Competing for a Duopoly:
International Trade and Tax Competition

Abstract
We consider the competition between potential host governments to attract the investment of both firms in an industry. Competition by identical countries for a monopoly firm’s investment is known to result in a “race to the bottom” where all rents are captured by the firm through subsidies. We demonstrate that with two firms, both are taxed in equilibrium, despite the explicit non-cooperation between governments. When countries differ in size, a single firm will be attracted to the larger market. We explore the conditions under which both firms in a duopoly co-locate and when each nation attracts a firm in equilibrium. The literature tends to focus on the polar cases of (perfect) competition and monopoly, despite the empirical prevalence of oligopoly. Our investigation of duopoly is a first step to a more complete understanding.
1 Introduction

“Tax competition among advanced states works to drain public finances and make a welfare state unaffordable.” Gray (1998, p. 88)

This view of the effects of tax competition, offered by the eminent British political philosopher John Gray, echoes widely-held popular concern that competition between potential host countries for the foreign direct investment (FDI) of large, footloose multinational enterprises (MNEs) will result in a “race to the bottom” over time in corporate tax rates and an inflation in subsidy payments.1 Gray’s view receives support from two sources. First, there exists case-study evidence from a small number of industries, notably automobiles and electronics, that severe incentive-inflation exists.2 However, such case studies provide an unrepresentative picture of the fiscal stance across all industries. For example, using information on the whole structure of national tax systems to derive “effective” tax rates, Devereux et al. (2002) show that over the 1980s and 1990s marginal corporate tax rates across 18 countries (the EU and G7) remained stable, while average rates fell slightly. We believe that the unrepresentativeness of the incentive-inflation case studies is not entirely due to an unimportance of MNEs in the aggregate economy.3 Rather, it seems that tax competition for

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1 During the late 1990s, these popular concerns were reflected at the policy level in the launching of initiatives by both the European Union and the OECD to combat “harmful” tax competition (see European Commission, 1997; OECD, 1998; in both cases, “harm” was equated with abnormally low corporate tax rates). In addition to collapsing corporate tax rates, there are also frequently-voiced concerns that the “race to the bottom” will manifest itself in a multilateral deregulation of environmental protections and government-imposed floors on working conditions. However, our focus is tax competition. Markusen et al. (1996) formally analyse the “race to the bottom” in environmental policies.

2 For example, in 1994 the US state of Alabama offered Mercedes an incentive package worth approximately $230 millions for a new plant to employ 1,500 workers (Head, 1998). In the UK, Siemens was offered £50 millions in 1996 to locate a 1000-worker semiconductor plant in Tyneside, northeast England. The factory closed 18 months later, and Siemens had to repay £18 millions in grants. See also Kozul-Wright and Rowthorn (1998, p. 86).

3 UNCTAD (2000) reports that, by 1999, the ratio of world FDI stock to world GDP had reached 16%.
FDI does \textit{not} invariably result in a “race to the bottom.”\textsuperscript{4}

Given the theoretical focus of our paper, the second source of support for Gray’s view is more significant: a general result from existing formal analyses of tax competition, such as the canonical model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), is that “independent governments engage in wasteful competition for scarce [mobile] capital through reductions in tax rates and public expenditure levels” (Wilson, 1999, p. 269). In common with much of the formal literature, Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) assume perfectly competitive (factor and product) markets.\textsuperscript{5} This stands in sharp contrast to the prevalence of oligopoly in industries where MNEs operate and national governments are observed to compete for their FDI projects. Therefore, in our examination of the competition between two potential host governments for the investments of two firms, we have two principal aims. Firstly, we wish to investigate the robustness of the conclusions of the “basic tax competition model” to changes in market structure in favour of realism.

Secondly, we want to investigate the impact of asymmetries in market size between the bidding countries on their equilibrium tax rates and success in attracting FDI. Although

\textsuperscript{4} Furthermore, the bulk of the fall in the effective average corporate tax rate (EACTR) reported by Devereux \textit{et al.} (2002) occurred in the mid- to late-1980s. When, during the 1990s, world FDI flows grew very rapidly (e.g., relative to GDP), EACTRs remained stable, a fact which sits uncomfortably with the “race to the bottom” hypothesis.

\textsuperscript{5} In his survey of theoretical contributions, Wilson (1999) christens the Zodrow/ Mieszkowski framework the “basic tax competition model.” In Zodrow/ Mieszkowski, a number of identical (small) countries levy specific taxes on the capital employed within their borders to finance the provision of a public good. Capital is perfectly mobile internationally, so its post-tax rate of return must be equated across countries. The key insight is that a rise in a given country’s tax rate creates a \textit{positive externality}: capital is driven abroad, and other countries benefit from higher tax revenues and wages. Under non-cooperative behaviour, national governments fail to account for these external benefits and, consequently, tax rates and public good provision are set at inefficiently low levels.
previous analyses of tax competition have incorporated country-size differences,\textsuperscript{6} none have done so under oligopoly.\textsuperscript{7} We fill this gap. There exists empirical evidence that corporation tax rates vary positively with country size,\textsuperscript{8} and we aim to shed some light on the causes of this empirical correlation. Moreover, a belief in a positive tax/size relationship is presumably the premise behind calls for corporate tax co-ordination in the EU (see European Commission, 1997): due to its size advantage, a “Fortress Europe” would then be able to set higher corporate taxes in a world of capital mobility than any of its member countries could levy individually.

We build a two-country, two-firm model of MNE investment where the MNEs produce homogeneous goods. The countries’ governments compete in taxes to attract the firms’ plants. Our game comprises three stages. In stage one, the governments post lump-sum bids to attract the FDI (taxes are equivalent to negative bids). These bids are location-specific fixed costs, in that they are only paid if the MNE invests in a country. In the second stage, the firms choose their investment locations. Each firm is assumed to be able to operate at most one plant from which it can sell in both countries, although a specific trade

\textsuperscript{6} For example, Bucovetsky (1991), Wilson (1991) and Kanbur and Keen (1993) under perfect competition; and Haufler and Wooton (1999) with a monopoly firm. A general result is that the large country chooses the higher tax rate in equilibrium. However, equilibrium location patterns depend crucially on the assumed market structure (i.e., under perfect competition the small country hosts a disproportionate share of firms in equilibrium, while under monopoly the large country “wins” the firm), which creates an interest in the examination of location patterns under oligopolistic competition.

\textsuperscript{7} Indeed, Janeba (1998) is, to our knowledge, the only existing model of tax competition under oligopoly. However, his set-up is very different to ours. In particular, all firms are assumed to sell into a single “third market,” so the impact of market-size differences cannot be assessed.

\textsuperscript{8} In their study of OECD countries’ corporation tax-setting behaviour between 1982 and 1999, Devereux et al. (2004) find that country size, measured by GDP, has a positive effect on the statutory rate of corporation tax. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) compare average corporate tax rates (i.e., total corporate tax revenue divided by GDP) in the large “core” European countries (Germany, Benelux, France and Italy) to those levied by the smaller countries on the “periphery” (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland) since the mid-1960s. They show that average corporate tax rates were systematically higher – often twice as high – in the “core.”
cost applies to internationally-traded goods. Finally, in stage three, Cournot competition establishes equilibrium on the countries’ product markets. We solve the game backwards to isolate its subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In stage one, the governments are motivated by national social welfare, which comprises consumer surplus less total bid payments (or plus total tax revenues). The governments must balance their budgets, and they exist only to redistribute income in a lump-sum manner between their populations and the foreign firms.\(^9\) Because we assume that the firms are owned outside the region and that trade costs are real, profits and transport cost payments do not enter the national welfare of either country. The only asymmetry in the model is that countries may differ in size, with one country having more consumers than the other.

The key element that makes our analysis interesting is the presence of trade costs. These mean that both firms and countries care about location. Countries prefer local production to imports because the price to their consumers is lower with local production as the trade cost is eliminated from the firm’s marginal cost. Indeed, raising consumer surplus is the \textit{only} incentive for countries to bid for the FDI.\(^10\) Firms also care about location but their motivation arises from the desire to gain access to a large local market.

We are able to isolate all the game’s bidding equilibria.\(^11\) We show that the qualitative nature of the equilibrium depends on whether the country-size asymmetry is “small” or “large.” If the countries are of similar sizes, then, in equilibrium, one firm locates in each

\(^9\) Moreover, we assume that governments know the firms’ costs. Olsen and Osmundsen (2003) relax this assumption in the context of competition for a monopolistic firm. On the role of asymmetric information in taxing transnationals, see Gresik (2001, section 7).

\(^10\) There are no aggregate employment effects of FDI. Hence production costs include no rent because workers are paid their opportunity cost (that is, the wage offered elsewhere in the economy). Haaparanta (1996) examines bidding for a monopoly firm when inward FDI relieves involuntary unemployment.

\(^11\) Whenever an equilibrium exists, it is unique.
country and all the firms’ profits are taxed away. We call this full profit extraction (FPE).

To see the intuition for this result, consider first the firms’ best responses to taxes set at (just below) FPE levels. If its rival locates in a given country, then a firm will strictly prefer locating a plant in the other country to both no-entry (zero profits) and co-location, which cuts both firms’ profits (a “competition effect”). Next, consider a country’s best response to FPE tax-setting by the other country. Taxing at the FPE level, which implies geographically dispersed production, clearly dominates all higher taxes because these would merely drive the local firm out of the industry, resulting in lower consumer surplus (monopoly pricing) and zero tax revenue. The possibility exists that cutting taxes from the FPE level in order to attract both firms might be optimal; we present conditions to rule this out in the main text.

Compared to results in the existing formal literature on non-cooperative tax-setting, the FPE bidding equilibrium with similar-sized countries is striking. The perfectly-competitive “basic tax competition model” predicts suboptimally low corporate taxes in equilibrium, whereas our FPE equilibrium maximizes industry tax revenue (subject to the constraint that both firms enter). Moreover, the monopoly model of Haufler and Wooton (1999), which we briefly review in section 3, predicts a “race to the top” in subsidy payments when countries are identical, so that the winner gains no benefit from hosting FDI.\footnote{In the Haufler/Wooton model, identical countries are Bertrand competitors for the monopolist. Other analyses of bidding for a monopolist that produce positive subsidies in equilibrium are Black and Hoyt (1989), King \textit{et al.} (1993), Haaparanta (1996), and Menezes (?).}

Our second set of equilibrium predictions relate to a large country-size asymmetry. The first consequence of increasing the country-size asymmetry is that the FPE bidding equilibrium breaks down. We show that if one country is much larger than the other and the
countries set FPE taxes, then both firms would gain (after taxes) from co-locating in the smaller country (relative to dispersion). The incumbent in the small country experiences a rise in total profits when its rival co-locates because competition on the large foreign market becomes less intense, and this gain outweighs the loss in profits from more intense local competition on a small market. With a large country-size asymmetry, we show that, in equilibrium, both firms locate in the larger country and are taxed. Qualitatively, this bidding equilibrium is identical to that derived for a large size asymmetry by Haufler and Wooton (1999): subject to keeping the small country indifferent between hosting one firm and none, the large country maximizes its tax level. Despite the small country’s equilibrium subsidy, the large country can impose a tax and attract both firms because it offers the firms a larger local market.

A general conclusion of our analysis is that tax competition under duopoly does not create a “race to the bottom” in corporation tax rates. In both equilibria of our model, the firms are taxed. This is consistent with empirical evidence that shows a remarkable stability of “effective” corporate tax rates over time (Devereux et al., 2002). Moreover, we feel that our results will readily generalize to many specifications with oligopoly in the product markets.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we develop the model used in the analysis. Section 3 examines the outcomes of the tax competition between

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13 Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005, Proposition 4(ii)) also present a qualitatively identical equilibrium in a model of tax competition between countries of different sizes under large-group monopolistic competition.

14 Moreover, our model is consistent with increased capital mobility (“globalization”) causing the modest fall in effective average corporate tax rates documented by Devereux et al. (2002). In the case of a large country-size asymmetry, the larger country sets its tax below the level that would fully extract profits under geographically dispersed production. Assume a “pre-globalization” phase where the firms are pre-assigned to different countries; here, the countries would obviously levy FPE taxes. Then, a move to “globalization” (firm mobility between countries) would drive down the large country’s taxes.
countries, and distinguishes between the cases of small and large country-size asymmetries. Finally, section 4 concludes and discusses potential generalizations of our results.

2 The Model

2.1 Households

We model the demand side of the model to be identical to that of H&W. Let there be a region composed of two countries, labelled $A$ and $B$. We assume that country $B$ is composed of a single household while country $A$ has $n \geq 1$ identical households. Good $X$, whose production is central to our analysis, is a homogeneous good that is manufactured under conditions of imperfect competition, details of which are discussed below. Following Haufler and Wooton (1999), the demand curves for this good are:

$$X_A = \frac{n(\alpha - p_A)}{\beta}, \quad X_B = \frac{\alpha - p_B}{\beta},$$

(1)

where $p_i$ is the market price of good $X$ in country $i \in \{A, B\}$.\(^{15}\)

Consumer surplus will depend upon the market price:

$$S_A (p) = \frac{n}{2\beta} (\alpha - p)^2, \quad S_B (p) = \frac{1}{2\beta} (\alpha - p)^2.$$  

(2)

2.2 Firms

We assume that the regional market for good $X$ is served by one or two foreign-owned firms, each of which chooses to establish its production facilities in either country $A$ or $B$ (or, indeed, decides not to invest at all). We assume that each firm sets up at most one plant.

Production is characterized by a fixed cost $F$ and constant marginal cost $w$, which are assumed the same in both countries. The national markets are segmented and there is a

\(^{15}\text{Implicit in our analysis is the existence of another sector } Y, \text{ producing a numeraire good under conditions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Details can be found in Haufler and Wooton (1999).}\)
trade cost of \( \tau \) per unit of the good exported in either direction. This trade cost is a real (e.g., transport) cost, borne by firms and having no welfare role. The marginal cost of serving a market will depend on the location of the firm and the consumers. For the local market \( MC_L \equiv w \) while for the foreign market the trade cost must be taken into account and therefore \( MC_F \equiv w + \tau \). As the good is homogeneous, in equilibrium all units of the good sold in a particular country will have the identical consumer price regardless of whether the good is domestically produced or imported.\(^{16}\)

Firms will make their decision as to location based upon a comparison of the profits from setting up in either country, taking into account any taxes levied on (or subsidies granted to) them by the host government.

2.3 Governments

We assume that the benefit arising from having a firm invest in a country lies in the lower price that consumers pay for locally produced goods, as opposed to imports. We ignore the labour-market implications of the investment. The governments of the countries will be prepared to offer inducements to firms to locate within their borders. Let the bids made by country \( i \) be \( B_i \) where \( B_i \geq 0 \) (a positive value being a lump-sum subsidy while a negative value would represent a tax on the firm). Each government’s objective function is aggregate consumer surplus minus total bid payments (justified because utility is quasi-linear and the coefficient on the numeraire good is 1).

\(^{16}\) The model has, in this regard, similarities with that of the "reciprocal dumping" model of Brander and Krugman (1983).
3 The tax competition game

The structure of the tax competition game has three stages.

Stage 1. Governments of countries $A$ and $B$ simultaneously and irreversibly announce their bids, $B_A$ and $B_B$.

Stage 2. The two firms simultaneously and irreversibly pick locations, choosing between $\{\emptyset, A, B\}$ where $\emptyset$ is an ‘inactivity’ option.

Stage 3. Firms compete à la Cournot to serve both countries.

Choices made in each stage are common knowledge in subsequent stages. We solve the game backwards for sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies.

3.1 Stage 3: Cournot competition

We determine the outcomes for firms and consumers resulting from the location choices made in Stage 2.

3.1.1 Firms’ profits

In the following analysis, we assume that profits (exclusive of bid receipts/tax payments) are strictly positive for all pairs of location choices. This is a ‘no lame ducks’ assumption (NLD)—subsidies are not required to make production profitable in absolute terms, they merely alter the relative profitability of alternative locations. We calculate the variable profits earned by either firm in market $B$ for location choices of local production $L$ or foreign production $F$, given its rival’s choice either of where to locate or not to enter. Variable profits in market $A$ are simply $n$ times those in market $B$ on the assumption of a symmetric trade cost between markets.

Should the other firm stay out (choose $\emptyset$), the firm will be a monopolist and its operating
profits per household will be:
\[
\pi_{L\varnothing} \equiv \frac{1}{4\beta} (\alpha - w)^2, \quad \text{if firm produces locally and rival does not enter;}
\]
\[
\pi_{F\varnothing} \equiv \frac{1}{4\beta} (\alpha - w - \tau)^2, \quad \text{if firm produces abroad and rival does not enter.}
\] (3)

Alternatively, the rival will enter the market and the firm’s operating profits will depend upon both firms’ locations:
\[
\pi_{LF} \equiv \frac{1}{9\beta} (\alpha - w + \tau)^2, \quad \text{if firm produces locally and rival produces abroad;}
\]
\[
\pi_{LL} \equiv \frac{1}{9\beta} (\alpha - w)^2, \quad \text{if both firms produce locally;}
\]
\[
\pi_{FF} \equiv \frac{1}{9\beta} (\alpha - w - \tau)^2, \quad \text{if both firms produce abroad;}
\]
\[
\pi_{FL} \equiv \frac{1}{9\beta} (\alpha - w - 2\tau)^2, \quad \text{if firm produces abroad and rival produces locally.}
\] (4)

This yields the following rankings:
\[
\pi_{L\varnothing} > \pi_{F\varnothing},
\]
\[
\pi_{LF} > \pi_{LL} > \pi_{FF} > \pi_{FL}, \quad \text{and}
\]
\[
\pi_{LF} + \pi_{FL} > \pi_{LL} + \pi_{FF}.
\] (5)

It is convenient to introduce the following notation for the aggregate profits of a firm, composed of its operating profits in each location less the fixed costs of production:
\[
\Pi_{A\varnothing} \equiv n\pi_{L\varnothing} + \pi_{F\varnothing} - F; \quad \Pi_{B\varnothing} \equiv \pi_{L\varnothing} + n\pi_{F\varnothing} - F;
\]
\[
\Pi_{AA} \equiv n\pi_{LL} + \pi_{FF} - F; \quad \Pi_{BA} \equiv \pi_{LF} + n\pi_{FL} - F;
\]
\[
\Pi_{AB} \equiv n\pi_{LF} + \pi_{FL} - F; \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_{BB} \equiv \pi_{LL} + n\pi_{FF} - F;
\] (6)

where \( \Pi_{ij} \) are the profits of a firm based in country \( i \) while its rival is set up in country \( j \).

The bottom result in (5) will be especially important in our analysis, and it can be interpreted in two ways. In narrow terms, it states that if the host countries are of identical size and their posted bids are equal, the firms would rather locate in different countries than co-locate (because this reduces “competition”). More broadly, it implies that
\[ \Pi_{AB} + \Pi_{BA} > \Pi_{AA} + \Pi_{BB}, \] where the L.H.S. is industry variable profits when production is geographically dispersed and the R.H.S. is “average” industry variable profits when production is geographically concentrated (with equal weight placed on location choices of AA and BB). Industry profits are higher with dispersed production because this reduces “competition” (consider, e.g., the case of a near-prohibitive trade cost).

We assume that

\[ 0 \leq \tau < \varpi \equiv \frac{1}{2} (\alpha - w) \]  

(7)

to ensure that all possible Cournot equilibria are interior (the necessary and sufficient condition is \( \pi_{FL} > 0 \)). We shall refer to \( \varpi \) as the “prohibitive tariff” as it is just sufficient to block any international trade between A and B.

3.1.2 Consumer surplus and market prices

When the market outcome is a monopoly, the single firm sets a market prices equal to \((\alpha + MC_j)/2\) where \( j \in \{L, F\} \). Consequently we can calculate the consumer surplus in country B as:

\[ S_{L\emptyset} = \frac{1}{8\beta} (\alpha - w)^2, \text{ if the monopolist produces locally;} \]
\[ S_{F\emptyset} = \frac{1}{8\beta} (\alpha - w - \tau)^2, \text{ if the monopolist produces abroad.} \]  

(8)

Clearly,

\[ S_{L\emptyset} > S_{F\emptyset}. \]

Once again, consumer surplus in country A is simply \( n \) times that in country B.

In the case of a duopoly, the Cournot duopoly price is \((\alpha + \sum MC_j)/3\) and the resulting
consumer surplus levels corresponding to firm locations are:

\[ S_{LL} = \frac{2}{9\beta} (\alpha - w)^2, \text{ if both firms produce locally;} \]
\[ S_{LF} = S_{FL} = \frac{1}{18\beta} (2\alpha - 2w - \tau)^2, \text{ if one firm is local, other produces abroad;} \]
\[ S_{FF} = \frac{2}{9\beta} (\alpha - w - \tau)^2, \text{ if both produce abroad.} \]

(9)

Clearly,

\[ S_{LL} > S_{LF} \equiv S_{FL} > S_{FF}, \]

the more firms in production locally, the better.

3.2 Stage 2: Firms’ location decisions

We begin by analyzing a firm’s best response (BR) to its rival’s choice given the bids \( B_i \) being offered by the potential host countries. Using these decision rules we can plot the best responses to \( \emptyset, A \) and \( B \) in \((B_A, B_B)\)-space and determine the locations chosen by firms in equilibrium.

3.2.1 The location of a single firm

We start by considering the outcome when a single firm is deciding on its location knowing that its rival will not enter the market (that is, the other firm chooses \( \emptyset \)). This is the case of the monopolistic firm that was analyzed by H&W. We can determine the frontiers along which the firm is indifferent between the locations.

In response to \( \emptyset \) (‘stay out’):

\[ A \succ \emptyset \text{ if and only if } B_A > -\Pi_{A\emptyset}; \]
\[ B \succ \emptyset \text{ if and only if } B_B > -\Pi_{B\emptyset}; \]
\[ A \succ B \text{ if and only if } B_A > B_B - \Gamma, \text{ where } \Gamma \equiv \Pi_{A\emptyset} - \Pi_{B\emptyset}. \]

(10)
The results are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows $BR_∅$, the firm’s best responses to $∅$ (that is, when there is no competition from another firm) where the NLD means that $\pi_{L∅} + n\pi_{F∅} > F$ (in the absence of any government bid payments the firm would still be prepared to invest in country $B$, the smaller and hence less attractive location).

Of course, the position of each frontier in Figure 1 depends on the model’s structural parameters. If $n = 1$, the two potential hosts are the same size and $BR_∅$ passes through the origin and is symmetric, and the firm has no preferences for locating in either market. Increasing $n$ shifts all three inter-regional boundaries, away from the origin and in favour of country $A$. This is intuitive, in that choosing to invest in country $A$ becomes even more attractive as $n$ rises. In particular, the intersection of $BR_∅$ and the $B_A$ axis shifts down.

The absolute value of the intercept is $Γ$, the “tax premium” that the firm is willing to pay to locate in country $A$. Substituting (3) into (10) yields an explicit expression for Country $A$’s geographical advantage:

$$Γ = \frac{τ}{4β} (n - 1) [2(α - w) - τ].$$  

(11)

This advantage becomes more pronounced the larger are the international trade costs, as $\frac{dΓ}{dτ} > 0$.

We use the inequalities in (10) to analyze the outcome of the game below.

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17 This is identical to equation (9) in Hauffer and Wooton (1999).
3.2.2 The location choices of two firms

We now consider the best locations for a firm given the choice made by its rival. From (5) and (6), we can find the inter-regional frontiers.

In response to $A$:

$$A > ∅ \text{ if and only if } B_A > -Π_{AA};$$

$$B > ∅ \text{ if and only if } B_B > -Π_{BA};$$

$$A > B \text{ if and only if } B_A > B_B - Δ, \text{ where } Δ ≡ Π_{AA} - Π_{BA}. \quad (12)$$

In response to $B$:

$$A > ∅ \text{ if and only if } B_A > -Π_{AB};$$

$$B > ∅ \text{ if and only if } B_B > -Π_{BB};$$

$$A > B \text{ if and only if } B_A > B_B - Θ, \text{ where } Θ ≡ Π_{AB} - Π_{BB}. \quad (13)$$

Panels (12) and (13) determine $BR_A$ and $BR_B$, the best responses to $A$ and $B$ respectively. Under the NLD assumption, plots of $BR_A$ and $BR_B$ in $(B_B, B_A)$-space are qualitatively
identical to $BR_\emptyset$ illustrated in Figure 1. In particular, $BR_A = \emptyset$ and $BR_B = \emptyset$ both require $B_A, B_B < 0$. Increasing $n$ shifts the plots of $BR_A$ and $BR_B$ towards the south-west: the region where the best response is $A$ grows and that where it is $\emptyset$ shrinks.\(^{18}\)

In Figure 2, $BR_A$ and $BR_B$ are plotted together in the case where $n$ is “small”; where the exact meaning and significance of this restriction will be explained below. (Recall that to the NW of the $BR_A$ plot, $BR_A = A$; to the SE, $BR_A = B$; and to the SW, $BR_A = \emptyset$; likewise for $BR_B$.)

The first point to note about Figure 2 is that the $B_A$-intercept of the $BR_A$ plot lies above that of $BR_B$. This occurs because the attractiveness of $A$ as a location, measured by a firm’s total variable profits when located in $A$ minus those when located in $B$, rise if the rival firm switches from $A$ to $B$.\(^{19}\) Compared to the case of all production being concentrated in

\(^{18}\) The region where the best response is $B$ is squeezed from above by $A$ but gains ground from $\emptyset$ to the left.

\(^{19}\) That is, $\Theta > \Delta$. For $(B_A, B_B)$ between the upward-sloping parts of $BR_A$ and $BR_B$ we have $BR_A = B$ but $BR_B = A$, so a switch by its rival from $A$ to $B$ prompts a firm itself to switch in the opposite direction.
one country, a geographical dispersion of production, when combined with strictly positive trade costs, reduces the degree of “competition” in the industry and raises industry profits (see (5). Therefore, when the rival firm chooses B, the motive to disperse production and thereby reduce “competition” works in favour of A. However, when the rival itself chooses A, the “dispersion motive” favours B.

The second relevant characteristic of Figure 2 is that the $B_A$-intercept of $BR_A$ is nearer to the origin than that of $BR_B$. This feature arises from our assumption that country A is, in general, larger than B. If $n = 1$, both countries are the same size and the smallest bid either country must post to attract both firms if its rival posts a zero bid is the same (and strictly positive) for A and B. For country A, this critical bid is equal to $\Delta$, the $B_A$-intercept of $BR_A$; for B, it is $\Theta$, the $B_B$-intercept of $BR_B$. Increases in $n$ raise the relative geographic advantage of A and therefore affect the countries’ critical bids asymmetrically. To attract both firms, country B must bid more if $n$ rises; however, country A can bid less (and, for sufficiently large $n$, impose a tax).

The third noteworthy feature of Figure 2 is that the horizontal part of $BR_B$ is below that of $BR_A$. This arises because $\Pi_{AB} > \Pi_{AA}$: a firm located in A earns larger profits if its rival chooses B (dispersed production) than A (concentrated production).

The fourth feature of Figure 2 defines “small” $n$. The vertical part of $BR_B$ lies rightwards of the corresponding part of $BR_A$ if and only if $\Pi_{BA} > \Pi_{BB}$. This holds at $n = 1$, reflecting the firms’ preference for geographically dispersed over concentrated production. However, as $n$ rises, the profits on the A market of a firm producing in B rise faster if the rival firm is also

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20 When $n = 1$ (identical country sizes) $BR_A$ and $BR_B$ cut the $B_A$-axis at equal distances from the origin but on opposite sides. Increases in $n$ shift both $B_A$-intercepts downwards.
located in $B$ than if it is in $A$, so eventually $\Pi_{BB} > \Pi_{BA}$. This is because a firm producing in $B$ has a stronger “competitive position” on the $A$ market when its rival is not local to $A$ and therefore must also incur trade costs to serve $A$. By “small” $n$ we mean $n < \pi$, where $\pi$ is the relative size of $A$ at which the vertical parts of the best response schedules overlap ($\Pi_{BA} = \Pi_{BB}$). Using (4) and (4), we determine:

$$\pi \equiv \frac{\pi_{LF} - \pi_{LL}}{\pi_{FF} - \pi_{FL}} = \frac{2(\alpha - w) + \tau}{2(\alpha - w) - 3\tau}. \quad (14)$$

At $\tau = 0$, $\pi = 1$. $\pi$ is increasing in $\tau$ and realises a maximum value of 5 when (7) holds, in which circumstance the trade barrier is prohibitive.

We shall therefore refer to the “small” $n$ case when $n < \pi$, while the “large” $n$ case corresponds to $n > \pi$. The large $n$ case is illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3 replicates the first three properties of Figure 2 that were catalogued above. The crucial difference between the diagrams for large and small $n$ concerns the “full profit extraction” (FPE) point $E$, shown in both diagrams. Point $E = (-\Pi_{BA}, -\Pi_{AB})$ is such
that, if each of the two firms was to locate in a different country, all of the profits of both firms would be captured by the taxes set by the host nations (country A’s tax being larger than that of country B, reflecting the geographical advantage enjoyed by the larger market).

In the small $n$ case, $E$ lies at the intersection of $BR_A$ and $BR_B$. However, when $n > \pi$, $E$ is an interior point as it does not lie on $BR_B$ because, for large $n$, the vertical part of $BR_B$ lies to the left of that of $BR_A$.\(^{21}\)

Figures 2 and 3 both illustrate a number of features regarding the location of $BR_\emptyset$.

i. The horizontal part of $BR_\emptyset$ lies below the corresponding parts of the other two best response plots.

ii. The vertical part of $BR_\emptyset$ lies to the left of the corresponding parts of the other two best response plots.

Together, these mean that $BR_A = BR_B = \emptyset$ is necessary (but not sufficient) for $BR_\emptyset = \emptyset$.\(^{22}\) Put differently, the presence of an incumbent firm reduces a second firm’s incentive to enter the industry.

iii. The intercept of the $BR_A$ plot on the $B_A$ axis lies above that of the $BR_\emptyset$ plot.\(^{23}\)

iv. The $BR_\emptyset$ plot lies above point $E$.\(^{24}\)

\(^{21}\) As explained below, the significance of interior $E$ is that it cannot then be a bidding equilibrium in the first stage of the game, as only boundary points are eligible.

\(^{22}\) Moreover, given the NLD assumption, for a firm to have \(\emptyset\) as its best response to any choice by its rival requires $B_A, B_B < 0$.

\(^{23}\) This requires $\pi_L, -\pi_R > \pi_L - \pi_F$, which holds for all $n \geq 1$ as long as $\tau \leq \tau$. Intuitively, the gain from being local is greater if there is not already another local firm.

\(^{24}\) The $B_A$-intercept of $BR_\emptyset$ is above that of $BR_B$ for all $n$ if $\tau > \frac{2}{3}(\alpha - \omega)$. Otherwise, the $B_A$-intercept of $BR_B$ is higher than that of $BR_\emptyset$ (as plotted in Figure 3) for sufficiently large $n$. However, as shown in section 3.3.3, this distinction is not significant for our analysis.
If the bids of the national governments were set to fully extract the firms’ profits (that is, \( B_A = -\Pi_{AB} \) and \( B_B = -\Pi_{BA} \) at \( E \)), then the equilibrium locations are:

\[
\begin{align*}
(A, B) & \text{ for small } n, \ [BR_A = B, BR_B = A, BR_{\emptyset} = B]; \\
(B, B) & \text{ in dominant strategies for large } n, \ [BR_A = BR_B = BR_{\emptyset} = B].
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, if the country size differential is not too great, the firms will choose to locate in different countries; otherwise they will both locate in \( B \).\(^{25}\)

We now turn to examining the potential equilibrium outcomes of the complete game.

### 3.3 Stage 1: Bidding equilibria

In determining their best responses, we assume that countries never play weakly dominated strategies (that is, strategies that are as good as another for some play by a rival but strictly worse for others). This refinement of Nash equilibrium eliminates a number of implausible Nash equilibria and ensures that no country will ever offer a bid that exceeds its valuation of attracting the investment.\(^{26}\)

#### 3.3.1 Competition for the single firm

Turning to the H&W case of competition for the investment of a single firm, the countries’ valuations of persuading the firm to locate within their borders are:

\[
\begin{align*}
V_A &= n(S_{L\emptyset} - S_{F\emptyset}); \\
V_B &= S_{L\emptyset} - S_{F\emptyset}.
\end{align*}
\]  

\(^{25}\) The intuition for this co-location in \( B \) is as follows. At point \( E \), the firms by definition make zero post-tax profits if they choose location pattern \( AB \). However, for large \( n \), both firms gain if the \( A \)-firm jumps into \( B \): the jumper enjoys a fall in her tax burden (\( \Pi_{AB} \gg \Pi_{BA} \)); and the incumbent in \( B \) enjoys a rise in operating profits (\( \Pi_{BB} > \Pi_{BA} \), the implicit definition of large \( n \)) because it gains more through reduced competition on the (larger) foreign market than it loses at home.

\(^{26}\) We will also find it convenient to assume that there exists a well-defined minimum interval between bids, \( \varepsilon \); i.e. that the bid grid is “finite.”
Substituting (8) into (15) yields:

\[
V_A = \frac{n\tau}{8\beta} [2(\alpha - w) - \tau] > 0; \\
V_B = \frac{\tau}{8\beta} [2(\alpha - w) - \tau] > 0.
\]  

(16)

Thus both governments would be prepared to offer subsidies in order to attract the firm. The present analysis with a single firm is a standard first-price auction.

We use Figure 4 to determine the equilibrium bids and location of the firm. \( R_A (B_B) \) and \( R_B (B_A) \) are the reaction functions of countries A and B, respectively. Each country offers the maximum tax (minimum subsidy) necessary to make the firm just willing to invest within the country’s borders, given the other country’s bid. Thus country B tries to make investment within its boundaries more attractive to the firm than its otherwise locating in country A by offering a tax/subsidy just to the right of the \( BR_\emptyset \) plot. However, the bid cannot exceed the valuation \( V_B \) and so the reaction function turns vertical at that value. \( R_A \) is constructed in exactly the same way, though the kink occurs at the higher \( V_A \). The reaction curves intersect at point \( M \) where country A captures the investment by marginally improving on \( V_B - \Gamma \). While country A is prepared to pay more (that is, offer a larger subsidy than Country B), it does not need to given its geographic advantage. Thus the winning subsidy \( B_A^* \) is less than that offered by country B.

The difference in country size rules out the familiar “race to the bottom” in taxes (subsidies) that would otherwise occur.\(^{27}\) The bigger country does not have to match the offer of the smaller location and therefore the winning bid will not transfer all of the national benefits of the investment to the firm. Indeed, some of the profits from the firm may be captured

\(^{27}\) If \( n = 1 \) and the countries are identical to each other, \( B_A^* = V_A = V_B = B_B^* \) resulting in countries being indifferent to hosting the monopoly, given that the winning bid transfers all of the benefits of the the investment from the host nation to the firm in the form of a subsidy.
by the host country. As H&W show and as we illustrate in Figure 4, for sufficiently large $n$, $B_A^* < 0$ and the winning bid will be a tax on the investment in $A$. The next subsection investigates how this story changes when countries there are two firms looking to invest.

3.3.2 Competing for the duopoly: the small $n$ case

The equilibrium locations for given $B_A$ and $B_B$ are illustrated in Figure 5. In order to limit the taxonomy, regions have been grouped together.

In the shaded triangle, $BR_A = \emptyset$, $BR_B = A$, and $BR_{\emptyset} = B$, so there is no pure strategy location equilibrium under simultaneous moves by firms.28 Were sequential moves assumed, the equilibrium would be $(A, \emptyset)$, with the leader choosing $A$.29

We now consider the conditions for a bidding equilibrium to occur at FPE point $E$. At this point, each country gets the investment of one of the firms and has imposed a tax that

---

28 A symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium does, however, exist.

29 Note also that all of the simultaneous-moves location equilibria would be preserved under sequential moves (with the leader choosing the more profitable location).
Figure 5: Bidding equilibrium in the small $n$ case

equals the profits accruing to the firm.

If country $A$ were to reduce its offer and cut $B_A$ (that is, increase its tax), it would move to inside the $(B, \emptyset)$ region and the previously local firm would be driven out of the industry. This is clearly not worthwhile for $A$ because both its consumer surplus and tax revenues fall. Likewise, it is not worthwhile for country $B$ to deviate from point $E$ by cutting $B_B$. $^{30}$

Now consider whether either country will improve its offer. If country $A$ were to lower its tax, or perhaps offer a subsidy, it would move to just inside $(A,A)$. $^{31}$ This would not be worthwhile if and only if:

$$nS_{LF} + \Pi_{AB} > nS_{LL} + 2\Pi_{AA}. \quad (17)$$

$^{30}$ Note that country $A$ is indifferent between all $B_A$ in $(B, \emptyset)$ and $B$ is indifferent between all $B_B$ in $(A, \emptyset)$. The formal conditions for deviations from point $E$ to higher taxes not to be worthwhile are: $nS_{LF} + \Pi_{AB} > nS_{F\emptyset}$ for country $A$ and $S_{LF} + \Pi_{BA} > S_{F\emptyset}$ for $B$. The NLD assumption is sufficient for both of these to hold. If NLD failed, the countries would face a trade-off when contemplating “deviating downwards” from $E$ between lower consumer surplus and reduced subsidy payments.

$^{31}$ This is country $A$’s most preferred point in $(A,A)$ because it represents the largest possible tax consistent with attracting both firms. Likewise, for $B_B = -\Pi_{BA}$, point $E$ is $A$’s most preferred point in $(A,B)$, i.e. the largest possible tax consistent with attracting one firm. $A$ is indifferent between all $B_A$ in $(B, \emptyset)$ because it attracts neither firm. Country $B$ has analogous preferences.
Rewriting (17), using (6), yields:

\[ F > n (S_{LL} - S_{LF} - \pi_{LF} + 2\pi_{LL}) + (2\pi_{FF} - \pi_{FL}). \]  \hspace{1cm} (18)

If country \( B \) were to improve its offer, this would move the outcome to just inside \((B, B)\).

Increasing \( B_B \) is not worthwhile if and only if:

\[ S_{LF} + \Pi_{BA} > S_{LL} + 2\Pi_{BB}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (19)

Rewriting (19), using (6), gives:

\[ F > (S_{LL} - S_{LF} - \pi_{LF} + 2\pi_{LL}) + n (2\pi_{FF} - \pi_{FL}). \]  \hspace{1cm} (20)

Both terms on the right-hand sides of (18) and (20) are positive for non-prohibitive trade costs. Increasing \( B_A \) and \( B_B \) is not worthwhile if conditions (18) and (20), respectively, hold. At \( n = 1 \), the two conditions are equivalent. At \( n > 1 \), condition (18) is tighter so (20) can be dropped. Substituting (9) into (18) gives a necessary-and-sufficient condition for neither country to improve its bid:

\[ F > \frac{n}{18\beta} \left[ 2(\alpha - w)^2 - 3\tau^2 \right] + \frac{1}{9\beta} \left[ (\alpha - w)^2 - 2\tau^2 \right]. \]  \hspace{1cm} (21)

Our maintained NLD assumption requires that pre-tax profits at \( E \) be positive. Since \( \Pi_{AB} > \Pi_{BA} \), this requires that the firm in \( B \) break-even before tax, i.e. \( \Pi_{BA} > 0 \):

\[ F < \frac{1}{9\beta} (\alpha - w + \tau)^2 + \frac{n}{9\beta} (\alpha - w - 2\tau)^2. \]  \hspace{1cm} (22)

There is a potential conflict between these last two expressions, and we must establish whether there is a non-empty interval of \( F \) values that meets both. The two expressions are consistent if and only if:

\[ n < n^* \equiv \frac{4(\alpha - w) + 6\tau}{8(\alpha - w) - 11\tau}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (23)
where \( n^* > 1 \) if and only if \( \tau > \frac{4}{17} (\alpha - w) \). Therefore, for trade costs \( \tau \), where \( \frac{4}{17} (\alpha - w) < \tau < \frac{1}{2} (\alpha - w) \), and fixed costs \( F \) consistent with the two inequalities above, a bidding equilibrium exists at the full-profit-extraction point \( E \) for all \( n \in [1, n^*] \). Furthermore, this equilibrium is unique.\(^{32}\)

The critical value \( n^* \) can be compared with \( n^\pi \), our “smallness” criterion (14). For all parameter values, \( n^* < n^\pi \). Thus there is always a range of values of \( n \) where the country size differential is still “small” but is great enough that the full-profit-extraction point \( E \) cannot be an equilibrium.\(^{34}\)

Consider how the outcome of this game differs from that of competing for a monopoly. Initially, take the symmetrical case with \( n = 1 \). In this situation, neither country has a geographical advantage. In competing for the monopoly, each nation will be prepared to bid up to its valuation of capturing the investment. The ensuing race to the bottom will transfer the increased consumer surplus \( V_i \) of “winning” country \( i \) to the firm in the form of a subsidy, such that the host nation ends up no better off than the loser. The situation is effectively reversed when a second firm also wishes to invest. In this case, each country is able to attract

\(^{32}\) An illustrative numerical example of this result would be if we let \( (\alpha - w) = 10, \beta = 1, \) and \( \tau = 4 \) (which is non-prohibitive). Therefore, \( n^* = 1.78 \). From the restrictions on \( F \), we get: (i) at \( n = 1 \), an FPE equilibrium exists for all \( F \in [16, 22.22] \); and (ii) at \( n = 1.5 \), an FPE equilibrium exists for all \( F \in [20.22, 22.44] \).

\(^{33}\) To prove the uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium at \( E \), consider first the part of Figure 5 where \( B_A < -H_{AA} \) and \( B_B < -H_{BB} \). Here, there are four location equilibria, \((\emptyset, \emptyset), (A, \emptyset), (B, \emptyset)\) and \((A, B)\), and for all bid pairs the location equilibrium is unique. Country \( A \) could profitably deviate from any candidate equilibrium point in \((\emptyset, \emptyset)\) or \((B, \emptyset)\) by setting \( B_A = -H_{AB} + \epsilon \); this would increase both \( A \)'s consumer surplus and \( A \)'s tax revenue. Likewise, country \( B \) could profitably deviate from any point in \((\emptyset, \emptyset)\) or \((A, \emptyset)\) (e.g., by setting \( B_B = -H_{BA} + \epsilon \)). Lastly, note that point \( E \) is the only possible bidding equilibrium in \((A, B)\) because, at all other points, at least one country can profitably deviate by increasing its tax without affecting the firms’ locations.

If, in Figure 5, \( B_A > -H_{AA} \) or \( B_B > -H_{BB} \), the problem of isolating bidding equilibria becomes identical to that tackled in section 3.3.3 below. In section 3.3.3 we show that no bidding equilibrium exists in this part of bid space for \( n < n^* \).

\(^{34}\) Of course, \( n^* < n^\pi \) is not surprising. When \( n \approx n^\pi \), the vertical parts of the \( BR_A \) and \( BR_B \) plots almost coincide, and country \( B \) can attract both firms with only a very small cut in its tax from its level at \( E \).
investment by one of the firms while imposing an FPE tax of $\Pi_{AB} = \Pi_{BA}$. Thus, rather than the firm being given a subsidy that exhausts all of the aggregate benefits to the host country (increased consumer surplus and profits) from its investment under monopoly, the shift in bargaining power to the host governments under duopoly results in their capturing all of the gains.

If $n > 1$, the geographical advantage enjoyed by country $A$ allows it to reduce its subsidy to the monopolist and still attract the investment, but qualitatively the result is the same under symmetry, in that the firm essentially has the upper hand in choosing where to invest. Under duopoly, as long as $n$ is not “too large”, FPE still occurs with the allocation of gains being biased in favour of the larger country. What happens when $n$ does become “too” large is the focus of the next subsection.

### 3.3.3 Competing for the duopoly: the large $n$ case

If $n$ is large then locating in the larger market becomes more of an imperative for both firms despite the more intense competition that would result. We illustrate the equilibrium locations in Figure 6.35

We concentrate our search for bidding equilibria outside the region where $BR_A = \emptyset$ (i.e. we exclude bid pairs with $B_A < -\Pi_{AA}$ and $B_B < -\Pi_{BA}$) because no bidding equilibria exist there. We would expect country $A$ to be host to at least one of the firms. The

---

35 These locations are independent of whether the upward-sloping component of $BR_{\emptyset}$ lies above or below that of $BR_B$.

36 This can be straightforwardly shown. With “large” $n$, four location equilibria exist in the region of bid space where $BR_A = \emptyset$: $(\emptyset, \emptyset), (A, \emptyset), (B, \emptyset)$ and $(B, B)$. The location equilibrium associated with a bid pair such that $BR_A = \emptyset$ is, in general, unique (whether this is always so depends on the position of the $B_A$-intercept of $BR_{\emptyset}$ relative to $BR_B$, although uniqueness is not important); and in the particular case where no pure-strategy location equilibrium under simultaneous moves by firms exists, we use the intuitively-appealing
Figure 6: Bidding equilibrium in the large $n$ case

question is whether the size differential is now sufficiently large (compared to the small $n$ case) to result in both firms being persuaded to invest in the larger country. We consider first country $A$’s best bidding responses; country $B$’s can be derived by straightforward analogy.

For $B_B > -\Pi_{BA}$, country $A$ will, in setting $B_A$ in response to $B_B$, be choosing between three location pairs, $(A,A)$, $(A,B)$ and $(B,B)$.\footnote{Note, in particular, that if bid pairs where $BR_A = \emptyset$ are excluded, then both firms always enter the industry for all remaining bid pairs.} Moreover, of all $B_A$ that induce the firms to choose $(A,A)$, country $A$ strictly prefers setting $B_A$ just above $BR_A$ (i.e., such that $B_A = B_B - \Delta + \varepsilon$) because this maximizes the revenue from its two-firm tax base. Likewise, of all $B_A$ that produce $(A,B)$ as locations, country $A$ strictly prefers setting $B_A$ just above $BR_B$ (i.e. such that $B_A = B_B - \Theta + \varepsilon$), which maximizes tax revenue from the firm it attracts. Because it collects no tax revenue under $(B,B)$, country $A$ is indifferent between sequential-moves equilibrium. From the NLD assumption, note that $BR_A = \emptyset$ implies that $B_A, B_B < 0$. Therefore, no bidding equilibria are possible with locations $(\emptyset, \emptyset)$, $(B, \emptyset)$ or $(B,B)$ because country $A$ could profitably deviate, increasing both tax revenue and consumer surplus, to $B_A = -\Pi_{AA} + \varepsilon$ (i.e. just inside the $(A,A)$ region). Likewise, no bidding equilibrium is possible with locations $(A,\emptyset)$ because country $B$ could profitably deviate to $B_B = -\Pi_{BA} + \varepsilon$ (i.e. just inside the $(A,B)$ or $(B,B)$ regions).
all $B_A$ that attract no firms.

The value to country $A$ of attracting one firm given that the second firm chooses $B$, that is $A$’s valuation of $(A, B)$ over $(B, B)$, is

$$V_A^1 \equiv n (S_{LF} - S_{FF}), \quad (24)$$

which measures the increase in country $A$’s consumer surplus if one of the two firms jumps from $B$ to $A$. The smallest “price” $A$ would have to pay in order to tempt one of the firms away from $B$ is $B_A = B_B - \Theta + \varepsilon$ (i.e., $B_A$ just above $BR_B$). This price is strictly less than $B_B$ because $A$’s market enjoys a geographical advantage in having a larger market than that of $B$ and consequently $\Theta > 0$. Therefore, $A$ will optimally bid one firm away from $B$ if and only if its valuation exceeds the price. This can be expressed in terms of $\overline{B_B}$, the maximum bid that country $B$ could make that still makes it just worthwhile for $A$ to attempt to grab one firm:

$$B_B < \overline{B_B} \equiv V_A^1 + \Theta. \quad (25)$$

The value to country $A$ of attracting both firms away from $B$, rather than just one, is $A$’s valuation of $(A, A)$ over $(A, B)$:

$$V_A^2 \equiv n (S_{LL} - S_{LF}) - (\Theta - \Delta). \quad (26)$$

The first term of (26) is the increase in $A$’s consumer surplus. The second, $(\Theta - \Delta) > 0$, is the extra bid payment $A$ must make (or taxes that it must forego) in order to attract the firm under $(A, B)$.\footnote{The presence of the term in $(\Theta - \Delta)$ in $V_A^2$ follows from our assumption that the countries cannot, in setting their bids, discriminate between the firms. If $A$ bids more to attract an additional firm, its bid payments to the firm already hosted must rise by the same amount (the countries are “oligopsonists” in the market for firms). In the present model, there is no obvious basis for discrimination. Discrimination might} The price $A$ must pay to attract the second firm away from $B$ is
\( B_A = B_B - \Delta + \varepsilon \) (i.e., \( B_A \) just above \( BR_A \)). Therefore, \( A \) will optimally bid the second firm away from \( B \) if and only if its valuation exceeds the price. Writing this in terms of \( B_B \), the maximum bid that \( B \) could make that still makes \( A \) to attempt to get the second firm, yields:

\[
B_B < B_B \equiv V_A^2 + \Delta.
\]

The critical values \( V_A^1, V_A^2 \) and associated bids \( B_B, B_B \) are shown in Figure 6, where \( R_A \) is country \( A \)'s best response function. It is straightforward (but tedious) to show that \( V_A^1 > V_A^2 \) (i.e. diminishing “marginal utility”) and \( B_B > B_B > 0 \). Therefore, on \( B_B \in (-\Pi_{BA}, B_B) \), \( A \)'s best response is to bid just above \( BR_A \), inducing \((A, A)\); on \( B_B \in (B_B, B_B) \), it is to bid just above \( BR_B \), inducing \((A, B)\); and on \( B_B > B_B \), \( A \) optimally bids \( V_A^1 \), inducing \((B, B)\).

Repeating the preceding analysis for country \( B \) produces \( R_B \), \( B \)'s best response function, which is qualitatively identical to \( R_A \). By analogy with the four critical values derived above, we get

\[
V_B^1 \equiv (S_{LF} - S_{FF}), \quad (27)
\]

\[
\overline{B_A} \equiv V_B^1 + \Delta, \quad (28)
\]

\[
V_B^2 \equiv (S_{LF} - S_{FF}) - (\Theta - \Delta), \quad (29)
\]

\[
B_A \equiv V_B^2 - \Theta. \quad (30)
\]

\begin{itemize}
\item be thought likely if the firms arrived sequentially (so bids could be “dated”). However, in that case, the location pattern derived here would remain an equilibrium (with \( A \) paying \( V_A^1 \) for the second firm and .... - NEED TO FINISH!)
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item Although country \( A \)'s social welfare is the same for all \( B_A \) beneath \( BR_B \), our assumption that countries never post weakly dominated bids rules out all \( B_A > V_A^1 \) in response to \( B_B > B_B \).
\end{itemize}
In particular, note that country $A$’s valuations of both a first and a second firm are higher than those of $B$ (i.e., for all $n > 1$, $V_A^1 > V_B^1$ and $V_A^2 > V_B^2$). The sole reason for this is that (for a given number of firms already hosted) $A$ gains more in aggregate consumer surplus by attracting an additional firm than does $B$. For a given bid posted by the other country, the prices to $B$ of one or two firms are both higher than those faced by $A$ (because country $A$ has the advantage of being able to offer the firms a larger local market). However, the premium that must be paid to attract both firms rather than just one is the same for both countries and equal to $(\Theta - \Delta)$.

A bidding equilibrium exists at point $D$ in Figure 6 if and only if $V_A^2 > \overline{B}_A$ (or, equivalently, $B_B > V_B^1$). In this equilibrium, country $A$ attracts both firms, country $B$ offers a subsidy equal to $V_B^1$, and country $A$ trumps this with a tax just less than $-\overline{B}_A$. The existence condition $V_A^2 > \overline{B}_A$ holds if and only if

$$n > \frac{12 (\alpha - w) + 5\tau}{12 (\alpha - w) - 17\tau}.$$ 

It is straightforward to show that this condition is less restrictive than the definition of large $n$, $n > \pi$ in (14). Therefore, for all “large” $n$, a bidding equilibrium exists at point $D$ in Figure 6. However, we can also show that the existence condition above is incompatible with the existence condition from the small $n$ case, $n < n^*$ in (23). Given that no bidding equilibrium can exist in Figure 6 where $BR_A = \emptyset$, the equilibrium at $D$ is unique if and only if $V_A^1 > \overline{B}_A$ (or, equivalently, $\overline{B}_B > V_B^2$). This condition holds for all $\tau > 0, n \geq 1$. Therefore, the equilibrium at point $D$ is indeed unique.

In summary, when $n$ is large enough, in the sense that we have previously defined, the equilibrium of the international competition is characterized by both firms being attracted
to the larger country, where their investments are taxed despite the offer of a subsidy from the smaller country.

4 Conclusions and Extensions

This paper examines the competition between rival governments to attract the foreign direct investment of two firms from the same industry. The existence of trade costs between the two countries confers benefits on consumers in a host nation, as the marginal cost of servicing the local market is less than that of exporting. Firms are attracted by larger markets as well as any fiscal inducement offered by the host government. We compare our results to those of Haufler and Wooton (1999) whose focus was on the competition for a single, monopolist firm.

The presence of an additional firm makes a startling difference in the distribution of benefits between host and firm. When the two countries are of equal size, the monopoly situation is characterized by a “race to the bottom” in taxes, with the winning country offering a subsidy to the firm that extracts all of the benefit to the nation of being the host. In contrast, when the two governments are bidding for the investment of two firms, each will attract one in equilibrium while charging a tax that fully extracts the firm’s profits. If the sizes of the two countries are sufficiently different, the larger nation will be able to attract the investment of both firms and, in a result reminiscent of that of Haufler and Wooton (1999), the host will tax both firms despite the smaller country’s preparedness to subsidize any investment within its borders,

**Formal statement of our results:** We have isolated all the game’s bidding equilibria for $n \geq 1$. Qualitatively, we found two types of equilibrium to exist, and bidding equilibria
(if they exist) are always unique. For relatively small differences in relative country size \( n \) (and with appropriate levels of \( \tau, F \)), an FPE equilibrium exists: one firm locates in each country and all their profits are taxed away. For greater size differentials, a co-location equilibrium exists: both firms locate in the larger country and are taxed. The definitions of “small” and “large” \( n \) are mutually exclusive; in between, no bidding equilibrium (in pure strategies) exists.

**Generalizations:** Seems clear that our small \( n \) result will readily generalize to settings with \( m \) host countries and \( m \) firms, \( m > 2 \). (Of course, there is the open issue of how to model size asymmetries with more than two countries.) The analysis of the large \( n \) case should be generalizable to more than two firms (but sticking with two host countries). We should always be able to find a sufficiently large \( n \) such that (i) country \( A \) attracts all the firms; (ii) country \( B \) bids its valuation for one firm; and (iii) country \( A \) just trumps \( B \). I would expect this critical \( n \)-value (i.e. the minimum size asymmetry necessary for the existence of a bidding equilibrium where all firms co-locate in the larger country and are taxed) to be increasing in the number of firms.

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