-0.1470	-0.1200	-0.0193	-0.0218
SGP	0.0000	-0.0193	-0.0195	-0.0145	-0.0163
SVK	0.1769	0.0892	0.1016	0.1399	0.1409
SVN	0.3232	0.1920	0.2124	0.2774	0.2670
SWE	0.7574	0.4893	0.5450	0.7035	0.7160
SYR	0.0000	-0.0785	-0.0651	-0.0208	-0.0155
THA	0.0000	-0.0322	-0.0292	-0.0178	-0.0198
TKM	0.0000	-0.2245	-0.1673	0.0229	0.0062
TUN	0.0000	-0.0827	-0.0750	-0.0450	-0.0407
TUR	0.0000	-0.0701	-0.0621	-0.0342	-0.0365
TZA	0.0000	-0.1309	-0.1043	-0.0167	-0.0004
UKR	0.0000	-0.0418	-0.0368	-0.0148	-0.0164
USA	0.0000	-0.4338	-0.3643	-0.1819	-0.1975
UZB	0.0000	-0.0417	-0.0339	-0.0075	0.0010
VEN	0.0000	-0.0525	-0.0468	-0.0273	-0.0277
VNM	0.0000	-0.0315	-0.0278	-0.0160	-0.0168
ZAF	0.0000	-0.0782	-0.0678	-0.0356	-0.0369
ZWE	0.0000	-0.0934	-0.0738	-0.0091	0.0047
World	0.4813	0.2566	0.3031	0.4283	0.4303
CETA	103.6020	98.1506	99.3822	102.4111	102.3218
ROW	0.0000	-0.2003	-0.1593	-0.0477	-0.0536

Table 8: Evaluation of the Physical Capital and FDI Effects of CETA as an RTA on Trade Costs of the “Full GE Dynamic” scenarios

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country	Physical Capital without FDI	Physical Capital with FDI	Outward FDI quantity	Outward FDI earn.	Inward FDI pay.
AGO	-0.0021	-0.0158	-0.0156	-0.0015	-0.0158
ARG	-0.0064	-0.0086	-0.0064	0.0601	-0.0086
AUS	-0.0022	-0.0028	-0.0026	0.0655	-0.0028
AUT	0.2363	0.2395	0.2371	0.1138	0.2395
AZE	0.0462	-0.0054	-0.0040	0.0476	-0.0054
BEL	0.0654	0.0663	0.0663	0.0567	0.0663
BGD	-0.0033	-0.0075	-0.0055	0.0584	-0.0075
BGR	0.0969	0.0985	0.0970	0.0813	0.0985
BLR	0.0002	-0.0040	-0.0025	0.0498	-0.0040
BRA	-0.0029	-0.0036	-0.0034	0.0637	-0.0036
CAN	3.9858	4.1126	4.0948	1.4518	4.1126
CHE	-0.0110	-0.0126	-0.0123	0.0475	-0.0126
CHL	-0.0070	-0.0095	-0.0079	0.0635	-0.0095
CHN	-0.0040	-0.0033	-0.0032	0.0732	-0.0033
COL	-0.0031	-0.0053	-0.0040	0.0697	-0.0053
CYP	0.4396	0.0262	0.0332	0.0669	0.0262
CZE	0.0222	0.0214	0.0216	0.0487	0.0214
DEU	0.1971	0.2014	0.2012	0.0972	0.2014
DNK	0.3179	0.3224	0.3171	0.1389	0.3224
DOM	-0.0031	-0.0029	0.0054	0.0723	-0.0029
ECU	-0.0005	-0.0043	-0.0014	0.0674	-0.0043
EGY	-0.0054	-0.0079	-0.0057	0.0528	-0.0079
ESP	0.1086	0.1095	0.1093	0.0750	0.1095
EST	0.1731	0.0433	0.0448	0.0712	0.0433
ETH	-0.0031	-0.0015	0.0129	0.0477	-0.0015
FIN	0.2770	0.2811	0.2771	0.1296	0.2811
FRA	0.2082	0.2119	0.2115	0.1008	0.2119
GBR	0.5646	0.5754	0.5737	0.1978	0.5754
GHA	0.0874	-0.0082	-0.0036	0.0455	-0.0082
GRC	0.0680	0.0682	0.0682	0.0698	0.0682
GTM	-0.0040	-0.0045	0.0030	0.0719	-0.0045
HKG	-0.0044	-0.0061	-0.0054	0.0622	-0.0061
HRV	0.0686	0.0417	0.0431	0.0611	0.0417
HUN	0.1189	0.1144	0.1133	0.0752	0.1144
IDN	-0.0027	-0.0041	-0.0037	0.0636	-0.0041
IND	-0.0028	-0.0035	-0.0032	0.0609	-0.0035
IRL	0.3856	0.3917	0.3865	0.1575	0.3917
IRN	-0.0017	-0.0032	-0.0027	0.0562	-0.0032
IRQ	-0.0024	-0.0044	-0.0036	0.0646	-0.0044
ISR	-0.0104	-0.0119	-0.0099	0.0570	-0.0119
ITA	0.1710	0.1740	0.1738	0.0910	0.1740
JPN	-0.0041	-0.0040	-0.0039	0.0698	-0.0040
KAZ	-0.0028	-0.0048	-0.0041	0.0523	-0.0048
KEN	0.0651	-0.0059	0.0028	0.0447	-0.0059
KOR	-0.0042	-0.0048	-0.0047	0.0655	-0.0048
KWT	-0.0020	-0.0042	-0.0029	0.0602	-0.0042
LBN	-0.0028	-0.0068	0.0034	0.0457	-0.0068
LKA	0.0088	-0.0064	-0.0016	0.0558	-0.0064
LTU	0.1319	0.1087	0.1081	0.0930	0.1087
LUX	0.0676	0.0490	0.0496	0.0612	0.0490
LVA	0.3803	0.0209	0.0235	0.0582	0.0209
MAR	-0.0113	-0.0137	-0.0099	0.0450	-0.0137
MEX	-0.0303	-0.0279	-0.0271	0.0815	-0.0279
MKD	0.8661	-0.0051	0.0019	0.0379	-0.0051
MLT	0.1287	0.1220	0.1152	0.1007	0.1220
MYS	-0.0054	-0.0071	-0.0064	0.0636	-0.0071
NGA	-0.0021	-0.0036	-0.0031	0.0625	-0.0036
NLD	0.1986	0.2016	0.2010	0.1016	0.2016
NOR	-0.0198	-0.0228	-0.0220	0.0447	-0.0228

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Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country	Physical Capital without FDI	Physical Capital with FDI	Outward FDI quantity	Outward FDI earn.	Inward FDI pay.
NZL	-0.0034	-0.0059	-0.0043	0.0623	-0.0059
OMN	0.0003	-0.0028	-0.0015	0.0612	-0.0028
PAK	-0.0041	-0.0070	-0.0046	0.0576	-0.0070
PER	-0.0071	-0.0097	-0.0081	0.0704	-0.0097
PHL	-0.0077	-0.0098	-0.0069	0.0638	-0.0098
POL	0.0868	0.0835	0.0833	0.0639	0.0835
PRT	0.1422	0.1428	0.1407	0.0852	0.1428
QAT	-0.0009	-0.0029	-0.0022	0.0604	-0.0029
ROM	0.0945	0.0945	0.0938	0.0742	0.0945
RUS	-0.0025	-0.0022	-0.0022	0.0544	-0.0022
SAU	-0.0013	-0.0016	-0.0015	0.0649	-0.0016
SDN	0.0032	-0.0040	-0.0005	0.0576	-0.0040
SER	0.1242	-0.0069	-0.0030	0.0414	-0.0069
SGP	-0.0087	-0.0104	-0.0095	0.0613	-0.0104
SVK	0.0157	0.0142	0.0146	0.0476	0.0142
SVN	0.0480	0.0344	0.0351	0.0569	0.0344
SWE	0.2904	0.2949	0.2924	0.1303	0.2949
SYR	0.0541	-0.0062	-0.0006	0.0467	-0.0062
THA	-0.0055	-0.0072	-0.0065	0.0630	-0.0072
TKM	0.4450	-0.0022	0.0032	0.0473	-0.0022
TUN	-0.0144	-0.0162	-0.0103	0.0377	-0.0162
TUR	-0.0074	-0.0089	-0.0084	0.0489	-0.0089
TZA	0.1358	-0.0029	0.0090	0.0458	-0.0029
UKR	-0.0028	-0.0040	-0.0034	0.0505	-0.0040
USA	-0.0264	-0.0319	-0.0318	0.0906	-0.0319
UZB	0.0423	-0.0027	0.0037	0.0502	-0.0027
VEN	-0.0024	-0.0041	-0.0033	0.0745	-0.0041
VNM	-0.0018	-0.0035	-0.0029	0.0628	-0.0035
ZAF	-0.0040	-0.0052	-0.0048	0.0548	-0.0052
ZWE	0.1105	-0.0009	0.0136	0.0468	-0.0009
World	0.0831	0.0809	0.1151	0.0884	0.0809
CETA	0.3648	0.3659	0.2307	0.1476	0.3659
ROW	-0.0081	-0.0106	-0.0077	0.0585	-0.0106

Table 9: Evaluation of the Trade Effects of CETA as an RTA and BIT on Trade Costs

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country	Direct Eff.	Cond. GE	Full GE Static	Full GE Dynamic	Full GE Dynamic FDI
AGO	0.0000	-0.1352	-0.1168	-0.0624	0.1041
ARG	0.0000	-0.0756	-0.0687	-0.0415	-0.0393
AUS	0.0000	-0.0822	-0.0721	-0.0400	-0.0405
AUT	1.0429	0.5966	0.6863	0.9439	0.9632
AZE	0.0000	-0.2160	-0.1834	-0.0848	-0.0692
BEL	1.0614	0.7235	0.7768	0.9362	0.9736
BGD	0.0000	-0.1769	-0.1527	-0.0810	-0.0718
BGR	0.6151	0.3686	0.4118	0.5465	0.5270
BLR	0.0000	-0.0442	-0.0396	-0.0207	-0.0145
BRA	0.0000	-0.1208	-0.1055	-0.0578	-0.0598
CAN	16.0751	11.4931	12.8344	16.1821	14.5757
CHE	0.0000	-0.1749	-0.1560	-0.0895	-0.0922
CHL	0.0000	-0.1201	-0.1062	-0.0602	-0.0603
CHN	0.0000	-0.1165	-0.1018	-0.0557	-0.0582
COL	0.0000	-0.1133	-0.1005	-0.0571	-0.0519
CYP	0.3795	-0.0134	0.0678	0.3309	0.2373
CZE	0.4510	0.2396	0.2696	0.3625	0.3751
DEU	1.2127	0.8105	0.8882	1.1162	1.1507
DNK	1.5501	0.9467	1.0686	1.4171	1.4356
DOM	0.0000	-0.0344	-0.0367	-0.0299	0.0047
ECU	0.0000	-0.0641	-0.0588	-0.0358	-0.0194
EGY	0.0000	-0.1149	-0.1022	-0.0580	-0.0502
ESP	0.9349	0.6106	0.6654	0.8319	0.8535
EST	0.7983	0.4508	0.5106	0.7001	0.6359
ETH	0.0000	-0.0893	-0.0799	-0.0464	0.0110
FIN	1.6442	1.1106	1.2180	1.5267	1.5420
FRA	1.3608	0.9302	1.0132	1.2565	1.2941
GBR	3.2620	2.3541	2.5549	3.1157	3.2010
GHA	0.0000	-0.2509	-0.2120	-0.0908	-0.0595
GRC	0.7129	0.4506	0.4925	0.6271	0.6200
GTM	0.0000	-0.0776	-0.0726	-0.0468	-0.0114
HKG	0.0000	-0.0456	-0.0423	-0.0268	-0.0258
HRV	0.5251	0.2906	0.3272	0.4455	0.4291
HUN	0.6491	0.3441	0.3967	0.5576	0.5831
IDN	0.0000	-0.0537	-0.0482	-0.0284	-0.0274
IND	0.0000	-0.0838	-0.0741	-0.0415	-0.0412
IRL	1.6706	0.9766	1.1208	1.5283	1.5590
IRN	0.0000	-0.0762	-0.0669	-0.0367	-0.0347
IRQ	0.0000	-0.1537	-0.1324	-0.0698	-0.0653
ISR	0.0000	-0.1326	-0.1201	-0.0708	-0.0702
ITA	1.4016	1.0063	1.0800	1.2977	1.3372
JPN	0.0000	-0.0962	-0.0845	-0.0471	-0.0490
KAZ	0.0000	-0.1271	-0.1099	-0.0576	-0.0549
KEN	0.0000	-0.1740	-0.1484	-0.0619	-0.0193
KOR	0.0000	-0.0694	-0.0621	-0.0361	-0.0366
KWT	0.0000	-0.0506	-0.0458	-0.0275	-0.0210
LBN	0.0000	-0.1053	-0.0950	-0.0540	-0.0212
LKA	0.0000	-0.1211	-0.1057	-0.0557	-0.0330
LTU	1.6477	1.2634	1.3315	1.5407	1.4734
LUX	0.8626	0.5652	0.6117	0.7516	0.7096
LVA	0.4339	0.0390	0.1160	0.3636	0.3230
MAR	0.0000	-0.1477	-0.1330	-0.0783	-0.0703
MEX	0.0000	-0.1913	-0.1808	-0.1156	-0.1289
MKD	0.0000	-0.5361	-0.4112	0.0095	-0.0135
MLT	0.6344	0.3170	0.3725	0.5378	0.4488
MYS	0.0000	-0.0482	-0.0453	-0.0296	-0.0291
NGA	0.0000	-0.1109	-0.0986	-0.0560	-0.0518
NLD	0.8588	0.4552	0.5325	0.7605	0.7803
NOR	0.0000	-0.4025	-0.3500	-0.1890	-0.1989

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Table 9 – *Continued from previous page*

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country	Direct Eff.	Cond. GE	Full GE Static	Full GE Dynamic	Full GE Dynamic FDI
NZL	0.0000	-0.1078	-0.0938	-0.0512	-0.0454
OMN	0.0000	-0.0227	-0.0212	-0.0136	-0.0029
PAK	0.0000	-0.1141	-0.1001	-0.0552	-0.0456
PER	0.0000	-0.2830	-0.2403	-0.1225	-0.1232
PHL	0.0000	-0.0546	-0.0518	-0.0344	-0.0327
POL	0.7399	0.4525	0.4995	0.6447	0.6798
PRT	0.8559	0.4994	0.5621	0.7506	0.7541
QAT	0.0000	-0.0474	-0.0424	-0.0247	-0.0186
ROM	0.7463	0.4688	0.5156	0.6583	0.6577
RUS	0.0000	-0.1118	-0.0984	-0.0534	-0.0546
SAU	0.0000	-0.0670	-0.0597	-0.0342	-0.0331
SDN	0.0000	-0.0806	-0.0691	-0.0354	-0.0112
SER	0.0000	-0.1999	-0.1675	-0.0472	-0.0364
SGP	0.0000	-0.0363	-0.0372	-0.0278	-0.0275
SVK	0.3437	0.1696	0.1937	0.2691	0.2754
SVN	0.6281	0.3741	0.4123	0.5324	0.5183
SWE	1.4719	0.9249	1.0352	1.3528	1.3801
SYR	0.0000	-0.1217	-0.1041	-0.0440	-0.0246
THA	0.0000	-0.0609	-0.0556	-0.0340	-0.0340
TKM	0.0000	-0.2388	-0.1806	0.0145	0.0173
TUN	0.0000	-0.1560	-0.1424	-0.0865	-0.0732
TUR	0.0000	-0.1303	-0.1162	-0.0657	-0.0661
TZA	0.0000	-0.1838	-0.1511	-0.0433	0.0043
UKR	0.0000	-0.0691	-0.0615	-0.0294	-0.0270
USA	0.0000	-0.8248	-0.6951	-0.3464	-0.3709
UZB	0.0000	-0.0588	-0.0497	-0.0174	0.0069
VEN	0.0000	-0.0995	-0.0893	-0.0522	-0.0487
VNM	0.0000	-0.0594	-0.0530	-0.0306	-0.0281
ZAF	0.0000	-0.1459	-0.1273	-0.0684	-0.0669
ZWE	0.0000	-0.1252	-0.1029	-0.0270	0.0143
World	0.9352	0.4865	0.5783	0.8288	0.8359
CETA	201.3183	185.9714	189.3940	197.9635	197.7253
ROW	0.0000	-0.3792	-0.3030	-0.0912	-0.0993

Table 10: Evaluation of the Physical Capital and FDI Effects of CETA as an RTA and BIT on Trade Costs of the “Full GE Dynamic” scenarios

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country	Physical Capital without FDI	Physical Capital with FDI	Outward FDI quantity	Outward FDI earn.	Inward FDI pay.
AGO	-0.0041	-0.0127	-0.0115	0.0740	-0.0127
ARG	-0.0122	-0.0114	-0.0072	0.1183	-0.0114
AUS	-0.0042	-0.0028	-0.0024	0.1278	-0.0028
AUT	0.4549	0.4648	0.4602	0.2255	0.4648
AZE	0.0434	-0.0051	-0.0025	0.0957	-0.0051
BEL	0.1258	0.1297	0.1297	0.1158	0.1297
BGD	-0.0081	-0.0092	-0.0054	0.1150	-0.0092
BGR	0.1881	0.1947	0.1919	0.1625	0.1947
BLR	-0.0014	-0.0025	0.0002	0.1002	-0.0025
BRA	-0.0054	-0.0042	-0.0037	0.1250	-0.0042
CAN	7.7625	8.0135	7.9785	2.7720	8.0135
CHE	-0.0211	-0.0207	-0.0200	0.0959	-0.0207
CHL	-0.0134	-0.0133	-0.0104	0.1246	-0.0133
CHN	-0.0075	-0.0053	-0.0052	0.1431	-0.0053
COL	-0.0059	-0.0054	-0.0031	0.1349	-0.0054
CYP	0.4643	0.0563	0.0697	0.1344	0.0563
CZE	0.0428	0.0447	0.0450	0.0997	0.0447
DEU	0.3794	0.3891	0.3888	0.1933	0.3891
DNK	0.6118	0.6245	0.6145	0.2744	0.6245
DOM	-0.0058	0.0000	0.0154	0.1390	0.0000
ECU	-0.0027	-0.0030	0.0024	0.1309	-0.0030
EGY	-0.0107	-0.0099	-0.0058	0.1053	-0.0099
ESP	0.2090	0.2138	0.2134	0.1508	0.2138
EST	0.2140	0.0889	0.0917	0.1434	0.0889
ETH	-0.0085	0.0028	0.0298	0.0953	0.0028
FIN	0.5334	0.5452	0.5375	0.2562	0.5452
FRA	0.4006	0.4100	0.4092	0.2008	0.4100
GBR	1.0866	1.1093	1.1061	0.3888	1.1093
GHA	0.0812	-0.0100	-0.0013	0.0917	-0.0100
GRC	0.1316	0.1362	0.1363	0.1404	0.1362
GTM	-0.0077	-0.0030	0.0109	0.1383	-0.0030
HKG	-0.0085	-0.0078	-0.0064	0.1220	-0.0078
HRV	0.1098	0.0857	0.0885	0.1238	0.0857
HUN	0.2290	0.2247	0.2227	0.1510	0.2247
IDN	-0.0052	-0.0043	-0.0034	0.1244	-0.0043
IND	-0.0054	-0.0039	-0.0035	0.1199	-0.0039
IRL	0.7418	0.7573	0.7474	0.3097	0.7573
IRN	-0.0033	-0.0024	-0.0016	0.1114	-0.0024
IRQ	-0.0047	-0.0041	-0.0026	0.1260	-0.0041
ISR	-0.0197	-0.0179	-0.0141	0.1127	-0.0179
ITA	0.3291	0.3372	0.3367	0.1817	0.3372
JPN	-0.0078	-0.0061	-0.0059	0.1357	-0.0061
KAZ	-0.0054	-0.0048	-0.0035	0.1045	-0.0048
KEN	0.0588	-0.0056	0.0110	0.0900	-0.0056
KOR	-0.0081	-0.0068	-0.0064	0.1279	-0.0068
KWT	-0.0040	-0.0032	-0.0007	0.1185	-0.0032
LBN	-0.0099	-0.0074	0.0120	0.0924	-0.0074
LKA	0.0042	-0.0067	0.0023	0.1102	-0.0067
LTU	0.2318	0.2142	0.2132	0.1861	0.2142
LUX	0.1139	0.0996	0.1007	0.1248	0.0996
LVA	0.4020	0.0459	0.0509	0.1185	0.0459
MAR	-0.0218	-0.0209	-0.0136	0.0914	-0.0209
MEX	-0.0577	-0.0486	-0.0470	0.1556	-0.0486
MKD	0.8612	-0.0038	0.0095	0.0784	-0.0038
MLT	0.2481	0.2401	0.2272	0.1995	0.2401
MYS	-0.0104	-0.0097	-0.0085	0.1244	-0.0097
NGA	-0.0040	-0.0030	-0.0020	0.1224	-0.0030
NLD	0.3823	0.3910	0.3897	0.2018	0.3910
NOR	-0.0378	-0.0392	-0.0378	0.0908	-0.0392

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Table 10 – *Continued from previous page*

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country	Physical Capital without FDI	Physical Capital with FDI	Outward FDI quantity	Outward FDI earn.	Inward FDI pay.
NZL	-0.0067	-0.0064	-0.0034	0.1221	-0.0064
OMN	-0.0004	-0.0005	0.0018	0.1201	-0.0005
PAK	-0.0084	-0.0081	-0.0037	0.1136	-0.0081
PER	-0.0136	-0.0136	-0.0106	0.1365	-0.0136
PHL	-0.0146	-0.0137	-0.0083	0.1246	-0.0137
POL	0.1673	0.1645	0.1642	0.1293	0.1645
PRT	0.2735	0.2794	0.2754	0.1721	0.2794
QAT	-0.0019	-0.0012	0.0001	0.1186	-0.0012
ROM	0.1820	0.1868	0.1855	0.1492	0.1868
RUS	-0.0047	-0.0026	-0.0024	0.1087	-0.0026
SAU	-0.0025	-0.0008	-0.0005	0.1267	-0.0008
SDN	0.0010	-0.0022	0.0045	0.1135	-0.0022
SER	0.1194	-0.0075	-0.0001	0.0851	-0.0075
SGP	-0.0167	-0.0159	-0.0141	0.1202	-0.0159
SVK	0.0303	0.0316	0.0324	0.0975	0.0316
SVN	0.0811	0.0714	0.0728	0.1160	0.0714
SWE	0.5591	0.5712	0.5665	0.2576	0.5712
SYR	0.0495	-0.0062	0.0043	0.0943	-0.0062
THA	-0.0105	-0.0098	-0.0084	0.1233	-0.0098
TKM	0.4436	0.0016	0.0118	0.0953	0.0016
TUN	-0.0277	-0.0256	-0.0142	0.0783	-0.0256
TUR	-0.0139	-0.0132	-0.0122	0.0986	-0.0132
TZA	0.1303	0.0003	0.0225	0.0921	0.0003
UKR	-0.0048	-0.0033	-0.0021	0.1014	-0.0033
USA	-0.0503	-0.0598	-0.0596	0.1720	-0.0598
UZB	0.0402	0.0005	0.0127	0.1005	0.0005
VEN	-0.0045	-0.0037	-0.0021	0.1434	-0.0037
VNM	-0.0035	-0.0027	-0.0016	0.1231	-0.0027
ZAF	-0.0075	-0.0064	-0.0055	0.1097	-0.0064
ZWE	0.1059	0.0041	0.0315	0.0943	0.0041
World	0.1600	0.1592	0.2245	0.1745	0.1592
CETA	0.7044	0.7112	0.4475	0.2894	0.7112
ROW	-0.0162	-0.0180	-0.0122	0.1165	-0.0180

Table 11: Evaluation of the Trade Effects of CETA as an RTA and BIT on Trade Costs and FDI Frictions

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country	Direct Eff.	Cond. GE	Full GE Static	Full GE Dynamic	Full GE Dynamic FDI
AGO	0.0000	-0.1352	-0.1168	-0.0624	0.1154
ARG	0.0000	-0.0756	-0.0687	-0.0415	-0.0385
AUS	0.0000	-0.0822	-0.0721	-0.0400	-0.0398
AUT	1.0429	0.5966	0.6863	0.9439	0.9677
AZE	0.0000	-0.2160	-0.1834	-0.0848	-0.0674
BEL	1.0614	0.7235	0.7768	0.9362	0.9781
BGD	0.0000	-0.1769	-0.1527	-0.0810	-0.0702
BGR	0.6151	0.3686	0.4118	0.5465	0.5307
BLR	0.0000	-0.0442	-0.0396	-0.0207	-0.0141
BRA	0.0000	-0.1208	-0.1055	-0.0578	-0.0587
CAN	16.0751	11.4931	12.8344	16.1821	14.6516
CHE	0.0000	-0.1749	-0.1560	-0.0895	-0.0907
CHL	0.0000	-0.1201	-0.1062	-0.0602	-0.0591
CHN	0.0000	-0.1165	-0.1018	-0.0557	-0.0571
COL	0.0000	-0.1133	-0.1005	-0.0571	-0.0507
CYP	0.3795	-0.0134	0.0678	0.3309	0.2407
CZE	0.4510	0.2396	0.2696	0.3625	0.3791
DEU	1.2127	0.8105	0.8882	1.1162	1.1551
DNK	1.5501	0.9467	1.0686	1.4171	1.4403
DOM	0.0000	-0.0344	-0.0367	-0.0299	0.0054
ECU	0.0000	-0.0641	-0.0588	-0.0358	-0.0186
EGY	0.0000	-0.1149	-0.1022	-0.0580	-0.0492
ESP	0.9349	0.6106	0.6654	0.8319	0.8577
EST	0.7983	0.4508	0.5106	0.7001	0.6398
ETH	0.0000	-0.0893	-0.0799	-0.0464	0.0120
FIN	1.6442	1.1106	1.2180	1.5267	1.5466
FRA	1.3608	0.9302	1.0132	1.2565	1.2987
GBR	3.2620	2.3541	2.5549	3.1157	3.2071
GHA	0.0000	-0.2509	-0.2120	-0.0908	-0.0580
GRC	0.7129	0.4506	0.4925	0.6271	0.6239
GTM	0.0000	-0.0776	-0.0726	-0.0468	-0.0102
HKG	0.0000	-0.0456	-0.0423	-0.0268	-0.0254
HRV	0.5251	0.2906	0.3272	0.4455	0.4329
HUN	0.6491	0.3441	0.3967	0.5576	0.5872
IDN	0.0000	-0.0537	-0.0482	-0.0284	-0.0269
IND	0.0000	-0.0838	-0.0741	-0.0415	-0.0405
IRL	1.6706	0.9766	1.1208	1.5283	1.5637
IRN	0.0000	-0.0762	-0.0669	-0.0367	-0.0341
IRQ	0.0000	-0.1537	-0.1324	-0.0698	-0.0638
ISR	0.0000	-0.1326	-0.1201	-0.0708	-0.0689
ITA	1.4016	1.0063	1.0800	1.2977	1.3417
JPN	0.0000	-0.0962	-0.0845	-0.0471	-0.0480
KAZ	0.0000	-0.1271	-0.1099	-0.0576	-0.0538
KEN	0.0000	-0.1740	-0.1484	-0.0619	-0.0182
KOR	0.0000	-0.0694	-0.0621	-0.0361	-0.0359
KWT	0.0000	-0.0506	-0.0458	-0.0275	-0.0206
LBN	0.0000	-0.1053	-0.0950	-0.0540	-0.0202
LKA	0.0000	-0.1211	-0.1057	-0.0557	-0.0320
LTU	1.6477	1.2634	1.3315	1.5407	1.4780
LUX	0.8626	0.5652	0.6117	0.7516	0.7139
LVA	0.4339	0.0390	0.1160	0.3636	0.3267
MAR	0.0000	-0.1477	-0.1330	-0.0783	-0.0689
MEX	0.0000	-0.1913	-0.1808	-0.1156	-0.1253
MKD	0.0000	-0.5361	-0.4112	0.0095	-0.0122
MLT	0.6344	0.3170	0.3725	0.5378	0.4524
MYS	0.0000	-0.0482	-0.0453	-0.0296	-0.0286
NGA	0.0000	-0.1109	-0.0986	-0.0560	-0.0508
NLD	0.8588	0.4552	0.5325	0.7605	0.7845
NOR	0.0000	-0.4025	-0.3500	-0.1890	-0.1958

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Table 11 – *Continued from previous page*

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country	Direct Eff.	Cond. GE	Full GE Static	Full GE Dynamic	Full GE Dynamic FDI
NZL	0.0000	-0.1078	-0.0938	-0.0512	-0.0445
OMN	0.0000	-0.0227	-0.0212	-0.0136	-0.0028
PAK	0.0000	-0.1141	-0.1001	-0.0552	-0.0447
PER	0.0000	-0.2830	-0.2403	-0.1225	-0.1202
PHL	0.0000	-0.0546	-0.0518	-0.0344	-0.0322
POL	0.7399	0.4525	0.4995	0.6447	0.6840
PRT	0.8559	0.4994	0.5621	0.7506	0.7584
QAT	0.0000	-0.0474	-0.0424	-0.0247	-0.0183
ROM	0.7463	0.4688	0.5156	0.6583	0.6617
RUS	0.0000	-0.1118	-0.0984	-0.0534	-0.0537
SAU	0.0000	-0.0670	-0.0597	-0.0342	-0.0325
SDN	0.0000	-0.0806	-0.0691	-0.0354	-0.0104
SER	0.0000	-0.1999	-0.1675	-0.0472	-0.0352
SGP	0.0000	-0.0363	-0.0372	-0.0278	-0.0271
SVK	0.3437	0.1696	0.1937	0.2691	0.2792
SVN	0.6281	0.3741	0.4123	0.5324	0.5223
SWE	1.4719	0.9249	1.0352	1.3528	1.3847
SYR	0.0000	-0.1217	-0.1041	-0.0440	-0.0237
THA	0.0000	-0.0609	-0.0556	-0.0340	-0.0334
TKM	0.0000	-0.2388	-0.1806	0.0145	0.0180
TUN	0.0000	-0.1560	-0.1424	-0.0865	-0.0718
TUR	0.0000	-0.1303	-0.1162	-0.0657	-0.0651
TZA	0.0000	-0.1838	-0.1511	-0.0433	0.0055
UKR	0.0000	-0.0691	-0.0615	-0.0294	-0.0264
USA	0.0000	-0.8248	-0.6951	-0.3464	-0.3629
UZB	0.0000	-0.0588	-0.0497	-0.0174	0.0075
VEN	0.0000	-0.0995	-0.0893	-0.0522	-0.0475
VNM	0.0000	-0.0594	-0.0530	-0.0306	-0.0276
ZAF	0.0000	-0.1459	-0.1273	-0.0684	-0.0658
ZWE	0.0000	-0.1252	-0.1029	-0.0270	0.0151
World	0.9352	0.4865	0.5783	0.8288	0.8415
CETA	201.3183	185.9714	189.3940	197.9635	197.9171
ROW	0.0000	-0.3792	-0.3030	-0.0912	-0.0946

Table 12: Evaluation of the Physical Capital and FDI Effects of CETA as an RTA and BIT on Trade Costs and FDI Frictions of the “Full GE Dynamic” scenarios

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Country	Physical Capital without FDI	Physical Capital with FDI	Outward FDI quantity	Outward FDI earn.	Inward FDI quantity	Inward FDI pay.
AGO	-0.0041	-0.0133	-0.0121	0.0729	0.1770	-0.0133
ARG	-0.0122	-0.0114	-0.0070	0.1206	0.1770	-0.0114
AUS	-0.0042	-0.0027	-0.0023	0.1301	0.1770	-0.0027
AUT	0.4549	0.4690	0.6927	0.2283	0.4046	0.4690
AZE	0.0434	-0.0052	-0.0025	0.0979	0.1770	-0.0052
BEL	0.1258	0.1339	0.3614	0.1185	0.4046	0.1339
BGD	-0.0081	-0.0092	-0.0053	0.1172	0.1770	-0.0092
BGR	0.1881	0.1986	0.4228	0.1652	0.4040	0.1986
BLR	-0.0014	-0.0026	0.0002	0.1024	0.1770	-0.0026
BRA	-0.0054	-0.0041	-0.0037	0.1272	0.1770	-0.0041
CAN	7.7625	8.1135	15.1614	2.7818	6.7426	8.1135
CHE	-0.0211	-0.0205	-0.0197	0.0982	0.1770	-0.0205
CHL	-0.0134	-0.0132	-0.0102	0.1268	0.1770	-0.0132
CHN	-0.0075	-0.0051	-0.0050	0.1456	0.1770	-0.0051
COL	-0.0059	-0.0054	-0.0031	0.1372	0.1770	-0.0054
CYP	0.4643	0.0602	0.3008	0.1372	0.4047	0.0602
CZE	0.0428	0.0487	0.2761	0.1024	0.4043	0.0487
DEU	0.3794	0.3933	0.6208	0.1960	0.4043	0.3933
DNK	0.6118	0.6289	0.8471	0.2772	0.4043	0.6289
DOM	-0.0058	0.0000	0.0156	0.1412	0.1770	0.0000
ECU	-0.0027	-0.0030	0.0025	0.1330	0.1770	-0.0030
EGY	-0.0107	-0.0099	-0.0057	0.1075	0.1770	-0.0099
ESP	0.2090	0.2179	0.4452	0.1535	0.4046	0.2179
EST	0.2140	0.0929	0.3228	0.1462	0.4043	0.0929
ETH	-0.0085	0.0030	0.0306	0.0975	0.1770	0.0030
FIN	0.5334	0.5494	0.7699	0.2590	0.4044	0.5494
FRA	0.4006	0.4142	0.6414	0.2035	0.4044	0.4142
GBR	1.0866	1.1141	1.3405	0.3917	0.4044	1.1141
GHA	0.0812	-0.0100	-0.0011	0.0939	0.1770	-0.0100
GRC	0.1316	0.1402	0.3675	0.1431	0.4043	0.1402
GTM	-0.0077	-0.0030	0.0111	0.1405	0.1770	-0.0030
HKG	-0.0085	-0.0077	-0.0063	0.1242	0.1770	-0.0077
HRV	0.1098	0.0896	0.3196	0.1266	0.4044	0.0896
HUN	0.2290	0.2288	0.4540	0.1537	0.4042	0.2288
IDN	-0.0052	-0.0043	-0.0034	0.1266	0.1770	-0.0043
IND	-0.0054	-0.0039	-0.0034	0.1221	0.1770	-0.0039
IRL	0.7418	0.7617	0.9803	0.3125	0.4043	0.7617
IRN	-0.0033	-0.0024	-0.0016	0.1136	0.1770	-0.0024
IRQ	-0.0047	-0.0041	-0.0026	0.1282	0.1770	-0.0041
ISR	-0.0197	-0.0177	-0.0139	0.1150	0.1770	-0.0177
ITA	0.3291	0.3414	0.5688	0.1844	0.4045	0.3414
JPN	-0.0078	-0.0059	-0.0057	0.1381	0.1770	-0.0059
KAZ	-0.0054	-0.0048	-0.0035	0.1067	0.1770	-0.0048
KEN	0.0588	-0.0055	0.0114	0.0922	0.1770	-0.0055
KOR	-0.0081	-0.0067	-0.0063	0.1302	0.1770	-0.0067
KWT	-0.0040	-0.0033	-0.0007	0.1207	0.1770	-0.0033
LBN	-0.0099	-0.0072	0.0126	0.0946	0.1770	-0.0072
LKA	0.0042	-0.0067	0.0025	0.1123	0.1770	-0.0067
LTU	0.2318	0.2183	0.4450	0.1889	0.4046	0.2183
LUX	0.1139	0.1037	0.3317	0.1276	0.4042	0.1037
LVA	0.4020	0.0499	0.2819	0.1212	0.4044	0.0499
MAR	-0.0218	-0.0206	-0.0132	0.0937	0.1770	-0.0206
MEX	-0.0577	-0.0478	-0.0462	0.1579	0.1770	-0.0478
MKD	0.8612	-0.0037	0.0099	0.0806	0.1770	-0.0037
MLT	0.2481	0.2439	0.4581	0.2022	0.4044	0.2439
MYS	-0.0104	-0.0096	-0.0084	0.1266	0.1770	-0.0096
NGA	-0.0040	-0.0031	-0.0021	0.1247	0.1770	-0.0031
NLD	0.3823	0.3951	0.6216	0.2045	0.4042	0.3951

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Table 12 – *Continued from previous page*

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Country	Physical Capital without FDI	Physical Capital with FDI	Outward FDI quantity	Outward FDI earn.	Inward FDI quantity	Inward FDI pay.
NOR	-0.0378	-0.0387	-0.0373	0.0932	0.1770	-0.0387
NZL	-0.0067	-0.0064	-0.0034	0.1242	0.1770	-0.0064
OMN	-0.0004	-0.0007	0.0017	0.1223	0.1770	-0.0007
PAK	-0.0084	-0.0081	-0.0036	0.1158	0.1770	-0.0081
PER	-0.0136	-0.0134	-0.0104	0.1387	0.1770	-0.0134
PHL	-0.0146	-0.0136	-0.0081	0.1268	0.1770	-0.0136
POL	0.1673	0.1686	0.3957	0.1320	0.4045	0.1686
PRT	0.2735	0.2835	0.5072	0.1748	0.4044	0.2835
QAT	-0.0019	-0.0013	0.0001	0.1208	0.1770	-0.0013
ROM	0.1820	0.1908	0.4170	0.1519	0.4044	0.1908
RUS	-0.0047	-0.0025	-0.0023	0.1110	0.1770	-0.0025
SAU	-0.0025	-0.0008	-0.0005	0.1289	0.1770	-0.0008
SDN	0.0010	-0.0023	0.0045	0.1156	0.1770	-0.0023
SER	0.1194	-0.0075	0.0001	0.0873	0.1770	-0.0075
SGP	-0.0167	-0.0158	-0.0139	0.1225	0.1770	-0.0158
SVK	0.0303	0.0356	0.2631	0.1002	0.4041	0.0356
SVN	0.0811	0.0755	0.3038	0.1187	0.4043	0.0755
SWE	0.5591	0.5755	0.7991	0.2604	0.4045	0.5755
SYR	0.0495	-0.0061	0.0046	0.0964	0.1770	-0.0061
THA	-0.0105	-0.0097	-0.0083	0.1255	0.1770	-0.0097
TKM	0.4436	0.0015	0.0119	0.0973	0.1770	0.0015
TUN	-0.0277	-0.0253	-0.0136	0.0806	0.1770	-0.0253
TUR	-0.0139	-0.0130	-0.0120	0.1009	0.1770	-0.0130
TZA	0.1303	0.0005	0.0232	0.0942	0.1770	0.0005
UKR	-0.0048	-0.0034	-0.0021	0.1036	0.1770	-0.0034
USA	-0.0503	-0.0582	-0.0581	0.1751	0.1770	-0.0582
UZB	0.0402	0.0004	0.0129	0.1026	0.1770	0.0004
VEN	-0.0045	-0.0037	-0.0021	0.1456	0.1770	-0.0037
VNM	-0.0035	-0.0027	-0.0016	0.1253	0.1770	-0.0027
ZAF	-0.0075	-0.0064	-0.0055	0.1118	0.1770	-0.0064
ZWE	0.1059	0.0043	0.0322	0.0964	0.1770	0.0043
World	0.1600	0.1616	0.3799	0.1770	0.3186	0.1616
CETA	0.7044	0.7198	0.7490	0.2925	0.4542	0.7198
ROW	-0.0162	-0.0176	-0.0120	0.1187	0.1770	-0.0176